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Abstract 
State-Business relations play a significant part in the study of politics of Hong Kong. . After the 
handover in 1997, controversies about the so-called "State-Business collusion" created political 
turmoil, although few commentators have knowledge about State-Business relations. This is also a 
significant issue in political theories, as political theorists disagreed about the degree of state autonomy 
under business influence. In the scenario of Hong Kong, while some scholars argued that the polity of 
Hong Kong is a synarchy of bureaucrats and business elites, some suggested that it is a bureaucratic 
state. Existing empirical evidence is insufficient to provide conclusive answers to these debates. 
To figure out how the state interacted with the business sector, we would need to measure the 
relative power of these two parties. The study tried to estimate the decision-making power of the state 
and the business sector using the technique of social network analysis. The methodology has been used 
in the study of politics for decades, and it enables analyses to be conducted while official data are 
limited. Following the conclusion of Burt's (2005) network studies on social capital, the sum of 
brokerage and closure of social actors within a social network was used as the indicator of power. In 
the study, Executive Councilors were treated as representatives of the state or the business sector within 
the central decision-making body of Hong Kong, and their brokerage and closure were scored. The sum 
of the scores was used to estimate the relative power of the state and the business. 
It was found that business influence on politics, after a period of state-business synarchy, had 
declined significantly since late 1980s. Although businessmen dominated official posts in the 
government in the first few years after the handover, their rule remained ineffective, and bureaucrats 
resumed control after a series of legitimacy crises. The decline of business influence was associated 
with the fragmentation of business community, which was a result of changing economic structures, 
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Chapter 1. Concern on State-Business Relations 
1.1. Introduction: Political Debates on State-Business Relations 
The issue of State-Business relations became highly sensitive after the establishment of 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). The public was increasingly suspicious of the 
fairness of policy decisions, particularly in those policies involving business interest. Accusations 
of state-business collusion triggered several political events, which drove the government towards 
the edge of legitimacy crisis. 
The increasing suspicion towards state-business relations could be reflected in certain 
opinion polls. When respondents were asked to evaluate the political influence of the business 
sector in 1993, around one-fifth of them believed that the business lacked political influence. When 
the same question was asked nine years after the establishment of SAR, less than one-tenth of 
respondents shared the same opinion. The proportion of those who saw the business as too powerful 
had a slight increase of around 6%. The attitude towards business influence upon the state was 
increasingly negative after the handover of sovereignty of Hong Kong (Table 1.1). 
In a survey conducted in 2006, 82.4% of the respondents believed that the government 
provided material interests to business leaders, and 44.1% of the respondents considered the 
condition severe. Some 46.7% of the respondents believed that the business sector was anti-
Table 1.1. Public Opinion Regarding Political Influence of the Business Sector 
1993 2006 Change in Percentage 
T u 135 592 丄广，… 
Too much (52.33%) (59.08%) +6.750/� 
Moderate (25^97%) (3L54o/o) +5.57% 
56 94 
Too Little (21.710/0) (9.38%) -丨】.]。/。 
258 1002 
(100%) (100%) 
X2-29.89, df^2, p<0.0001 
Source: Lau et al 1995, Wong and Zheng 2006 
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democratic as they were too interest-orientated. Some 56.8% of the respondents even thought that 
business leaders did not have any respectable characters (Wong and Zheng 2006). In short, in the 
eyes of the public the business sector was politically superior while morally inferior. 
In several occasions, this suspicious mood deteriorated into political conflict. In February 
2005, Legislative councilor Emily Lau raised a motion against state-business collusion (Ming Pao, 
2/2/2005, A04). The debate soon escalated into a public controversy, and the political atmosphere 
became so tense that even politicians in the pro-government camp initiated their own attacks on the 
business sector (Ming Pao, 19/2/2005, A13). The government was fortunate as resentment did not 
progress further, thanks to the resignation of Tung Chee Hwa, the chief executive, in March 2005, 
which distracted public attention (Ming Pao, 11/3/2005). The motion was in effect a threat of vote 
of no-confident which was triggered by the scandals in Cyberport and Hung Horn Peninsular. 
The idea of Cyberport was initiated by Richard Li, the chairman of Pacific Century 
Cyberworks (PCCW), who is also the son of Li Kar Shing, a local tycoon. In January 1999, Richard 
Li made a proposal to build an information technology center in Pok Fu Lam, which successfully 
attracted the attention from the Chief Executive (Ming Pao, 21/1/1999, B02). Within a few months, 
the government decided to initiate the Cyberport project without much public consultation, and the 
plan was implemented through a joint-venture with PCCW which was formed without any prior 
open bidding (Ming Pao, 4/3/1999, B04). The public soon realized that one-third of the area in 
Cyberport would be used for real estate developments (Ming Pao, 6/3/1999, BOl). This infuriated 
many legislative councillors, and they demanded public bidding before the initiation of the project 
(Ming Pao, 19/3/1999, A03). The project became a sign of nepotism and favouritism, as the 
decision was made in a few months after Li Kar Shing openly criticized the investment environment 
in Hong Kong (Sing Tao Daily, 30/4/1999, A12). Despite fierce oppositions, the Legislative 
Council eventually approved the budget for Cyberport development, and the debate cooled down 
temporarily (Sing Tao Daily, 13/5/1999, A14). 
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The debate over business-government relations was brought back to the public agenda after 
the controversy over Hung Horn Peninsular arose. In response to a catastrophic drop in property 
price after the handover, the government halted the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS), a programme 
selling lower price housing to the lower middle class. The construction work of some HOS 
housings had just completed upon this announcement, and remained unoccupied for years. As a 
means to utilize these empty government properties, two of these unsold HOS estates, including 
Hung Horn Peninsular, were being sold to New World Development in 2003 (Sing Tao Daily, 
14/1/2003, A06). There were some initial criticisms as the selling price was found to be lower than 
the market price (Ming Pao, 22/1/2003, A07). The incident stirred up public resentment in 2004 
when New World Development decided to demolish the flats for redevelopment (Ming Pao, 
11/2/2004, AOS). Environmental groups criticized the decision as irresponsible, as it was an act of 
wasting which imposed a burden on the environment (Ming Pao, 11/2/2004, AOS; Sing Tao Daily, 
6/11/2004). The incident attracted the attention of legislative councillors, and they questioned the 
rationale behind the decision to sell Hung Horn Peninsular (Ming Pao, 18/2/2004, A06; 9/3/2004, 
A16). They raised the query of favouritism, as the government was eager to sell its property to a 
developer in a low price with no regard to the environmental impact. This resulted in a volatile 
debate which did not end before the conclusion of the year (Ming Pao, 6/12/1004, A06). Although 
the Secretary of Environment and Transportation Bureau eventually critized the plan, which led to 
its cancellation (Ming Pao, 14/12/2004, A06), the damage had already been done. Public sentiments 
against state-business collusion soon reminded the politicians about the incident in Cyberport. 
The public mood against State-Business collusion did not end with the fall of Tung, as the 
controversy about West Kowloon Cultural District spanned across the reign of two chief executives. 
The idea of building West Kowloon Cultural District was initiated by Tung, who announced the 
plan in the policy address of 1998 (Tung 1998, Paragraph 46). A public competition was held in 
2001, and the design of Foster and Partners, which covered the whole district with a giant canopy 
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(Ming Pao, 8/4/2002, A09), was adopted accordingly. The government planned to choose a single 
developer, who would also be assigned the right to run the facility for thirty years (Sing Tao Daily, 
21/3/2003, AOS), for the construction work (Sing Tao Daily, 29/4/2002, A04). The developer was 
allowed to diminish the maintenance cost by commercial and residential development in the 
area(Ming Pao, 21/10/2002, A02). However, it was soon discovered that only 29% of the area in the 
"cultural district" would be reserved for cultural facilities (Ming Pao, 6/9/2006, A06). The project 
was criticized as a sign of favouritism towards large real-estate developers. Since a large portion of 
the area could be used for real-estate development, many suspected the project was simply a plot 
which benefited the real-estate developers in the name of culture (Ming Pao, 28/10/2003, AOS). As 
Donald Tsang, the succeeding chief executive, was a senior official responsible for the project 
(Ming Pao, 12/1/2005, A09), the controversy became the first challenge in his term. Tsang 
succombed to public pressure and hinted that he would reconsider the method of bidding during the 
interregnum (Ming Pao, 3/6/2005, A10), and eventually the whole project was aborted for 
consultation and re-planning in 2006 (Ming Pao, 22/2/2006, A02). 
State-business relations remained a sensitive issue in Hong Kong. Accusations of 
favouritism towards the business and even conspiracy theories about business manipulations were 
common and influential. There were, however, very few empirical evidences that could verify or 
falsify these accusations. Some scholars even questioned whether there was increasing state-
business collusion after the handover (Yep 2004). In fact, particularism towards certain business 
firms was different from "state-business collusion". Such collusion could be said to exist only when 
businessmen as a group ruled the society hand-in-hand with state officials. This political 
controversy could hardly be resolved without further studies on the state-business relationship, the 
political power of the business, and their changes before and after the handover. 
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Table 1.2. Theories on State-Business Relations 
Cipher State Model Guardian State Model Partisan State Model 
State Autonomy The state acted according The state is able to balance The state is fully 
to societal needs societal force acted upon it autonomous and acted 
according to its own 
interest 
Business Influence Control the state as its As a major societal force Cannot impose its will on 
puppet influencing politics the state 
Elite Theories Radical elite theories Liberal Corporatist Model Autonomous State Mode! 
Marxist Theories Instrumentalist Model Functionalist Model Arbiter Model 
Pluralist Theories Deformed Polyarchy 
Model 
Source: Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987:327-31 
1.2. Theoretical debates on State-Business relations 
State-business relations in Hong Kong are worth studying as their significance is not limited 
to its effect on local politics. The problem of state-business relations is, in fact, the problem of state 
autonomy. When one is talking about the possibility of state-business collusion, one is concerned 
about the extent of business influence on politics. To put it another way, what we are going to ask is 
whether the state acts according to the will of the business, or whether the state is dependent on or 
autonomous from the business sector. 
The problem of state autonomy is a major dispute among political theories. According to 
Nordlinger (1981:9,11,27-38), there were at least three possibilities when the state encountered a 
dominant societal force, in our case the business sector. If the state is extremely weak, state officials 
can by no means have the ability to exert their preferences against societal demands. If the state is 
as powerful as societal forces, its officials can then act according to their own interest through 
persuasions. In the case where the state is much more powerful than its societal counterpart, state 
officials can act against the will of societal demands. The main theme of the debate is to determine 
which aforementioned possibility is closest to the reality. 
The controversies cannot be resolved by acknowledging the dominance of a particular 
group, say the business sector in our discussions, in state institutions. There are debates even among 
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Marxists, who undoubtedly recognized the dominant role of the business sector, or "capitalists" in 
their language, played in politics. There is no such thing that can be considered as a united Marxist 
theory, and even Marx himself did not have a clear and coherent theory on capitalist states. Some 
Marxists followed early Marx (1975:44-5) and see the matter of states as a non-issue, whereas some 
followed Gramsci (1971:206-76) and saw the state as a relatively autonomous and even neutral 
(Poulantzas 1973:44-50) mechanism in moderating class conflicts. Orthodox Marxist-Leninism saw 
the state as the ruling tool of the capitalists, while some other Marxists did not follow any of these 
mentioned theories (Jessop 1990:25-8). 
Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) examined a variety of state theories including Elite theories, 
Marxism, Pluralism and the New Right, and divided them into three different models according to 
their view about state autonomy (Table 1.2). In the cipher state model, the state is a weathervane 
controlled from the outside, and ultimate power lies outside the state. The state is weak while the 
environmental forces are strong. In the guardian state model, the state is an autonomous force 
capable of rebalancing the social pressure acted upon it. The state can be strong only when the 
societal forces are kept in balance. In the partisan state model, state officials advance for their own 
interest and act on their own behalf. The state remains strong even when it has to be confronted 
with oppositions (pp.327-33). 
In the case where the business is the most significant societal force, theories on state-
business relations can also be divided into these three models. We will have a brief review on these 
theories, which are originated from various schools of thought including Marxism, Pluralism and 
Elite theories, in the following sections. 
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1.2.1. Cipher State Models 
Some theorists describe the state as merely a puppet of the business sector. According to 
these cipher state models, the state apparatus works for the preferences of the business sector rather 
than that of its own. 
Radical elite theories are one of those theories which see the states as an instrument of 
prominent figures from the business sector. Major official positions in the state are said to be 
monopolized by the business or their loyal followers. C.Wright Mills (1956) suggested in The 
Power Elite, a classical text on American politics, that history making decisions in the United States 
were dominated by the power elite. They were a small and cohesive group of people including 
business conglomerates, the military and congressmen around the president. Domhoff (1967) 
moved a step further by concluding that the businessmen monopolized major political decisions. In 
his account, the input politics, including elections and advisory channels, were dominated by the 
business and facilitated firm control on political agendas. Through economic influences, the 
business sector became the only persons who could exert political power. 
This collided with some Marxist thoughts which consider the state as an apparatus of 
capitalists. According to these theories, state officials and politicians shared the same bourgeoise 
background as businessmen, and they formed a cohesive group which was able to exclude those 
anti-capitalists from office (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987:237-8). The theory of state monopoly 
capitalism, as an official ideology of some communist states, suggested that the development of 
capitalism would lead to conglomeration of corporations which would result in monopoly. This 
increased the political significance of the business sector, and the state would gradually fuse into 
those surviving conglomerates (Hardach and Karrass 1978). Despite their optimistic expectation on 
proletariat control through democratic means, Eurocommunists believed that capitalist states of 
their time were controlled by the business (Kautsky 1971:110). 
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Although pluralists are optimistic about the extent of democratic control in Western polities, 
their awareness on business influence increased after 1970，s (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987:272). 
They acknowledged the rise of large corporations would enable them to resist market force and 
manipulate economic development. The business sector could then use these newly acquired 
abilities to achieve political goals. Apart from threatening the state through economic means, large 
corporations could also control political parties and the lobbying process by providing resources to 
interest groups and politicians. They could also mold the public opinion by establishing mass media 
channels. These enabled the business to exclude those issues which pose a threat to business interest 
from political agendas (Lindblom 1977). These resulted in a deformed polyarchy in which 
democratic control was sacrificed for business interest. 
1.2.2. Guardian State Models 
In the guardian state models, the state is subjected to societal influences which can be 
balanced by state officials to a certain extent. The state is unable to act against societal demands, 
but it can influence public opinions and balance between different societal forces. The state cannot 
effectively impose its wills on societal actors, but it can fulfill its own interest by utilizing the 
cleavages between these actors. 
Theories belonged to these models include the liberal corporatist model in elite theory. 
According to this model, the state forms corporations with societal elites to facilitate its decision 
making process. On one hand, the state losses its institutional distinctiveness as elite from various 
sectors of the society exert their influence on their concerned policy area. This apparently put the 
state into the control of a variety of elites. On the other hand, despite being limited by these elites, 
the state is not simply a puppet. Through the guidances of discussions and negotiations between 
elites, as well as the coordination of elite from different sectors, state officials can control the 
agenda in the gaps between different elite (Schmitter 1974:111). In the corporatist system the state-
8 
business relations would become mutualistic. While a lot of elite enjoy the privileges of being 
represented in corporations, their participation in corporatist politics is also beneficial to the state. 
By appointing representatives to the corporations, the state can utilize the expertise of the elites and 
increase its legitimacy by showing its representativeness. The absorption of elite reduces their 
ability to oppose the state, and they can act as quasi-state agents to perform "dirty jobs" which are 
inappropriate for the state (Beer 1965). 
The vision of functionalist Marxists is also an example of the guardian state model. In these 
theories, the state enjoys autonomy from the direct control of capital as the result of the separation 
between economic, ideological and political structures (Dunleavy ad O'Leary 1987:331). The state 
often initiates resource redistribution so as to maintain the long term development of capitalism. In 
this case, the state works according to the long term interest of capitalists, while it has to be 
autonomous enough to resist the opposition from those capitalists suffering from short term losses. 
1.2.3. Partisan State Models 
Partisan state models regard the state as fully autonomous. The state and its officials can act 
according to its own preference, even when oppositions are encountered. 
The autonomous state model in elite theories suggests that the state is independent of 
societal force. Politics are dominated by politicians or civil servants, and the business sector does 
not have any roles to play (Krasner 1978). Based on historical studies, these theorists suggested that 
the state consolidated its power since the wake of modernity, as changes in international 
environment increased the necessity to prepare for wars and maintain the military. The situation 
enabled the state to have a firmer control over the business sector (Finer 1975). The state was also 
effective in resisting societal pressures, which could be achieved through propaganda, manipulation 
and coercion (Nordlinger 1981:92-4, 111-2, 130-2). 
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Those Marxists who recognized the complexity of modem capitalist states also saw the state 
as autonomous. Despite the existence of a dominant capitalist class, these Marxists suggested that 
the state defended its autonomy through accumulating support from various social classes 
(Poulantzas 1978). State officials are not members nor sympathizers of the business sector, and they 
keep institutional arrangements as class-neutral as possible. In some occasions there would be 
preferential treatments towards the business, but the state performed such act by its own decisions 
and for its own interest. The state would have to act according to the logic of capitalism, but it could 
disregard the interest of capitalists, and business interventions do not exist (Offe 1984). In spite of 
limitations imposed by the capitalist economy, the state could ignore oppositions from the business 
and adopt partial socialist reforms to safeguard its legitimacy. 
1.3. Theories of Hong Kong's situation 
Similar to its western counterpart, theories of state-business relations in Hong Kong can also 
be classified by the extent of state autonomy. Some theories emphasize the political influence 
exerted by societal groups led by the business, while some other theories stress the autonomy of the 
state which is composed of the governor and the civil service. 
1.3.1. Synarchy and Administrative Absorption 
The theory of administrative absorption of politics, which was proposed by Professor 
Ambrose King, is one of the most influential theories in the study of Hong Kong politics. 
According to King (2003:70), the relative political stability in Hong Kong was atypical in societies 
situated in a similar stage of urbanization. King suggested that the Hong Kong government was able 
to co-opt local elites into an administrative decision-making body, and he described the process as 
the administrative absorption of politics. 
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Although the governor in colonial Hong Kong was a de jure dictator, the political system in 
Hong Kong tried to maintain its legitimacy by seeking the consent from the ruled subjects. This 
resulted in a system of synarchy, a system of joint administration by British officials and local 
elites. Most of these local elites were businessmen who were ethnically Chinese. In the arrangement 
of synarchy, these local elites were invited to participate in various governmental bodies. Despite 
the fact that most of these bodies were advisory, some of them were decision-making bodies which 
included the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. Opinions from local elites were 
respected in the political process. As a result, new policies would avoid elite opposition and 
violations of local customs, while the elites reserved the right to initiate legislation (pp.73-4). 
As there were no full-time professional politicians in the colony, their roles were played by 
the bureaucrats in the civil service. Although the expatriates dominated the bureaucracy until the 
end of the colonial rule, the system recruited well-educated Chinese into the civil service. This 
arrangement absorbed intellectual elites into the administration. Self-help associations, formed by 
local elites, including Tung Wah Groups of Hospitals and Po Leung Kuk, played the role of gentry 
class in traditional Chinese society, and therefore served as agents of indirect rule. Honorary 
systems, consultative and advisory committees were a source of prestige and were useful in 
absorbing these elites into the administration (pp.77-9). After the riots in 1966 and 1967, the city 
district officer scheme was initiated as a means of political absorption in a more grass-root level 
(pp.81-2). According to King, while the colonial state had to share some power with local elites, 
this power-sharing guaranteed the loyalty from a possible source of opposition, and this gave the 
state the much needed legitimacy to implement its policies. These conclusions are similar to those 
proposed by liberal corporatist theory (Beer 1965), an example of guardian state model. 
Ian Scott (1989) analyzed the historical records of colonial Hong Kong and discovered 
several legitimacy crises throughout the history. These crises often had to be overcome by 
promising more power sharing to local elites, and most of them were prominent members in the 
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business sector. The colonial state encountered the challenge from these societal forces, and its 
autonomy would easily be hampered by the outbreak of crises. 
Hong Kong became the crown colony of Britain in the 1840s and served as a trading and 
military port. Businessmen from Britain expected lower tax rates and a more flexible land policy. 
Their demands resulted in political disputes which led to the first legitimacy crisis in Hong Kong. 
Since the colonial government adopted a minimalist policy which restricted its size and its 
expenditure, the state capacity was so weak that it could barely support its maintenance. The 
colonial state was also too weak to keep the disputes at bay, and the crisis eventually troubled 
London so much that the abandonment of this new colony was once considered. The colonial 
government resolved the crisis by formulating policies according to the interest of business elites 
(pp.39-41). The government also attempted to seek public support. Nonetheless, its expenditure 
could not support the provision of social welfare, and the task had to be fulfilled by the help from 
local and community elites. Missionaries and associations formed by Chinese elites became the 
city's social service provider, and the latter also became agents of indirect rule over Chinese citizens 
(pp-51-2). 
The weakness of the colonial government could be revealed in the process leading to the 
formation of sanitary board. This was proposed by the government in 1880 in response to the 
outbreak of epidemics. The bill was opposed by local elites including expatriates and Chinese. 
Finally, the bill could only be passed in 1902 after a series of lengthy and fierce debates (pp.52-3). 
Unofficial seats in the Legislative Council were dominated by businessmen, representatives of the 
chambers of commerce, who were mistrustful of colonial officials for their egalitarian tendencies. 
They desired a laissez-faire system and tried their best to monitor and control the finance of the 
colonial government (p.57). The fatigue of the colonial government confronted by the local elites 
rendered policy formulation slow and incremental. 
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In the 1890s, a group of local bourgeoisies, including Chinese elites, demanded political 
participation, and this triggered another legitimacy crisis. The colonial government responded by 
initiating the Lockhart reforms, which started to appoint business elites into the Executive Council, 
a decision-making body of the colonial state. Numerous advisory committees and salutatory bodies 
were formed to consult business elites in various policy areas. District watch committees were 
established to formalize the role of Chinese community elites (pp.59-61). The appointment of Sir 
Shouson Chau into the Executive Council in 1926 marked the increasingly significant role of 
Chinese elites in colonial politics (p.64). 
The influx of immigrants and industrial development after the war paved the way for a new 
legitimacy crisis. The existing system of representation was proven to be inadequate in the riots of 
1966 and 1967, in which demographic and economic changes led to the rise of new societal forces, 
and their discontent was not channeled (pp.79-80). The government responded by inviting elites 
from grass-root localities to join new advisory bodies, coordinated by the newly established city 
district office (p.107-9). Public opinions became the guidance of new policies which, best illustrated 
by the establishment of ICAC, provided performance legitimacy (p. 164). 
Leo Goodstadt (2005), the former head of Central Policy Unit during the last few years 
before the handover, described the siege mentality of expatriate colonial officials. They suffered 
from a sense of insecurity caused by the cultural barrier and racist sentiment against the Chinese 
majority (Goodstadt 2005:20-5). As a result, local business elites were chosen as the agent of 
indirect rule, so that the colonial officials could avoid contact with the general public (pp.34-5). 
The Chinese business elites won the trust from the colonial officers, because they helped the 
government to cope with the anti-colonial strikes in the 1920s. The colonial state relied on these 
elites so much that they were not punished for their betrayal during the Japanese occupation of 
Hong Kong (pp.99-102). There were tug-of-wars between the government and the business sector 
in the policy making process. Despite the government's autonomy in the issues of budget and 
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administration, the business sector manipulated industrial and commercial policies using their 
expertise. These interactions created the pro-business culture in the civil service (pp. 125-9). 
The business was anxious about their political privileges and rejected democratization as 
they feared confrontations (pp. 105-6). They therefore cooperated with Beijing to fight against the 
emerging democratic movement. Eventually the post-handover political arrangements ensured 
considerable business influences. By guaranteeing a large portion of seats in Selection Commitee 
and Election Committee, the business sector enjoyed bargaining power during the selection process 
of Chief Executives. The Chief Executive was likely to be someone pro-business, and the first Chief 
Executive was also a businessman himself. The introduction of principal officials accountability 
system (POAS) enabled business represetatives to be appointed as chief officials, and Goodstadt 
described it as an attempt to promote business domination by reducing the political role of civil 
servants (pp. 114-5). 
According to Anthony Cheung (2000), the new ruling elite of post-handover Hong Kong, 
which was dominated by business and professional sectors, were eager to surpass the achievements 
of the colonial administration. Such mentality was further strengthened by the need to seek for 
performance while Hong Kong experienced economic hardship after late 1990s. Besides, the 
institutional arrangement of post-handover Hong Kong allowed the business and professional 
sectors to decide on the selection of the Chief Executive and a large portion of seats in the 
Legislature. This made the government more suspectible to the demand from businessmen and 
professionals. As a result, the business-dominated ruling elite successfully acted against the advice 
of the bureaucrats, rejected the mininalist approach of colonial government and proposed a series of 
interventionalist policies. 
Alvin So (2000) rejected the notion that Hongkongers were powerless in front of the British 
government, the Chinese government and the local government. He suggested that societal forces in 
Hong Kong could often achieve their goal by forming strategic alliances with London, Beijing and 
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the local government of Hong Kong. By shifting alliances, the business sector successfully achieved 
their goal in blocking democratization, and dominated the politics of Hong Kong. However, So 
pointed out that the business domination was not absolute, as the democrats also attempted to form 
strategic alliances. Although the democrats failed to introduce democracy to post-handover Hong 
Kong, they secured a position in the semi-representative system in post-handover Hong Kong. The 
political picture of post-handover Hong Kong was thus characterized with the struggle between the 
business hegemony and influential pro-democratic opposition. 
1.3.2. Boundary Politics and Bureaucratic Politics 
Some other studies, however, emphasized the autonomy of the Hong Kong government. 
They included studies which delineated the anatomy of the colonial administration. John Rear 
(1971) stated that there was only "one brand of politics" monopolized by the bureaucracy. 
According to Rear, the absence of professional politicians in the territory forced the civil servants to 
play significant political roles. They adopted a bureaucratic stance in ruling Hong Kong. There was 
little transparency in administration. Besides, public discussions were discouraged. Unofficials in 
Executive and Legislative Council lacked a common ideology, so they failed to organize themselves 
into a consolidated oppositions. They were eager to co-operate with the colonial state for the sake of 
prosperity and stability. 
Peter Harris (1978) called Hong Kong an administrative state which was dominated by the 
administrative apparatus. The institutional design of the government imposed great power to the 
governor and colonial officials, and the role of unofficials was limited. Besides, local residents were 
only interested in maintaining their living, while politics was not considered important. This 
apolitical mood hampered political participation and prevented the rise of political figures. 
The latter part of Harris' argument was further illuminated by Lau Siu Kai's (1984) account 
of boundary and bureaucratic politics. As citizens in Hong Kong in postwar era were apolitical and 
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distanced themselves from the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy faced little opposition and thus 
dominated the politics of Hong Kong (p. 18-9). 
Most citizens in Hong Kong were influenced by the family-oriented Chinese culture. This 
traditional value was transformed by the structural condition of Hong Kong (p.83), and was unique 
in emphasizing the importance of material gains and social stability. Since most of them were 
economic refugees coming from the commercialized region of Guangdong, they produced a more 
materialized version of traditional Chinese values. The colony also lacked a gentry class to resist 
this trend of materialization. Residents in Hong Kong evaluated people and things in terms of 
material value. Consequently material wealth became the only source of social status. Most of them 
treated themselves as sojourners in the colony, and tried hard to fulfill their short term material 
desires (pp.68-70). 
Most of these Chinese citizens were victims of political turmoil in mainland China. They 
were thirsty for stability and were eager to compromise justice or national pride. Being influenced 
by the Chinese culture, they believed that only strong authority could prevent social conflicts and 
ensure social stability. They avoided violent actions against the political order for fear of disrupting 
the social order (p.71). 
These characters of Hong Kong citizens resulted in the local mentality of Utilitarian 
Familism. This local culture emphasized the economic role of the family. Chinese in Hong Kong 
have the obligation to assist their family members financially, in which this sort of assistance was 
treated as investments for mutual assistance (p.77). The family was regarded as the primary means 
of resource mobilization and redistribution (p.72). As a result, residents in Hong Kong put familial 
interests above everything and were uninterested in public issues. They also avoided political 
participation, as they worried that it could trigger social or political instability which would trouble 
their families. The sense of powerlessness and alienation was their common sentiment while facing 
public issues (p.74). 
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As a result, residents in Hong Kong treated the society as the instrument for familial 
economic gains (p.87). As their relation with the society is instrumental, they avoided interaction 
with those outside of their family in dread of conflicts with others (pp.90-1). They expected little 
from the society and optimistically believed in upward social mobility through personal efforts, 
which resulted in their lack of class consciousness (p.98). Hongkongers avoided contact with the 
state and disliked intervention from the government, and therefore they tried to obtain their needs 
through their family (p. 103). They had minimum expectations on the government and did not 
expect any concern from the government (p. 107). Political participation and polling rate remained 
low as a result (pp. 113-7). 
In contrast to the account of King (2003) or Scott (1989), Lau pointed out that local Chinese 
elites failed to pick up the role of political leadership. Under the influence of the materialistic ethos 
of the general public, local elite did not act as paternal protectors of the minors in accordance with 
Confucian ethics, as the gentry class did in traditional Chinese society. These local elite were 
businessmen lacking in administrative experience, and their linkage with the general public was 
weak (Lau 1984:123-4). The influence of traditional intermediate organizations, including kai-fong 
associations, clansman associations, chambers of commerce and charity organizations, declined 
after the war due to the rapid industrialization and modernization (p.133). These organizations were 
often confined in their locality. Accordingly, they were not well adapted to a complex society with a 
mobile population. Many intermediate organizations sustained their survival by government 
revenue and lost their ability to provide political leadership (pp.140-1). 
The ruling strategies of the bureaucracy in this apolitical city ensured its autonomy. The 
government also adopted paternalistic administration, acting like parents of the general public. 
Policy was made according to the public interest, and this enabled the government to win the 
consent of the majority (pp.29-32). This strategy effectively eliminated the desire for more political 
participation. The government also adopted a laissez-faire free-market policy which made economic 
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Table 1.3. Theories on State-Busines Relations in Hong Kong 
Cipher State Model Guardian State Model Partisan State Model 
Scott 1989 Rear 1971 
Cheung 2000 Harris 1978 
So 2000 Lau 1984 
King 2003 
Goodstadt 2005 
issues outside its jurisdiction, and adopted a low-profile approach in cultural issues. These strategies 
further reduced government's vulnerability to social conflicts (pp.42-3). The bureaucrats also shared 
a rational culture which was different from the particularistic local culture, and this esprit de corps 
separated them from the general public (p.29). All these factors contributed to a clear margin 
between the state and the society, and the two have little chance to interact except while necessary. 
As there was a lack in political leadership in a city with apolitical mood, the bureaucracy 
met little societal pressure, and this ensured their political neutrality. Accompanied by the absence 
of countercheck in the institution, the government which was led by the bureaucrats enjoyed full 
autonomy (p.28). 
1.4. Overview 
Theories on state-business relations in Hong Kong could also be classified according to their 
assessment of state autonomy, which is summarized in table 1.3. Rear (1971), Harris (1978) and 
Lau (1984) emphasized the automomy of the bureaucratic state. Their theories could be classified as 
a local counterpart of partisan state model. The theory of administrative absorption of politics (King 
2003) and Goodstadt's (2005) descriptions of state-business relations explained the presence of 
business influence over political issues. The state, however, was not merely a puppet of the 
business, as it was able to balance the business influence to a certain degree. Therefore we could 
safely classifiy these theories as guardian state models. The image of the state in Ian Scott's (1989) 
work was a dynamic one. During legitimacy crisis, the colonial state was quite impotent, and it 
often had to yield to business interest. However, when the crisis was solved, the state could be 
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relatively more independent of business demands. The colony was in general a guardian state, but it 
could be turned into a cipher state when there were undesirable changes in the political 
environment. Anthony Cheung (2000) and Alvin So (2000) also recognized the dominating role of 
the business sector in post-handover politics, while So also acknowledged the pro-democratic 
opposition as a significant societal force. 
None of the reviewed theories could provide a conclusive answer to the nature of state-
business relations in Hong Kong. Partially it is caused by the limitations of their 
empirical evidence. The empirical basis of the theory of administrative absorption (King 2003) 
came from a study on city district office, which was a peripheral part of the colonial state with little 
role in policy making. Lau Siu Kai (1984) drew his conclusion from a series of surveys of public 
attitudes, and there were few investigations concerning the state appartus. The studies of Rear 
(1971) and Harris (1978) focused on the de jure institutional arrangement, and this institutionalist 
bias hindered them from discovering the de facto power distribution. 
Ian Scott (1989) provided a detailed historical account of state-business relations, but he 
could only trace the trend up to mid-80s. Leo Goodstadt (2005) provided some first-hand 
information regarding the state-business relations from the 1990s onward. However, his identity as 
Chris Patten's advisor might affect the neutrality of his statements, and in fact his work looked like 
a memoir rather than a serious academic work. While Cheung (2000) demonstrated that business 
influence resulted in post-handover interventionist policies, judgements should not be made 
according to the outcome of a specific group of policies. Similarly, while So (2000) showed that the 
business sector successfully blocked the democratic progress, it only proved that the business sector 
did not passively accept the arrangement made by the state. There was not enough evidence to 
illustrate whether there was business domination or not. 
As mentioned by James Tang (1999), state-business relations in Hong Kong were influenced 
by economic ideology, institutional and policy framework, and the political envimoment. All these 
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factors experienced massive transformation after the handover. The minimalist ideology of the 
colonial government competed with the interventionist ideology of the business elites. New 
institutions like the Election Committee were being introduced into post-handover political system, 
while the economic crises hampered the legitimacy of the post-handover government. This 
indicated a throughout reassessment of post-handover state-business relations. Although we have 
reviewed several theories discussing the post-handover situation, their scope of concern and 
empirical basis were limited. According to the comment of a local political scientist, researches on 
post-handover state-business relations remained inadequate (Ma 2007: 27). Futher studies about the 
issue are thus justified. 
In conclusion, state-business relations in Hong Kong, while being an academically 
significant issue, have attracted a lot of public concern. Existing empirical evidence, however, is 
largely inadequate. This unfortunate fact justifies the initiation of a new round of research. Our 
reaserch attempted to solve this academic controversy by measuring the power of the state and the 
business, as well as the changes throughout the handover process. Discussions about the research 
methodology will begin in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2. Power and Network 
2.1. The Problem of Power 
The study of State-Business relations, in short, is the measurement and comparison of the 
relative power of the state and the business. The measurement of power, however, is a controversial 
issue in the study of politics. In colloquial language, the meaning of the term "power" is ambiguous. 
The term can refer to one's asset and ability, while it can also denote one's relative influence in a 
social setting. A precise definition is needed before we can study power in a scientific manner. 
The definition made by Max Weber is one of the most widely accepted definitions among 
social scientists (0mm 1989:132). According to Weber, "power is the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152)." The concept of power can 
be understood as “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social 
action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action (Weber 1968:962)." 
According to Weber, power is a property embedded in social relations. One cannot exert his 
power without social relations. Furthermore, the ruler and the ruled must be connected through 
social interactions. Power is the ability of an actor, or a group of actors, to alter the behaviour, 
which must be social actions, of others so that the latter would act in compliance with the wish of 
the former. Such influence supersedes the will of the latter, but the definition does not assume their 
willingness or unwillingness. Besides, the definition also does not limit the ways which the former 
used to alter the latter's behaviour, even if they are coercive measures. 
Despite the general agreement of this definition by most scholars, controversies arose when 
they tried to identify those people who could have a better chance to realize their own will. The 
debate was triggered by a series of studies which claimed to have identified a group of elite who 
monopolized the decision making process. 
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2.2. Dahl and His Critques 
The Pluralist-Elitist debate originated in post-war America, while Americans worried that 
the democractic process was being manipulated by a small number of elites. Such worries could be 
illustrated by President Eisenhower's farewell speech which urged the Americans to "guard against 
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial 
complex (Eisenhower 1960:1035-40)." The debate became academically important as a result of 
two studies concerning the elite influence. Floyd Hunter (1953) concluded that the business elites 
dominated the politics of Atlanta in his study which became controversial owing to the reputation 
method it adopted. At the beginning, Hunter set up a 14-person panel, which was composed of 
upper-middle class citizens who were knowledgeable about their city. Each of these panel members 
would name 10 people who were considered politically influential. A name list consisting of 175 
persons was then generated, and 40 persons who received most votes were invited for an interview. 
Among these 40 people, 27 were eventually interviewed and asked who the leader of the town was. 
Those being named as the leader in these interviews came from a small group of elite who shared a 
similar social background. Hence, as suggested by Hunter, this indicated community issues in 
Atlanta were monopolized by local elites. 
A few years later, C. Wright Mills (1956) published his classical thesis on the power elite. 
The research was done at national level, and it revealed that American politics was dominated by a 
few interconnected groups of elites, mainly consisting of the military, the business sector as well as 
congressmen. Mills defined the power elite as those occupying important positions and enjoying 
nationwide prestiges (p.83). Those people with good status taking important positions were 
assumed as decision-makers. He echoed with Eisenhower's notion of military-industrial complex, 
and suggested that the interest of this power elite was the cause of the worsening international 
relations during the Cold War (Mills 1959). 
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These studies tried to prove the existence of manipulating elites, but their methodologies 
were shown to be problematic. Hunter discovered the power elite in Atlanta by identifmg the most 
reputable persons in the city, while Mills defined the power elite as those occupying important 
positions. However, as Weber already pointed out, prestiges and official positions were not 
necessarily associated with power (Gerth and Mills 1946:180-1). Besides, Mills assumed the power 
elite, consisting of members from various bacgrounds, was a united group of actors. It seemed that 
Mills attributed this to their similar class backgrounds (Bottomore 1990:25-6), but he failed to 
explain how similarities in class backgrounds would led to the formation of a well-organized group 
of political actors. 
Pluralists believed that the power distribution in the United States was more egalitarian and 
they disagreed with the conclusions of the Elite theorists. Robert Dahl (1958) was one of the most 
vocal pluralists who denounced the ruling elite model as unfalsifiable and unjustified. According to 
Dahl, the ruling elite could be said to exist only if we could prove that they were a well-defined 
group whose members would act in a coherent manner. The ruling elite model was valid only if the 
preferences of this ruling elite were more likely to result in policies. Dahl suggested that this had to 
be achieved through studying the decision-making process. 
As stated in Dahl's definition, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl: 1957:202-3)." Power was not measurable if there 
was no difference of preferences between different actors. If B acted according to the wishes of A 
without contradicting his own will, it was not an exertion of power in Dahl's definition. In this 
definition, the amount of power pocessed by A could be measured by the difference between the 
possibility that B performed a certain act following the command of A, and the possibility that B 
performed the same act without the command of A (p.205). Based on this methodology, Dahl 
(1961) examined the decision-making process in New Haven, proving the pluralist view which 
claimed a relatively egalitarian pattern of power distribution. 
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This pluralist account of power, however, provoked its own critiques. Dahl's methodology 
assumed the presence of conflicts with observable behaviour, as well as the difference of 
preferences among actors, during the exertion of power. In practical terms, Dahl designed the 
methodology for studies on democratic state, which may not be feasible in authoritarian societies 
like Hong Kong, because information about political conflicts and political preferences is often too 
sensitive (Dahl 1958:468). Critics also attacked the basic assumptions of this methodology. Some 
scholars suggested that political conflicts may occur without any observable actions. Real-life 
politics does not only involve conflicts, but also the selection of conflicts through mobilization of 
bias (Schattschneider 1960:71). They pointed out that power-holders could alter the agenda in 
decision-making process, so that they could prevent undesirable outcomes before conflicts could 
have a chance to emerge (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Steven Lukes (2006) described it as the 
second face of power, which saw power as the ability to set the agenda of the political process. 
Lukes himself suggested a third face of power through ideological manipulation. Power-holders 
could alter the preferences of their subjects by manipulating their knowledge and beliefs (Lukes 
2006:56-7). Dahl's methodology would therefore ignore those possible latent conflicts that would 
never be manifested bahaviorally, thus underestimate the potency of power-holders. Besides, since 
the basic assumptions of Dahl's model were deduced from models of individual interactions, this 
methodological individualism was criticized as ignoring the fact that power was often exerted 
collectively through organizations (p.55). 
The Pluralist-Elitist debate remained unresolved for decades as neither pluralists nor elite 
theories could show the way to study the reality of power. The pluralists failed to acknowledge the 
presence of informal power structure, and this hampered the explanatory power of their theories. 
Eventually many of them had to shift their position decades later by acknowledging the influence of 
the business could be much greater than what they previously found (Dahl 1982). On the other 
hand, the processes of agenda setting and ideological manipulation were latent in nature, and the 
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information about these processes was difficult to obtain. While theories about the second and the 
third faces of power provided powerful critiques against the pluralists, their questionable 
falsifiability showed that they were not feasible alternative methodologies (Galaskiewicz 
1979:131). This resulted in a deadlock in the study of power over decades. 
2.3. Power and Networks 
The rise of social network analysis in the 1970s threw light on the issue of power. This 
emerging school of thought sees the society as a network, in which nodes representing social actors 
are linked together through edges which represent inter-relationships, resulting in a web-like social 
structure. The social structure can be understood as the product from the interaction between the 
relations among actors and the position of each individual actor. The information is analysed with 
the help of mathematical models such as graph theory (Berkowitz 1982:1-3). This perspective was 
introduced to the study of politics. Similar to other social structures, political system could also be 
considered as networks composed of sets of direct and indirect social ties between political actors 
from various social positions (Laumann and Pappi 1976:6). Political behaviour, perceptions and 
attitudes of political actors, and the whole system are explained in terms of the structure of social 
connections, i.e., network positions of social actors (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982:13, Knoke 1990:8-
9). 
Social network analysts realize the fact that the exertion of power is often a collective 
action. Power-holders do not only use their own resources for this purpose, as they often need to 
mobilize resources from their allies. They also realize that power could function even before any 
observable conflicts, and behavioral changes could be a result of a potential alliance rather than an 
actual one. Accordingly, power is the result from the mobilization of resources in a social structure 
through coalitions and potential coalitions (Galaskiewicz 1979:130-2). 
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Table 2.1. The Identification of Those Persons with Power 
Method of identification Rationales Criticisms 
Those reputed as influential are Reputation and prestige are not 
persons with power necessarily associated with power 
(Gerth and Mills 1946:180-1) 
Those occupying important official These positions are occupied by a Official and constitutional positions 
positions are persons with power group of elite sharing similar social are not necessarily associated with 
background (Mills 1956:83) power (Gerth and Mills 1946:180-1) 
Those who have their preference Power is not measurable in the Conflicts of preference could be 
won in decision-making process are absence of conflicts of preference. prevented by manipulation of agenda 
persons with power (Dahl 1957) One who acts according to his own (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). 
will is not under the power of others. Preference in itself could be a 
product of manipulation (Lukes 
2006). 
Those who have a better centrality in Those in the center are linked with Empirical evidence suggested that 
the political network are persons various parts of social structure, so the correlation between centrality 
with power that they could receive more and power could be lost in some 
information and mobilize more network structures (Cook et. al. 
resources. This facilitates their 1983, Bonacich and Roy 1986, 
influence or coercion (Freeman Mizruchi and Potts 1998). 
1977, 1979). 
Those who have both brokerage and Brokerage and closure are found to 
closure in the political network are be associated with one's ability to 
persons with power increase his opportunity by 
mobilizing network resources, i.e., 
social capital, while the network 
conceptions of power and social 
capital are similar (to be discussed in 
2.4.2 and 2.4.3). 
The resources that could be mobilized through political networks include information and material 
goods. One may transmit information to other actors to alter their actions, while they could also 
control other's behaviour through the provision of or withholding material goods (Knoke 1990:3-4), 
or simply by the threat of doing so (Oliver 1980). These strategies are not mutually exclusive, and 
they often coexist in real-life situations. Beneficial network positions in communication networks 
facilitate political influence through transmission of information. Actors occupying these positions 
are known to benefit more from social contagion and innovation diffusion (Granovetter 1978), 
political propaganda (Weimann 1982), interest representation in political system (Eulau 1986:179-
204) as well as the mobilization of collective actions (Laumann and Knoke 1987:206-48). It is also 
known that the occupation of advantaged network positions could enable social actors to control the 
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flow of material goods in social structures. This facilitates their ability to impose sanctions on 
others (Tichy and Fombrun 1979, Bacharach and Lawler 1980:203-23). As a result, social network 
analysts proposed a brand new methodology in the measurement of power: those occupying better 
network positions enjoyed more power, becausae they were more likely to realize their will. 
The perspective of social network analysis contributed to community power studies and 
accumulated a range of empirical support. People and organizations occupying an advantaged 
network position with seemingly better reputations in communities tended to be more active in 
community controversies. Most importantly, they were more likely to achieve the desired outcome 
in community policies (Galaskiewicz 1989). In an early study which focused on the German town 
of Altneustadt, it was revealed that organizations with higher influence reputation were more likely 
to achieve the desired outcome. The winning side of five community controversies could be 
predicted by the influence reputation of the organizations. It seems that the study repeated the 
problem of Hunter's (1953) widely criticized study, but it also revealed that influence reputation 
was 5 derived from the actor's network position towards the center of the network. The study 
therefore suggested an indirect link between actors' network position and their ability to fulfill their 
will in community events (Laumann and Pappi 1976:99). Later studies proved the correlation 
between one's network position and his ability to achieve the desired outcome. For example, in 
Galaskiewicz's (1979:151) study of an American city code-named as Towertown, it was shown that 
the linkages of resource inflow and outflow could significantly explain the success of certain 
community organizations in four community events. This association remained intact after 
statistical control of the funds, personnel and purposes of community organizations. 
The network perspective was shown to be useful in studies at national level as well. 
Laumann, Knoke and Kim (1987) studied the national energy and health policies in the United 
States. The power of organizations involved in these policies was predicted by a modified version 
of Coleman's (1973) exchange model. In this model, the power of an organization would be 
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predicted by their resource exchange relationship with other organizations. The model could 
accurately predict the outcome of fourteen out of sixteen, i.e., 87.5%, of controversies in health and 
energy policies (Laumann, Knoke and King 1987:362-3). The study of national policies through 
network perspective continued in the emerging school of policy network approach (Marsh 1998). 
The use of social network analysis was advocated by a number of scholars of the school (Marin and 
Mayntz 1991). Even the skeptics within the school acknowleged the role of the analysis in the study 
of policy networks (Dowding 1995:158). 
Social network analysis would not give us information about decision-making, agenda-
setting or ideological control, as the main purpose of this methodology was to measure the network 
position of different political actors. Apparently this repeated C. Wright Mills' (1956) mistake in 
measuring one's power through their positions, but there is a significant difference between the 
measurement of official positions and that of network positions. While performing social network 
analysis, we focused on the structure of social relations rather than the hierarchy of official 
positions. It was known that decison-making and agenda-setting were carried out through social 
relations (Dahl 1957:203, Bachrach and Baratz 1963:633), while those who occupied good network 
positions could have a better chance to exert ideological control (Weimann 1982). As a result, by 
understanding the structure of social relations we could estimate the extent of all three faces of 
power. Besides, social networks extend beyond political institutions, and these are often hidden 
before social network analysis is available. Applying social network analysis in the study of power 
allows us to investigate into latent manifestations of power which were hidden beneath official 
hierarchies and regulations, and eliminates the risk of resorting to conspiracy theories. 
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2.4. Power, Brokerage and Closure 
2.4.1. Centrality and Power 
While most Social Network Analysts agreed that power should be understood in terms of 
social network, the problem of choosing a network characteristic as the indicator of power was less 
straightforward. Early studies (e.g. Harry, Norman and Cartwright 1965, Rogers 1974, Benson 
1975, Laumann and Pappi 1976, Cook 1977, Mizmchi and Bunting 1981, Mariolis and Jones 1982, 
Mintz and Schwartz 1985) usually associated power with network centrality, which was a 
measurement of actor's prominence in a social network through involvements in social ties. In other 
words, those actors who had more connections were more central in a network (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994:172-3). In a network shaped like a crab, central actors acted like the body of a crab 
which linked those more peripheral limbs together. Actors with high centrality acquired power, as 
they lay between a large number of other actors. Therefore they could act as the router or switcher 
of the flow of information or resources. They occupied a network position which enhanced their 
ability to transmit information and impose sanctions, which, as we mentioned above, is the basis of 
power (Freeman 1977, 1979). 
This early consensus was challenged by emerging empirical studies. Although centrality is 
highly correlated with the ability to fulfill one's will in many studies, this association could be lost 
in certain types of networks (Cook et. al. 1983, Bonacich and Roy 1986，Mizmchi and Potts 1998). 
Among these studies, the case of American railroad companies in late nineteenth century mentioned 
by Bonacich and Roy (1986) is worth special attention. In that particular study, the interlocking 
directorship among American railroad companies in the studied period was examined, and it was 
found that the centrality of these firms had no significant correlation with their organizational 
power. The researchers noticed the difference between American railroad companies and the social 
networks in previous power studies. While most other networks consisted of singular hierarchal 
structures, the community of railroad companies was highly fragmented. This community was 
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Table 2.2. Network Perspectives on Social Capital 
Indicator of Social Capital Rationale Empirical Evidence 
Brokerage Those with brokerage filled the -Brokerage improved individual (Burt, 
structural holes and thus were Jannotta and Mahoney 1998) and 
connected to various parts of the group performance (Rosenthal 1996) 
social structure. This enabled them to -Brokerage improved actor's 
gajn access to a variety ofnon- opportunities m his career (Burt 1992, 
redundant information and resources inn-, ^ . ^ ,, , . . , 
(Burt 2005:16-7). ；二& Burt, Hogarth and Michand 
Closure A closed network facilitated -Closed network prevented children 
information flow within the group, from dropping out of schools 
and enabled them to punish those (Coleman 1990:590-7) 
being abusive. This eventually -closure among traders promoted 
promoted trust and reduced the trust(Greif 1989) 
transaction between actors (Burt , 
2005. 105-11) -Closed community networks 
promoted governance (Putnam 
1993:173-4) 
Both Brokerage and Closure "Brokerage is about coordinating -Profit of firms could be maximized if 
people between whom it would be there were both brokerage and closure 
valuable, but risky, to trust. Closure is (Burt et. al. 2002) 
bout making it safe to trust. The key _八 high value in both brokerage and 
o fc rea t ingva lue i s topu t the two closure led to early promotions (Burt 
together (Burt 2005:164)." 2000:3%) 
-Groups which had both brokerage and 
‘ closure had the best performance 
(Reagans and Zuckerman 2001) 
-The value of an actor's brokerage was 
contingent on his closure (Burt 
2005:158-60) 
divided into clusters led by companies like Pennsylvania Railroad and Vanderbilt's New York 
Central Railroad, while there were intense competitions and few links among these clusters. In this 
particular case, the organizational power of different railroad companies could be better predicted 
by their dominance within the clusters, rather than their centrality (pp. 128-9). These findings led to 
an important point: in spite of the close association of centrality with power, we should not adopt 
centralily as the sole indicator of power. In addition, it was shown in this case that other network 
characteristics, which were associated with the formation of closed clusters, should be put into 
consideration. 
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2.4.2. Lessons from Social Capital studies 
The study of social capital in network perspective may provide some hints to the network 
analysis of power. Indeed, the network conception of social capital is very similar to the network 
perspective of power, although the former is a more generalized concept which is not confined to 
the study of politics. Network analysts who studied social capital acknowledged that the success of 
action was positively associated with social capital, while the latter was the ftinction of network 
advantages of various social actors (Lin 2001: 60-5). Similar to the case of the network studies of 
power, there were disagreements about the definition of network advantage among scholars 
studying social capital (Burt 2001:32-8). Some would regard social capital as a function of 
brokerage (Granovetter 1973, Freeman 1977, Cook and Emerson 1978, Burt 1980, 1992), which is 
the ability of an actor to bridge across the structural holes, or gaps between clusters. The concept is 
similar to centrality, as those with more brokerage have more connections to different parts of the 
social structure. They argued that since those having better brokerage were linked with various parts 
of the social structure, they could gain access to a wider diversity of information. They could also 
recieve the information earlier than others, while controlling its diffusion as well. These advantages 
allowed those with brokerage to utilize more resources and attain their goal more easily (Burt 
2005:16-7). 
On the other hand, other scholars including James Coleman (1988, 1990) suggested that it 
was closure, which was resulted from joining a closed and tightly connected network with high 
density (Burt 2001:37), contributing to one's social capital. In a closed network, its participants did 
not have any other sources of reputation other than the network itself This reducedheir motive to 
become abusive in interactions. Tightly connected networks also facilitated the flow of information. 
Therefore, abusive actions could be easily detected and coercion through synchronized actions 
became possible. Trust could be developed among the members of a closed network, as those who 
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abused this trust would be picked out and punished. Hence the transaction cost of interactions was 
reduced among members (Burt 2005:105-11). 
There were evidences supporting both of these claims. It was found that brokerage was 
positively correlated with individual job performance (Burt, Jannotta and Mahoney 1998) as well as 
team performance (Rosenthal 1996). In studies about the career path in business settings, it was 
found that brokerage increased the chance of being promoted early (Burt 1992), and it was 
associated with higher pay in terms of salary and compensation (Burt 1997, Burt, Hogarth and 
Midland 2000). 
On the other hand, evidence can be found in favour of the thesis which considered closure 
the source of social capital. After analyzing the drop-out rate in schools, Coleman concluded that 
children living with closed network of adults were less likely to drop out of schools. These children 
included those coming from families with two parents and a few siblings, those living in the same 
neighbourhood throughout their life, as well as those studying in religious private schools (Coleman 
1990:590-7). In a study on Maghribi traders, a group of Jews living in the Middle East in the 
eighteenth century, it was found that they formed a closed network which brought about their 
success. As navigation was not reliable in that period, trade was a risky activity. Flexible agency 
relations were developed as a response to diversify risk among actors, but the system could be 
abused by dishonest rent-seekers. The closed network among Maghribi traders allowed them to act 
in concert to exclude abusive traders, and this turned the risk-diversifying agency relations into a 
sustainable system (Greif 1989). The study on the performance of Italian regional governments also 
indicated the importance of closure. It was found that the success of regional government is 
influenced by socioeconomic development, demographic stability as well as the civic culture 
(Putnam et. al. 1983). It was revealed that in regions withbetter civic culture, the citizens would 
form dense networks of civic engagement. The existence of these networks promoted trust and 
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reciprocity among citizens, which encouraged them to cooperate for the mutual benefit of the 
community (Putnam 1993:173-4). 
These findings are apparently puzzling, as the concepts of brokerage and closure seem to be 
contradictory. However, evidence suggested that both brokerage and closure were integrated parts 
of social capital. Those who had both brokerage and closure had better opportunities than those who 
had either of them only, and we could say that social capital was the sum of brokerage and closure. 
It was found that the industry profit margins of business firms were a function of both brokerage 
and closure (Burt et. al. 2002), while the same correlation could be found in the study of early 
promotions in business firms (Burt 2000:396). Teams which consisted of members from diverse 
backgrounds with a dense internal communication network were found to have the best 
performance (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). Last but not least, the value of an actor's brokerage 
was found to be contingent on his closure (Burt 2005:158-60), which indicated that both 
measurements could be linked up through a broader model. It is safe to conclude that brokerage and 
closure are two integrated mechanisms which resulted in one's social capital. 
2.4.3. Brokerage and Closure as Indicators of Power 
As discussed earlier, social capital and power are similar concepts in network perspective, 
because both are concerned with the correlation between one's opportunity and his network 
position. One may even suggest power as a subset of social capital. While we could conclude that 
social capital could be measured by an actor's brokerage and closure, it is reasonable to use these 
indicators in the study of power. 
In most power studies using the method of network analysis, centrality of actors was shown 
to be highly correlated with their ability to exercise their own will. The concepts of centrality and 
that of brokerage are similar, as both of them measured the ability to build bridges across different 
parts of a social structure. The exceptional case of American railroad (Bonacich and Roy 1986)， 
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however, suggested the limited role of centrality in contributing to one's power in a social structure 
fragmented into tiny clusters relatively closed to other parts of the network. The study proposed that 
closed clusters, or closure, also had a role in defining one's power. Although it is not conclusive, the 
evidence suggested it might be a reasonable choice to measure power through one's brokerage and 
closure. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the issues of power have been explored. While we could adopt the Weberian 
definition which sees power as the ability of an actor or a group to realize their will even in the face 
of resistance, it would be difficult to identify those who could really fulfill their preferences. The 
difficulty led to a prolonged debate between pluralists and elite theorists, and the methodology 
proposed by each camp caused their own problems. 
The network perspective of power, which identified those occupying advantaged network 
positions as those who could fulfill their preference against resistance, provided a key to solve the 
controversy. Empirical evidence can be found to support the assumption of this brand new 
perspective. After examining the studies on power, as well as those surrounding the similar concept 
of social capital, we can conclude that the brokerage and closure of actors or groups are the network 
characteristics that could also be used as the indicators of their power. In the next chapter, we would 
discuss how we could utilize the new understanding to design the research methodology. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design 
3.1. Concepts of the Study 
The aim of our study is to assess the state-business relations during the handover process. 
The studied period started from 1982, when Sino-British negotiations had just been initiated (Tsang 
2004:218), to 2005 when Tung Chee Hwa stepped down from his second term (Ming Pao, 
11/3/2005). This included the transitional period from 1982 to 1997, which could be splitted into 
two halves by the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The first term of Tung Chee Hwa starting from the 
handover in 1997 to 2002, and his second term ended by his resignation in 2005 , are also covered. 
Our major concern is the extent of state autonomy, and simultaneously the degree of 
business influence, in the studied period. The change throughout the period would also be 
identified. State autonomy would be measured by comparing the power of the state and the business 
sector in the political system. There would be four possibilities in this comparison, as illustrated in 
table 3.1. If it was found that the state is powerful while the business sector is weak, the state would 
be autonomous in this case, and the situation fit the descriptions of partisan state model. In another 
scenario where the business sector was powerful whereas the state was weak, the state would be 
likely to be a puppet of businessmen, and it is the case of cipher state model. While both the state 
and the business were found to be powerful, the state was subjected to business resistance but it 
would be able to balance against it, and vice versa. We could then regard the situation as a case of 
guardian state model. The situation would be more trivial, if both the state and the business were 
found to be weak. In this case there would be two possibilities: it may be the case when a third party 
Table 3.1. Possible patterns of State-Business Relations 
State Power 
Strong Weak 
Strong Guardian State Model Cipher State Model 
Business Power n • 。 u , Dominance of other Societal Force / 
Weak Partisan State Model rv i * u 
Disarticulation or Anarchy 
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outside the state and the business sector held political power, or it may be the case when nobody 
held political power. In this case further analysis on historical records would be necessary. 
The power of the state and the business sector would be measured by social network 
analysis. The major venue of decision making would be assessed as a social network, and the 
network position of its member would be evaluated. The power of each of these members would be 
determined by the summation of their brokerage and closure. Although the power of each individual 
Executive Councilors would be measured, the unit of analysis in the research was at the 
organizational level. Councilors were treated as agents of the state or business firms. From the 
scores of these representatives, the power of the state and the business sector as well as those of 
individual business firms could be evaluated and compared. 
Members in the policy making network who worked in the government administrative 
service could be defined as state representatives. The definition of business representatives, 
however, is more ambiguous. Someone who declares himself as a businessmen may actually, say, be 
an owner of a small grocery store. In this case, he cannot be considered as a person who can 
represent the business sector in general. While the state is formed by a closely knitted group of 
officials, the business sector is a much larger community which is also a complex social network. A 
representative who can promote business influence in policy making must be able to represent the 
interest of prominent business firms which take leading roles in the business community. The 
prominence of a firm in the business community could be, again, measured by the sum of its 
brokerage and closure. Only those members who could represent business firms scored high in 
terms of brokerage and closure could be considered as business representatives with the potential to 
exert business influence on politics. 
To conclude, our research aims to evaluate state autonomy through the measurement of the 
network advantage of state officials and business representatives in the decision making network. 
The basic assumption is that this network should be decision making bodies making important 
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decisions. The network should also be a level playing ground in which the majority's view usually 
becomes decisions.In this way the odds of turning one's preferences into policies could be enhanced 
by network mobilization. Those who can represent business firms with network advantage in the 
business community are considered as agents of the business sector, and it will be a case business 
dominance in politics (thus the lacking in state autonomy) if they have better network advantages 
than state officials. 
3.2. Data Collection and Research Design 
Before conducting the research, we needed to operationalize certain important concepts that 
we had to deal with in the study. At first, we were required to identify and focus on the decision-
making network within the political establishment. Before we could begin social network analysis, 
it was necessary to clarify the problem of measuring social linkages between actors in the network. 
The method to measure brokerage and closure, and therefore power, was also essential. Last but not 
least, a clear definitions on state representatives and business representatives were also necessary, 
and the definition of the latter would be dependent on how we defined the business community. 
3.2.1. Executive Council as Decision Making Network 
Before identifying the decision making network to be focused in the research, it would be 
beneficial for us to have a review on the policy making process in Hong Kong (Figure 3.1 and 3.2). 
The civil services, dominated by administrative officiers, is responsible for policy 
implementation in Hong Kong. They are also responsible for drafting policy proposals and 
formulating budgets. Despite their importance in the policy making process, their proposals have to 
be accepted by the policy making process, and they have to reformulate their suggestions if it is 
found to be unsatisfactory. Although civil servants assist the policy making process and provide 
advice in the process, they should not be considered as decision makers (Tsang 2007:145). 
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At the beginning of the policy making process, policy proposals need to be approved by the 
Executive Council. Its members are formally appointed by the governor or the chief executive. 
Before the implementation of principle officials accountability system (POAS) in late 2002, the 
Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary are ex-officio members of the 
council (Miners 1998:73). The Commander of British Forces was also an ex-officio member before 
the arrival of Chris Patten in 1993, but he seldom participated in the meetings (Lee 2004:25). While 
civil servants filled some of the remaining unofficial seats, local Chinese elite had filled most of 
these seats since 1974. The governor was required by the Royal Instruction to consult the Executive 
Council in most decisions. The governor seldom overrode the majority view and the council 
became a de facto decision-making body (Miners 1998:74-5). The council had the power to accept 
or reject policy proposals. The proposals would be returned to the civil services in the latter case 
(p.76). Besides, all major policy decisions from department heads or secretaries needed to be 
approved by the council (p.79). According to a councilor's account served in the 1980s, decisions in 
the council were usually made with deliberations. In controversial issues where consensus could not 
be reached, a vote by simple majority rule would be initiated. Although it was the governor led the 
meetings, he seldom revealed his personal opinions and limited his role to providing guidance. 
Occasionally councilors would raise their own issues under the agreement of the chief councilor, 
without a policy proposal formulated by the civil services beforehand. In any cases, the mainline 
opinions in the council would result in policies. The decision making role of the Executive Council 
was largely reserved after 1997, as required by Article 56 of the Basic Law (p.82). A major change 
in the Executive Council was the introduction of POAS in 2002. In this new arrangement, all senior 
officials became ex-officio members of the Executive Council, while the posts of senior officials 
were no longer monopolized by the civil servants. These posts could be filled by persons originated 
from the private sector, through political appointments by the Chief Executive (Cheung 2005:160-
1). Despite the changes, the constitutional role of the Executive Council remained unaltered. 
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Bills were formulated by the secretariat according to the conclusions reached in the 
Executive Council, and would be sent to the Legislative Council for ratification. Bills passed by the 
council would become formal laws, and the governor seldom used his veto power (pp. 123-5). 
Besides, the council also had the power to approve, reject or reduce government expenditures. The 
Financial Committee in the council had absolute veto power on departmental spending, and the 
draft estimates of government annual revenue and expenditures have to be approved by the whole 
council (pp. 134-8). Initially all councilors were appointed by the governor, with the presence of ex-
officio members. Elected elements were introduced in 1985, and seats from direct election were 
introduced in 1991, while all appointed seats were cancelled in 1995 (p. 116). After the handover, all 
councilors were elected after the first formal term in 1998 (p.251), and the council's role in passing 
laws and approving budgets were perserved by Article 73 of the Basic Law. 
Besides the Executive and Legislative Councils, there were also several other apparatuses in 
the policy making process. The Urban and Regional Councils enjoyed financial independence and 
was responsible for making environmental, public health, recreational and cultural policies (pp. 156-
66). However, these two councils were abolished in 1998 (Ma 2007:147). The government also set 
up various boards and committees, and appointed members into these bodies. The influences of 
boards and committees vary, but most of them are insignificant in policy making. The agendas 
discussed in these bodies are often filtered by the departments, and their capacity is further limited 
by infrequent meetings, overloaded agendas as well as the lack of assistance. Decisions made by the 
boards and committees are also often rejected or reversed, as the Financial Secretary can reject 
proposals that require additional funds (Miners 1998:108-10). Finally, District Councils (known as 
District Boards before the handover) were established in 1982, but the power of these councils are 
limited to controlling a small public fund for minor public work in locality level (pp. 170-6). 
We have to tackle the problem about which of the aforementioned apparatuses should be 
chosen as the focus of the present study. Institutions other than the Executive and Legislative 
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Councils could be safely excluded from our list, as they lack decision making power and have their 
power confined in regions or localities. The Legislative Council is also an unsuitable candidate for 
our study, because its composition was constantly changing in the studied period owing to a gradual 
introduction of elected members. These changes will hinder the comparisons between different 
periods. This implies that the Executive Council is the only institution that can be considered as the 
decision making network. Indeed, according to the discussions above, the Executive Council makes 
most major political decisions in Hong Kong. Although Legislative Council also plays a major role 
in decision making, and it also possesses the power to approve budgets, its main role is to ratify 
decisions which are already made by the Executive Council. The Legislative Council can approve 
or reject the decisions of the Executive Council, but its power to initiate its own bills is rather 
limited. In this sense, the role of Legislative Council is not as significant as that of the Executive 
Council 
In addition to being an institution which makes major decisions, the Executive Council also 
makes decisions with deliberations or through majority votes. Although the Governor or the Chief 
Executive could legally override their decisions, such move was often not a viable option, and this 
seldom occurred in the Post-war era. The Governor and the Chief Executive could still influence the 
council through dismissing or appointing members in the council. However, although this did 
happen in the studied period, such practice was very unusual (p.76) and was an indicator of 
influences outside the state. As the Executive Council fitted most of the criteria in being a decision-
making network, social network analysis could be applied in studying the power distribution in it. 
The study on the linkages between Executive Councilors will probably produce meaningful results. 
3.2.2. Measuring Social Linkages 
After choosing the Executive Council as the focus of the study, we need to measure the 
social linkages among the councilors. To measure friendship in a direct manner could be a difficult 
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Table 3.2. A Sociomatrix Showing Interrelations between Executive Councilors in 1984 
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task, as information about interpersonal relations are often too personal to be publicized. However, 
there are some indicators which can measure these relations indirectly. These indicators had been 
adopted in previous studies and were found to be effective. 
Interlocking directorship is one of the most commonly used indicators of interpersonal 
relations, particularly in relations between businessmen. Directorate interlock refers to the condition 
in which a director sits on more than one board simultaneously, or when an officer becomes a 
member of the board of directors of another firm. This is a common situation in capitalist 
economies, and it was estimated that in more than 60 percent of large publicly held firms, more than 
half of their directors were interlocks (Waldo 1985:6). Interlocking directorship facilitates corporate 
control of one firm by another, reflects interest cohesion as well as overcomes uncertainties of 
market resources (Mizruchi 1982:34-5). It could also be considered as a cooptation strategy (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Directors from the same board have to meet frequently for board meetings, and 
therefore they are likely to be familiar with each another. Besides, the characteristics of interlocking 
directorship also suggest that these directors often share similar interests. Being colleagues working 
together for similar interests, interlocking directors in the Executive Council could be expected to 
utilize their relations for political mobilization. Senior administrators of business firms have to 
cooperate with the board of directors in their daily duties, and share similar interest with the board 
as they are in the same boat. As a result, in the case when two Executive Councilors work as 
directors in the same firm (or in more than one firms), or when one of them works as a director 
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when the other works as a senior administrator, or in the non-existing case when both of them work 
as administrators in the same firm, they will be counted as being linked with each another. 
Similarly, if two councilors work in the same non-commercial organization, they will also be 
counted as being linked as they are also colleagues working for a common goal. 
Before measuring relations among state officials, we have to differentiate between 
administrative officers and other civil servants. The relations between administrative officers and 
professional officers were often tense, and they played different roles in the civil services (Tsang 
2007:167-70). Administrative officers also formed an esprit de corps, acting as a close-knit group 
(p.44) which has shared the same professional spirit (p. 110) since creating the post in 1862. As a 
result, administrative officers in the Executive Council will be counted as being linked with one 
another, while non-administrative officers will only be counted as being linked with an officer from 
the same professional field. 
What makes the situation more complicated is that a number of the ex-officio members were 
not government employees prior to the appointment of the post. They served in the private sector 
before the appointment, and left their original career to work as senior officials in the government. 
This situation was particularly common after the implementation of POAS. Besides, those civil 
servants serving as senior officials had to resign from the civil services in POAS, and a large 
portion of them were reemployed through political appointments (Cheung 2005:162). There are 
several points to consider when we measure the social linkage in these cases. At first, it is pointless 
to regard all these appointees as government officials linked with each another, as many of them 
were newcomers to the government. Furthermore, it is premature to assume the disappearance of 
the previous social relations of senior officials, simply on the basis that they had to resign from their 
original duties upon appointment. Rapport built through interlocking directorship would not 
disappear overnight when a senior official resigned from the board of directors, as required by the 
new appointment. When a previous administrative officer replaced his civil services contact with a 
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political one, the team spirit of the esprit de corps would create social linkages with his colleagues 
who were or had been administrative officers. Indeed, these previous social linkages may actually 
the political capital which led to their appointment as Executive Councilors. Based on these 
considerations, their social linkages would be determined by their status at the point just prior to the 
appointment. 
While the list of Executive Councilors in the studied period could be obtained from Hong 
Kong Year Book (Hong Kong Government Printer 1982-2005), information about their directorships 
and employment could be obtained from registers of celebrities (Sinclair 1984, 1988, Lo and Ho 
1995, Ho 2001, Sing Tao Publishing 2004). The social relations between Executive Councilors each 
year will be recorded in a sociomatrix, as shown in table 3.2. A value of 1 was attributed to the 
presence of social linkage between two councilors, when two councilors served in the same board 
of directors, served as senior executives in the same institution, or served in the same branch in the 
government. (In the table, the relations between a councilor and himself was counted as 1, but this 
value was meaningless and thus would not be included in subsequent calculations.) If these kinds of 
linkage were absent, a value of 0 was attributed. Although there could be multiple linkages between 
company directors, the matrix would be binary and only mark the presence or absence of linkage 
(i.e. 1 and 0) rather than its amount. Although this would lead to some loss of information, it was 
justified by the fact that we could not have enough information to differentiate the intensity of 
linkages between government employees. Adopting valued data in this case might over-estimate the 
political power of business representatives. The construction of sociomatrix would facilitate the 
calculation of brokerage and closure of each councilor, by using a software designed for social 
network analysis. 
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Table 3.3. Scoring Scheme of Brokerage Score and Closure Score 
Brokerage Score Closure Score 
0 Flow Betweenness<(Mean-S.D.), or 、 ， , , , 
Flow Betweenness=0 if (Mean-S.D.)<0 Not linked with others 
1 (Mean-S.D.)<Flow Betweenness<Mean, or „ . . . . 」 ， 
0<Flow Betweenness<Mean if (Mean-S.D.)<0 Participation in a dyad 
2 Mean<Flow Betweenness<(Mean+S.D.) P^f j c i f ^ n in a cluster involving less than one-
third of the network members 
3 Flow Betweenness>(Mean+S.D.) Participation in a cluster involving at least one-third 
or the network members 
3.2.3. Measuring Brokerage, Closure and Power 
As discussed in the last chapter, power could be considered as a function of both brokerage 
and closure (Burt 2005). In our research both the brokerage and closure of Executive Councilors 
would be measured by a scale ranging from 0 to 3. The sum of these two scores would become an 
index ranging from 0 to 6.We would use the index to measure the power of each particular 
councilor. 
Brokerage is an actor's ability to bridge across the gap between clusters. As mentioned 
before, the concept of brokerage is similar to that of centrality, and a centrality measure called 
betweenness may best illustrate this similarity. Betweenness is calculated by measuring the degree 
of an actor lying between other actors within a social structure (Freeman 1979), or we may simply 
consider betweenness as a measure of bridge-building abilities. 
In our study the brokerage score would be determined by a modified betweenness measure, 
"flow betweenness", which could be calculated from the sociomatrix using UCINET 6. While the 
measurement of betweenness assumes that actors use the shortest path to perform social 
interaction, the measurement of flow betweenness assume that they will try all feasible alternative 
paths rather than putting all eggs in one single basket. As a result, the measurement of flow 
betweenness is closer to the reality. Another advantage of flow betweenness is that the measurement 
is designed for both binary and valued data (Freeman, Borgatti and White 1991). Although the data 
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about Executive Council were binary, this design would be useful in the analysis of the business 
community, and we will discuss it in the next section. 
The flow betweenness value of each Executive Councilor in a particular year would be 
converted to brokerage score, by measuring the difference of the value with the annual mean in 
terms of standard deviation. 
The closure score would be measured by the councilor's participation in cohesive 
subgroups, which could be assessed by drawing a sociogram. The presence of relations would be 
indicated by an edge between the nodes which represented Executive Councilors. In the example 
shown in figure 3.3, we could identify two cohesive subgroups. Although some studies assumed 
smaller groups were closer groups (Burt 2005:160), this would not be the case in our study. Closure 
and group size were inversely correlated when the group size reached hundreds, group sizes were 
much smaller in our study. It would be anti-intuitional by insisting that being a member of a group 
with 3 people had more closure than those in a group with 10 people. In the magnitude of our study, 
those belonging to a larger subgroup would have a better ability to be agglutinated into a closed 
cluster, and a higher closure score would be attributed to them. The scoring scheme of brokerage 
and closure score are summarized in table 3.3. 
Figure 3.3. Sociogram of Executive Councilors in 1984 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lee Quo Wei 
/ \ Bremridge / 
Sandberg \ 
Haddon-Cave \ / ^ ^ d i a 
Q Y " ^ Dunn 
Lo Tak S h i n g ^ 
Aker-Jone^ Eric Peter 
Source: Author's own calculation 
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The power of each respective Executive Councilors could be indicated by the power index which 
was the summation of brokerage and closure. The power of state officials could be evaluated by the 
index score of each administrative officer in the council, as well as their average score. However, 
before we could evaluate the power of the business sector, an analysis of the business community 
had to be conducted. 
3.2.4. Assessing the Business Community 
As mentioned earlier, we cannot identify those councilors who could represent the business 
sector unless we have some knowledge about the business community. We have to identify those 
prominent firms in the community, and only representatives of these firms could be said to be 
representing the whole business community. Prominence of business firms could be measured by, 
again, social network analysis using information of interlocking directorships. By analysing the 
network position of different firms or directors in the interlocking network, network analysts 
assessed the power distribution in business communities (Unseem 1982, 1983; Mintz and Schwartz 
1985). 
Constrained by time and resources, we would not be able to assess the interlocking 
directorship of all business firms in Hong Kong throughout the studied period. Instead, we would 
select the most significant part of the business community and compare the prominence of these 
larger firms. In the research, interlocking directorship between firms with their stocks listed as Hang 
Seng Index component (HSIC) would be studied. HSIC firms included those most significant firms 
in business community, as the selection of HSIC is based on the asset value, market capitalization, 
sales, revenues and representativeness in individual market sectors (Cheung 1994:43). As in 1990, 
the top twenty listed firms accounted for more than two-third of the total market capitalization 
(Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 1991), and the figure remained over 60 percent in 2005 
(Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 2006). It was likely that those thirty-three HSIC 
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firms included most of the largest firms in Hong Kong, which would have a chance to exert political 
influences on behalf of the business sector. 
The prominence of individual firms in the network of HSIC firms could be evaluated by 
their brokerage and closure. The main difference between the network of HSIC firms and the 
network of Executive Councilors was that multiple linkages among nodes were much more 
common in the former case. As revealed in previous studies about corporate interlocks, most 
studied firms were included in a cluster with at least one linkage in each edge (Sonquist and Koenig 
1975, Stockman et al. 1985). This would not affect the measurement of brokerage, as the 
calculation of flow betweenness would still be applicable in valued data reflecting multiple 
linkages. A brokerage score was attributed to each HSIC firm according to the scoring scheme in 
table 3.3. The measurement of closure, however, would have to be modified here. While we could 
still identify clusters by drawing sociogram, the strength of inter-firms connections would also need 
to be considered (Wasserman and Faust 1994:251-2). In the study we would identify 2-graphs and 
3-graphs, which were clusters with at least two or three linkages in each edge. Closure score would 
be attributed according to the size of either 2-graphs or 3-graphs, following the criteria in table 3.3. 
Whether the size of 2-graphs or 3-graphs would be measured depended on the empirical results, and 
the level which could best illustrate the changes in the studied period would be adopted. There have 
already been several studies using a similar method to identify business groups within Hong Kong 
business community (Wong 1996, Lui and Chiu 2004). 
Annual information about the boards of directors in HSIC firms was not available, as many 
of these records were lost decades ago. At the moment, directorate information of 1982, 1986, 1997 
and 2000 can be found in company handbooks (Database Publishing 1982, Database Asia 1986, 
Edinburgh Financial Publishing 1997, Hong Kong Business Information Center 2001). The data of 
1990 can be obtained from a previous study which studied interlocking directorship in Hong Kong 
(Cheung 1994), whereas the data of 2005 could be obtained from the annual report of HSIC firms. 
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Table 3.4. Defining the Strength of State and Business Power by the scoring of Power Index 
Strength of State/Business Power Definition 
Strong Power Index > 5 
Medium 5 > Power Index > 3 
Weak 3 > Power Index > 1 
Very Weak Power Index < 1 
Table 3.5. Model of State Business Relations and the Power of the State and the Business 
State Power Business Power Model of State Business Relations 
Strong / Medium Weak / Very Weak Partisan 
Strong / Medium Strong / Medium Guardian 
Weak / Very Weak Strong / Medium Cipher 
Weak / Very Weak Weak / Very Weak Dis-articulated 
By using these data, sociomatrices similar to table 3.2. could be constructed, except that the matrix 
did not only record the presence of relation but the number of directors shared between two firms as 
well. The data were further analysed by UCINET 6 and Net Draw. 
3.2.5. Comparing State and Business Power 
At the beginning of the study, we had to differentiate those prominent HSIC firms from 
other less prominent counterparts, since only Executive Councilors who represented these 
prominent firms could be said to represent the whole business sector. The differentiation could be 
done by assessing the value of their prominence index. As the scoring of the index ranged from 0 to 
6, we would define those HSIC firms which scored 5 or above as prominent business. 
An unfortunate fact is that we could not assess the prominence of HSIC firms on a year-by-
year basis. We only had information about corporation interlocks in 1982, 1986, 1990, 1997, 2000 
and 2004. Those years with information available are more or less evenly distributed. Apart from a 
3-year-gap from 1997 to 2000 and a 7-year-gap from 1990 to 1997, the rest of the intervals lasted 
for four years. These data, limited though, included information of early transitional period, late 
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transitional period as well as the two terms of Mr. Tung Chee Hwa. Our basic approach was to 
assume the prominent firms in those few years could represent those prominent firms in a period of 
a few years. 
We may now imagine a situation in which a firm has just become prominent. If this 
prominent firm needs to extend its political influence (in terms of taking part in Executive Council), 
it could achieve it in two ways. It may invite some existing councilors to join its board of directors, 
while it may expect the government will approach its director or executives as the prestige of the 
firm is rising. If the prominence of a firm increases its political influence, there would be a time lag 
between these changes. At first, both the mechanisms require the building of new social linkages, 
and this could be a time consuming process (Burt 2005:98-104). Besides, the change of personnel in 
Executive Council could take place annually in its highest frequency. Usually only a few 
councillors would be changed each time, except in the case of 1993 (Miners 1998:76, 82b). Our 
conclusion is that there is a delay between the rising prominence of a firm and the occurrence of its 
political influence. We also expect that if a firm becomes less prominent, there will be some inertia 
for its political influence to decline. In short, the effect of a firm's prominence will persist for a 
period of time. 
As a consequence, if a firm is found to be prominent in a particular year, it will be 
reasonable to assume their prominence would endure for the following three to four years (up to 
seven years in a special case). In other words, a prominent firm in 1982 would also be a prominent 
firm in 1983, 1984 and 1985, while the prominence of a firm in 1986 would remain the same until 
the beginning of 1990, and so on. 
By using the method mentioned before, we would identify the prominent HSIC firms (with 
prominence > 5) in each of the studied years. Directors and senior executives of these firms would 
be identified as business representatives. The state would be defined as the component basically 
including civil servants in the bureaucracy within the Hong Kong Government which did not 
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represent societal interest. Administrative officers were identified as the representatives of the state, 
as they were the main government officials who were involved in policy implementation and 
formulation (Tsang 2007:145). Acting as both ex-officio members and unofficial members of the 
council, the administrative officers were the only cohesive group in the council representing the 
interest of the bureaucracy. 
The Power Index Score of the state and business representatives was then evaluated, and a 
mean Power Index Score of state representatives and business representatives would be calculated. 
The value of the mean score would be used to assess the power of the business sector or the state, as 
summarized in table 3.4. By comparing the scores, the most appropriate model for describing the 
state-business relations in that particular year would be selected by a scheme listed in table 3.5. We 
could identify the nature of state-business relations in Hong Kong, as well as the change in the 
transitional and handover period. If the scores of both sectors were found to be low, there would be 
two possibilities: the existence of external influence (likely from London or Beijing) or the 
disarticulation of the political system. An in-depth study on this period would then be required to 
differentiate the two. 
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Chapter 4. Research Findings 
In the last chapter we have a thourough discussion about the research method. Network 
analysis was performed on the interpersonal network in the Executive Council, and the power of 
each particular councilor was measured. We would also need to study the interlocking directorship 
among the most significant part of the business sector, which was represented by the firms with 
their stocks listed as Hang Seng Index component. We could then identify those most prominent 
firms which could represent the whole sector. The power index score of Executive Councilors 
representing these firms, as well as the score of administrative officers, would be compared in a 
longitudinal manner. From these data we could evaluate the state-business relations in Hong Kong 
in the last twenty three years. 
In this chapter, we will first discuss the characteristics of the social network within the 
Executive Council. The change throughout the studied period will also be mentioned. In the next 
section we will perform a similar task in the study of the network in business community. After that, 
we will assess how the business network and the Executive Council network interacted with each 
another. Last but not least, the power of prominent business firms in the Executive Council will be 
compared with administrative officers, who act as the representatives of the state. 
4.1. The Network of Executive Councilors 
In general, the connectedness between Executive Councilors was decreasing throughout the 
studied period. While the councilors were quite well connected in early 1980，s, their associations 
loosened rapidly prior to the dawn of the 1990s. 
The changes in the social network among Executive Councilors are best visualized by a 
series of sociograms (Appendix 1). Up to 1986, there were two clusters within the Executive 
Council. The smaller cluster was formed by three administrators, while the larger cluster consisted 
of around six to eight members with business background. John Henry Bremridge, the Financial 
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Table 4.1. Average Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors from 1982 to 2005 
Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index Score 
All Councilors ‘ Non- All Councilors ^ Non- All Councilors ^ Non-
governmental governmental governmental 
Councilors Councilors Councilors …？ 
T ^ \2\ r ^ 121 L78 
1983 1.20 1.50 1.80 2.10 3.00 3.60 
1984 0.94 1.08 1.59 1.75 2.53 2.83 
1985 1.00 1.18 1.88 2.18 2.88 3.36 
1986 0.93 1.11 1.71 2.00 2.64 3.11 
1987 1.13 0.67 1.00 0.89 2.13 1.56 
1988 1.29 1.13 1.00 1.00 2.29 2.13 
1989 0.64 0.00 0.57 0.22 1.21 0.22 
1990 0.60 0.00 0.53 0.20 1.13 0.20 
1991 0.60 0.00 0.53 0.20 1.13 0.20 
1992 0.64 0.00 0.57 0.22 1.21 0.22 
1993 0.94 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.56 0.00 
1994 0.69 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.15 0.00 
1995 0.69 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.15 0.00 
1996 0.64 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.07 0.00 
1997 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.00 
1998 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 
1999 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 
2000 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 
2001 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.00 
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2003 0.95 0.00 0.74 0.15 1.68 0.15 
2004 1.11 0.00 1.11 0.00 2.21 0.00 
2005 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2 0.00 
1ANOVA: df产23, df2=332, F=2.10, p O . O l 
2 ANOVA: dfi=23, df2=223, F=7.37, p<0.001 
3 ANOVA: df�=23, df2=332, F=4.48, p<0.001 
4 ANOVA: df,=23, df2=223, F=12.02, p<0.001 
5 ANOVA: df,=23, df2=332, F=2.96, p<0.001 
6AN0VA: df,二23，df2=223, F二 11.06, p<0.001 
7 Councilors who were not employed by Government Administrative Services, Government Judiciary Services or the 
British Force through non-political means. 
Secretary who served as the CEO of Swire as well as directors of various firms, played an important 
role in maintaining the latter cluster. He acted as a bridge who linked up two different parts of the 
cluster together. After his retirement in 1986, the cluster split into two smaller clusters. One of them 
was a dyad while the other one was a triad. The triad disappeared in 1989, and the dyad persisted 
until 1993. 
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In 1993 only one cluster, formed by administrative officers, was left in the Executive 
Council. This cluster became a dyad in 1997, and disappeared in 2002. A large cluster with 6 
members, formed by ex-administrative officers, appeared in 2003 and persisted up to the end of our 
studied period. A small dyad resulted from interlocking directorships existed for merely a year in 
2003. 
These findings could be summarized by the change in the closure score throughout the 
studied period. The mean closure score of Executive Councilors was greater than the one before 
1989. It decreasaed to a range between 0.43 to 0.63 in the period from 1989 to 1996. The mean 
closure score dropped to the level below 0.20 after 1997 and reached zero in 2002. The score was 
on the rebound in 2003, and it ranged from 0.74 to 1.11 afterwards. 
For those councilors who were not government employees prior to their appointment, the 
decrease in closure score occurred much earlier in a more dramatic manner. The period from 1983 
to 1986 was their golden period in which their mean closure score ranged from 1.75 to 2.18 and was 
higher than the average of the whole council. It dropped to a range between 0.89 and 1.00 in 1987 
and 1988. The score further dropped to the range between 0.20 and 0.22 in the period from 1989 to 
1992. Their mean closure score had remained zero since 1993, except in a short-lived rebound in 
2003 (table 4.1). 
A similar pattern could be found in the mean brokerage score of the councilors. The mean 
flow betweenness ranged from 2.418 to 5.460 in 1982 to 1986, and decreased to the range between 
0.214 to 0.667 from 1987 to 1996. The value fell to zero from 1997 to 2003, and rebounded to a 
range from 1.263 to 1.842 in 2003 to 2005 (Appendix 2). This pattern was more or less perserved 
when the value of flow betweenness was translated to the brokerage score. The brokerage score 
ranged from 0.93 to 1.29 in the period between 1982 and 1988. The score then fluctuated around 
the level of 0.60 up to 1996, except in a brief rebound in 1993. The average brokerage score 
dropped to zero afterwards, and had rebounded to the level between 0.95 and 1.11 since 2003. The 
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drop in non-governmental councilors was, again, much earlier and more dramatic than that of their 
governmental counterparts. Their mean brokerage score had dropped to zero since 1989, without 
any rebound. 
The power index score of Executive Councilors, obtained from summing up brokerage score 
and closure score, fluctuated in the same manner. The mean power index score ranged from 2.13 to 
3.00 in the period between 1982 and 1988. From 1989 to 1996, the score decreased to the range of 
1.07 and 1.56. There was a further drop of the power index score in 1997, and it reached zero in 
2002. Eventually a rebound occurred in 2003, and the average score ranged from 1.68 to 2.21 
afterwards. The power index score of non-govemmental councilors also decreased by the end of the 
1980s. The drop was more severe as their power index score reached the level between 0.20 and 
0.22 from 1989 to 1992. The score had dropped to zero since 1993, and there was only a brief 
rebound in 2003 (table 4.1). 
One may wonder whether the power index score could reflect the power of individual 
councilors. Although we could not verify it by examining the minutes of the meetings, it could be 
illustrated by the account of three Executive Councilors who served in the later part of the 1980s. 
Lydia Dunn (1989), who represented the Swire Group, was a member in the largest cluster in the 
council and therefore had a high power index score. When she reviewed the duties of Executive 
Councilors, she emphasized that the council was not a rubber stamp. She considered that the 
constitutional documents of Hong Kong, despite the entitled dictatorial power to the Governor, 
simply reminded the Governor "that his power is limited by other provisions of the Constitution 
(p.79)". She stressed that Executive Councilors had the right to disagree, while their willingness to 
say no in the best interest of Hong Kong formed the basis of their appointment (p.81). Similarly, 
another councilor who scored similarly also shared her view and emphasized that "when I was an 
Executive councillor, the Executive Council was the decision making body in Hong Kong., even 
those senior officials have to listen to us." According to this informant, everybody in the council 
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could feel free to argue, and even the Governor would not impose his view on them. This informant 
also revealed that opinions of all councilors were considered in a more or less equal basis. In 
contrast, another informant who scored zero reported to be excluded from part of the decision 
making process. Although the discussions were apparently open, it was discovered that some 
agendas were often set before official meetings. These agendas were often decided by those 
councilors representing the business sectors, especially those serving in expatriate firms. These 
cases showed that the scores of power index were positively related to the sense of potency. 
Although this was not an accurate assessment on the power of councilors, these findings hinted that 
those who scored high were often more successful in the decision making process. 
4.2. The Network of HSIC firms 
Firms with their stocks listed as Hang Seng Index components represented the most 
significant section of the whole business community. By studying the social network formed by 
HSIC firms, we could identify those most prominent firms within the business community. 
We could obtain a clear image of the network of HSIC firms through looking at the 
sociograms (appendix 3). As multiple linkages between firms are extremely common, we identified 
clusters by the presence of linkage as well as the strength of linkages. In these diagrams, 1 -graphs, 
Table 4.2. Average Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score, Prominence Score of 
HSIC Firms and the Number of Prominent firms in 1982, 1984, 1990, 1997, 2000 and 2004 
^ ]997 i m 2004 
Flow Betweenness ‘ 28.02 27.26 39.12 39.38 35.11 32.15 
Brokerage 2 1.56 1.5 1.42 1.36 1.33 1.24 
Closure 3 2.62 2.25 2.60 1.54 1.15 1.09 
Prominence 4 4.18 3.75 4.03 2.90 2.48 2.33 
Prominent Firms 5 17 14 13 5 3 4 
% in HSIC firms 53.13% 43.75% 39.39% 15.15% 9.09% 12.12% 
1ANOVA: dfi-5, df2=190, F二0.966, p二0.440 
2 ANOVA: dfi=5, df2=190, F=0.487, p=0.786 
3 ANOVA: dfi=5, df2=190, F=14.533, p<0.001 
4ANOVA: df,=5, df2=190, F=7.443, p<0.001 
5 Number of HSIC firms with Prominence >5 up to the next studied period (up to 2005 in 2004 data). 
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2-graphs and 3-graphs are shown. Throughout the studied period, most HSIC firms were included 
in a single giant 1-graph, which indicated that the firms formed a large cluster with at least one 
linkage in each edge. As a result, studying this 1-graph had little value in comparative studies. 
On the other hand, the characteristic of 2-graph was much more dynamic. The number and 
size of clusters with at least two linkages in each edge varied throughout the studied period. In 
1982, 28 out of 32 studied HSIC firms were members of a giant 2-graph. The giant undergone 
fission in the following years. In 1986, there was a giant 2-graph with 20 firms, and two smaller 2-
graphs with three members in each of them. When it came to 1990, the giant 2-graph resumed to the 
size of 27, and there was only a small satellite 2-graph with merely two members. The fission 
accelerated in the following years. In 1997, the largest 2-graph only had 11 members, and five 
smaller satellite 2-graphs with two or three members emerged. There were two large 2-graphs with 
8 to 9 members each, as well as two tiny 2-graphs with 2 members each, at the beginning of the 
millennium. When it came to 2004, there were 3 medium sized 2-graphs, with 5 to 7 members in 
each of them. Besides, there was a small 2-graphs formed by Wharf and Wheelock. The general 
picture was that the 2-graphs had been cracking into pieces since the start of the 1990s. As variation 
throughout the period could be best observed from these 2-graphs, the closure score of HSIC firms 
would be evaluated from the size of the 2-graph in which a firm participated , using the criteria 
listed in table 3.3 (chapter 3). When the observation from these sociograms were converted into 
closure score, we could find that the average score of HSIC firms changed significantly throughout 
the period. The closure score up to 1990 ranged from 2.25 to 2.62, while the score ranged from 1.09 
to 1.54 from 1997 onwards (table 4.2). 
The mean flow betweenness of HSIC firms ranged from 27.26 to 28.02 in 1982 and 1986. It 
increased to the range between 39.12 and 29.38 in 1990 and 1997, and decreased a little bit to the 
range between 32.15 and 35.11 in 2000 and 2004. These changes, however, were not statistically 
significant. We could also notice that the variance between HSIC firms increased gradually 
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throughout the period. The standard deviation of flow betweenness was 14.24 in 1982, and it 
progressively went up to 37.33 in 2000. It then slightly decreased to 36.59 in 2004. While there 
were no significant changes in the mean flow betweenness, the inequalities between HSIC firms 
increased (appendix 4, table 7). Significant changes were also absent in brokerage score. The score 
varied from 1.24 to 1.56, and these variations were insignificant in terms of statistics. 
The changes in the prominence score of HSIC firms were, on the other hand, significant. 
The mean prominence of HSIC firms ranged from 3.75 to 4.18 before the end of 1990. From 1997 
onwards, the range decreased to the level between 2.33 to 2.90. This suggested that HSIC firms 
were in general decreasingly prominent, and the change was particularly apparent in the 1990s. 
These patterns would also emerge, if we counted the number of prominent firms, which were firms 
with prominent score equal to or more than 5, in the intervals between the studied year and the next 
studied year. In the first three intervals, around 13 to 17 HSIC firms were found to be prominent, 
which constituted around 53.13% to 39.39% of all HSIC firms. In the intervals after the beginning 
of 1997, however, there were around 3 to 5 prominent firms only. This indicated that only around 
9.09% to 15.15% of HSIC firms could be considered as prominent (table 4.2). 
4.3. HSIC firms' representatives in the Executive Council 
After investigating into the structure of corporate networks among HSIC firms, we would 
like to evaluate how these firms were represented in the Executive Council (appendix 5). We found 
that the voice of HSIC firms in the Executive Council was diminishing throughout the studied 
period. 
At first, we could notice that the number of HSIC firms which had representatives in the 
council was constantly decreasing. In the period between 1982 and 1985, 16 out of 32 studied HSIC 
firms had representatives in the council. That is to say, half of the HSIC firms were represented in 
the council in this period. There were 9 firms, constituting 28.12% of all the HSIC firms, being 
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Table 4.3. Representation of HSIC Firms in the Executive Council, 1982-2005 
Year No. of % of Mean No. of HSIC % of HSIC Mean Power 
Represented Represented Prominence of rep. in rep. in Index Score 
HSIC Firms firms among Represented Executive Executive of HSIC rep. 
HSIC Firms Council Council 
1982 6 42.80% 4.33 
1983 7 50% 4.43 
16 50% 4.69 
1984 9 52.94% 3.33 
1985 8 50% 3.75 
1986 5 35.71% 4.4 
1987 5 31.25% 2.8 
9 28.13% 4.56 
1988 5 35.71% 3.4 
1989 3 21.43% 0.67 
1990 3 20% 0.67 
1991 3 20% 0.67 
1992 3 20% 0.67 
1993 4 12.12% 5.25 2 12.50% 0 
1994 2 15.38% 0 
1995 2 15.28% 0 
1996 2 14.28% 0 
1997 2 18.18% 0 
1998 7 21.21% 3.71 2 14.29% 0 
1999 2 14.29% 0 
2000 2 15.38% 0 
2001 2 15.38% 0 
3 9.09% 2.67 
2002 2 16.67% 0 
2003 2 10.53% 1 
2004 1 5.26% 0 
2 6.06% 1.5 
2005 1 4.76% 0 
represented in the council from 1986 to 1989. The figure decreased to 4, equivalent to 12.12% of 
the HSIC firms, in the period before the handover. There was a brief rebound from 1997 to 1999, as 
there were 7 firms or 21.21% of the HSIC firms which were represented. However, a decline 
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Table 4.4. Summary on the Power of Representatives of Prominent HSIC Firms 
1982-1985 1986-1989 1990-1996 1997-1999 2000-2003 2004-2005 
HSIC firms 
with 17 14 13 5 3 4 
prominence>5 
% in HSIC 53.13% 43.75% 39.39% 15.15% 9.09% 12.12% 
Representatives 
of prominent 8 7 5 2 1 0 
firms 
Representatives 
of prominent 4 6 0 0 0 0 
firms with 
power>5 
followed afterwards. From 2000 to 2003, there were only 3 firms being represented in the council, 
and only 2 HSIC firms were represented in the subsequent period. 
The prominence of the represented firms also suffered a downward trend. In the period 
between 1982 and 1985, the mean prominence of the represented firms was 4.69. The prominence 
of these firms remained strong before the handover, as the mean prominence scored 4.56 from 1986 
to 1989, and 5.25 from 1990 to 1996. The mean prominence of the represented firms decreased to 
3.71 from 1997 to 1999, and further decreased to 2.67 in the period between 2000 and 2003. From 
2004 to 2005, the mean prominence reached the nadir of 1.5. 
The proportion of HSIC representatives in the Executive Council also decreased throughout 
the studied period. From 1982 to 1985, around 6 to 9 Executive Councilors represented 16 HSIC 
firms (through interlocks) and occupied around half of the seats in the council. In the following 
period between 1986 and 1999, there were 3 to 5 HSIC representatives in the council and occupied 
around one-third of the seats. There had been only 2 to 3 HSIC representatives in the council since 
1990, and they could control no more than 20% of votes in the Executive Council. The situation 
became worse in 2004 and 2005, because only one councilor with less then 6% of vote could be 
considered as an HSIC representative. 
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The weakness of these HSIC representatives in the Executive Council was not only reflected 
in the number of representatives. When we assessed the power of these representatives through 
social network analysis, we would notice that the power of these representatives was continuously 
falling. The mean power index of the HSIC representatives ranged from 2.80 to 4.43 before the end 
of 1988. Nevertheless, a massive drop occurred in 1989. Starting from this year to 1992, the mean 
score was 0.67. The mean power of HSIC representatives dropped to zero from 1993 onwards, 
except a short-lived rebound in 2003 in which the score rose to 1 for a single year (table 4.3). 
In conclusion, less and less HSIC firms sent representatives to the Executive Council from 
the 1980s onwards. The prominence of those firms which insisted on sending representatives 
decreased. The number and proportion of HSIC representatives in the Executive Council were also 
decreasing, particularly after the end of the 1980s. For those representatives who remained in the 
council, the power that they could obtain from their social networks was severely limited. 
4.4. Comparing the Power of the State and Prominent Business 
When the number of representatives of HSIC firms was decreasing throughout the studied 
period, this decline was also apparent among the prominent firms. As mentioned above, there were 
less and less prominent firms with prominent score equal to or more than five. The number of 
Executive Councilors representing these firms was also diminishing. In the period between 1982 
and 1985, 8 of those councilors serving in the council during the period represented the prominent 
business firms. The figure was 7 in the period between 1986 ad 1989. Progressive decline occurred 
after the beginning of the 1990s. The figure between 1990 and 1996 was 5, and it then dropped to 2 
between 1997 and 1999, and decreased to 1 in the period from 2000 to 2003. There had been no 
representatives from the prominent business firms since 2004. 
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Table 4.5. Mean Power Index Score of Representatives of Prominent Business and Administrative 
officers in the Executive Council 
Prominent Business Administrative Officers State-Business 
Business Relations 
Year Mean Power Number Mean Power Number Power State Power Model 
1982 0.66 3 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1983 4.2 5 3 3 Medium Medium Guardian 
1984 3 6 3 3 Medium Medium Guardian 
1985 3.83 6 3 3 Medium Medium Guardian 
1986 4.67 6 3 3 Medium Medium Guardian 
1987 3.2 5 5 4 Medium Strong Guardian 
1988 3.4 5 5 3 Medium Strong Guardian 
1989 0.66 3 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1990 0.66 3 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1991 0.66 3 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1992 0.66 3 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1993 0 2 5 5 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1994 0 2 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1995 0 2 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1996 0 2 5 3 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1997 0 1 1 2 Very Weak Weak Uncertain 
1998 0 1 1 2 Very Weak Weak Uncertain 
1999 0 1 1 2 Very Weak Weak Uncertain 
2000 0 0 1 2 Very Weak Weak Uncertain 
2001 0 0 1 2 Very Weak Weak Uncertain 
2002 0 0 0 1 Very Weak Very Weak Uncertain 
2003 1 1 5 6 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
2004 0 0 6 7 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
2005 0 0 6 7 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
If we counted the number of prominent firm representatives who were powerful, as defined 
by a power index score equal to or more than 5, in the council, we would discover that the power of 
prominent business suffered a rapid decline since the beginning of the 1990s. In the period between 
1982 and 1985, there were 4 powerful representatives in the Executive Council. The figure rose to 7 
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in the period between 1986 and 1989. We could conclude that the prominent business firms played 
a role in Hong Kong's politics in the 1980s. The picture changed after the onset of the 1990s, none 
of those representatives of the prominent firms could become powerful again. This marked the 
decline of the prominent firms in Hong Kong. 
At this point we would need to investigate into the core part of the research. State power and 
business power would be compared annually. The state power would be measured by the mean 
power index of Executive Councilors who were administrative officiers in a particular year, while 
the business power would be measured by the mean power index of Executive Councilors 
representing the prominent business firms. The strength of state or business power would be 
measured by the standard in table 3.4. After that, the comparison of state and business power would 
perform annually, and the model of state-business relations in a particular year would be evaluated 
by the criteria listed in tabe 3.5. The results of these comparisons are summarized in table 4.5. 
Business power was very weak while state power was strong in 1982. It was the last year of 
Sir MacLehose, and the autonomy of the colonial state was atypically strong during his reign (Scott 
1989:163-6). After the retirement of MacLehose, business power increased to a medium level. The 
level of state power increased from medium to strong, which meant that the state and the business 
enjoyed similar amount of power. In this case the state would neither enjoy full autonomy, nor 
become the puppet of the business sector. This pattern of state-business relations fitted the 
descriptions of guardian state models, and continued till the end of 1988. 
There was a turning point in 1989. Business power declined rapidly and dropped to a very 
weak level. The power of the state, led by administrative officers in the bureaucracy, became strong. 
As the business sector was relatively impotent in front of the state, it would not be able to impose 
its will on the state. It was an era when the colonial state was highly autonomous, and the overall 
pattern fitted the descriptions of partisan state models. This golden age of the colonial state ended 
63 
Table 4.6. Relative Power of the State and the Business in Different Periods 
Period Business Power State Power State-Business Relations Model 
1983-1988 Medium Medium to Strong Guardian 
1989-1996 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
1997-2002 Very Weak Very Weak to Weak Uncertain 
2003-2005 Very Weak Strong Partisan 
when the deadline of the handover approached, and we would witness another turning point in 
1997. 
The pattern of state-business relations at the very end of the colonial period, as well as in the 
first term of the Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, was atypical. In the period between 1997 and 
2002, neither the state nor the business was found to be powerful. In fact, the power of both parties 
were simultaneously weak, and the question which followed was who was on the driver seat. Hong 
Kong might be under the control of someone else, probably the new sovereign in Beijing. It was 
also possible that nobody could effectively control the politics of the newly established SAR, as 
reflected by the numerous disasters in governance during the period. The state-business relations in 
this period would remain a mystery until our further analysis in the next chapter. 
Situation changed when Tung started his second term in mid-2002. From 2003 onward, 
there was a rebound of state power. The state power became strong while the business power 
remained very weak. Politics of Hong Kong was once again under the control of officials serving as 
administrative officers, and fitted the descriptions of partisan state model. The sudden revival of 
bureaucratic influence after 5 years of fatigue was another mystery that required further discussions. 
4.5. Summary of Findings 
After evaluating the change of state and business power throughout the studied period, we 
would like to investigate the causes of these changes. At the moment we could find that the change 
of state and business power occurred in a timeframe similar to that of the transformation of the 
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business community network structure. Simple correlation tests were performed to confirm whether 
these changes were associated. 
As revealed in table 4.7, business power was significantly correlated with indicators 
reflecting the characteristics of the Executive Council as well as those of the business community. It 
was highly correlated with the average power of non-governmental councilors (r=0.942), the 
proportion of HSIC firms being represented in the council (r=0.708) and the proportion of HSIC 
representatives in the Executive Council (r=0.826). There was also a medium strength correlation 
between business power and the average prominence of HSIC firms in the business community 
(r=0.446), although this correlation was likely to be underestimated owing to limitation of data. The 
average power of non-governmental councilors (r=0.497) and HSIC representatives (r=0.514), as 
well as the proportion of the represented firms among HSIC firms (r=0.549) and that of HSIC 
representatives in the Executive Council (r=0.619), were also significantly correlated with the 
average prominence of HSIC firms. Although the discoveries from bivariate correlations might not 
Table 4.7. Correlations between State Power, Business Power and the Characteristics of Executive 
Council and Business Community 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State Power Business Average Average Average Percentage Percentage Average 
Power Power of Power of Power of of HSIC of rep. of Prominence 
Executive Non-Govt. HSIC firm firms HSIC firms of HSIC 
Councilor Councilor Rep. represented in Council firms # 
in Council" 
(1) 1 
(2) 0.042 1 
(3) 0.551** 0.765** 1 
(4) -0.014 0.942** 0.790** 1 
(5) 0.095 0.896** 0.792** 0.954** 1 
(6) -0.090 0.708** 0.606** 0.862** 0.856** 1 
(7) -0.077 0.826** 0.647* 0.933** 0.914** 0.938** 1 
(8) 0.396 0.446* 0.482* 0.497* 0.514* 0.549** 0.619** 1 
Mean 3.708 1.108 1.414 0.807 1.255 21.228 23.001 3.647 
S.D. 1.899 1.596 0.952 1.262 1.710 14.938 14.150 0.723 
* p<0.05 , ** p<0.01 
# Only the data of 1982, 1986, 1989, 1997, 2000 and 2004 was available. The values of these years were assigned as 
the value throughout the subsequent interval period. 
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be conclusive, it would be reasonable to suggest that the changes in social interactions among 
Executive Councilors, the changing pattern in appointing councilors and the structural 
transformation of the business community were major factors affecting the business power. 
Subsequently, these factors contributed greatly to the shifting pattern of state-business relations. 
In order to investigate the mechanism leading to the change in state and business power, as 
well as to illustrate the interaction of state-business relations,the network characteristics of the 
Executive Council and the business networks, a detailed analysis of historical events was necessary. 
We would divide the studied period into four sections according to the state and business power, as 
revealed in table 4.6. In the following chapters, we would discuss the changes of state-business 
relations, the network structure of the Executive Council and business networks, as well as the 
possible causes and impacts of these changes. 
66 
Chapter 5. State-Business Relations from 1982 to 1988: On the Edge of 
Transformations 
The State-Business relations in early 1980s were apparently stable. There was not much 
change in the relative power of the state and the business. Only subtle changes could be detected in 
the network structure of the business community and the Executive Council. It was, however, not a 
period of insignificance. Transformations in the political environment, as well as those within the 
business sector, would have profound impacts upon the State-Business relations of the subsequent 
period. 
5.1. Findings in the Period 
In the period between 1982 and 1988, the average power index scores of representatives 
from the state and the business were similar. The average state power ranged from 3 to 5, which was 
at a medium to strong level. Except in 1982, business power was also medium to strong in the 
period, ranging from 3.00 to 4.67. The State-Business relations in the period fitted the description of 
the guardian state model, as Hong Kong was being ruled by the synarchy of the business and the 
state in the period. 
Table 5.1. Summary of Findings, 1982-1988 
Year Average State Business Average No. of No. of No. of Ave. 
Power Power Power Prom. Prom. Prom. HSIC Power of 
Firms Firm Reps Rep. HSIC 
Rep. 
1982 2.21 5 0.66 4.18 17 3 6 1.33 
1983 3.00 3 4.20 5 7 1.43 
1984 2.53 3 3.00 6 9 3.33 
1985 2.88 3 3.83 6 8 3.75 
1986 2.64 3 4.67 3.75 14 6 5 4.40 
1987 2.13 5 3.20 5 5 2.80 
1988 2.29 5 3.40 5 5 3.40 
67 
There was a relatively well-connected social network within the business community. The 
average prominence score of HSIC firms, an indicator reflecting the connectedness of the business 
community, was 4.18 out of 6 in 1982, and it slightly declined to 3.75 in 1986. The value was high 
when compared with the figure of the subsequent period. In 1982 there were 17 prominent firms, 
defined as business firms with prominence score not less than 5 over 6, while there were 14 
prominent firms in 1986. Despite the slight decrease, nearly half of the HSIC firms remained 
prominent in 1986. There were 3 representatives from these prominent firms in the Executive 
Council in 1982, and the number increased to 5 or 6 in the following years. This indicated that 
except in 1982, more than one-third of Executive Councilors could represent the interest of the 
prominent firms. If we counted the representatives of all HSIC firms, the figure ranged from 5 to 9. 
In 1984 and 1985, HSIC representatives constituted more than half of the Executive Council. 
As illuminated by the discussions above, the power of the state and the business was similar 
and a synarchy was effectively formed. Besides, representatives from the prominent firms and 
HSIC firms constituted a large portion in the Executive Council, and the network within the 
business community was relatively strong in the period. These factors probably facilitated business 
influence within the Executive Council. State-business relations were stable in the period, and so 
was the network structure of the business community despite a minor trend of decreasing firm 
prominence. 
5.2. Events in the Period 
5.2.1. The Problem of Political Future 
The discussion so far assumed that only the Hong Kong government and businessmen in 
Hong Kong competed for political power. This would be an over-simplification, as Hong Kong was 
a crown colony of Britain bordering the People's Republic of China. Both London and Beijing 
would be able to play a role in Hong Kong politics if they were determined to do so. Nevertheless, 
68 
Hong Kong enjoyed decades of autonomy from these giants in the post-war era. Wishing to 
preserve a window for supplies during the blockage initiated by the Korean War, as well as avoiding 
to trigger the anti-communist mood of the United States, China restrained itself from Hong Kong 
politics until the 1980s (Miners 1998:5). Even in the 1967 riot sparked off as an offshoot of Cultural 
Revolution, the Maoist demonstrators did not demand the retreat of the British (p.7). 
The British government also intervened little in the affairs of Hong Kong. The British 
colonial policy stressed the self-reliance of its colony, and London would seldom intervene unless 
there was a major crisis (Mills 1970). Although colonial officials would act according to the interest 
of British Empire, their interpretation of the British interest was often different from that of the 
Whitehall. Although they believed that the interest of Hong Kong coincided with that of the whole 
empire, colonial officials in Hong Kong would not hesitate to clash with London if they threatened 
the interest of British Hong Kong (Tsang 2007:171-2). These colonial officials also had a strong 
sense of belonging to the colonial government, so they considered themselves as civil servants of 
Hong Kong rather than that of the United Kingdom (p. 177). In the 1960s, officials in the Foreign 
Office even nicknamed the colonial government as "the republic of Hong Kong" (p. 141). The post-
war decline of the British Empire also diminished London's ability to intervene. After the 
establishment of Malaysia in 1963, Hong Kong became an isolated enclave thousand kilometers 
away from metropolitan Britain. This created room for the colonial government to ignore or mislead 
the sovereign in London (Goodstadt 2005: 51-2). As a result, state-business relations were mainly 
an issue between the colonial government and the business sector in post-war Hong Kong. 
This was no longer the case after the problem of Hong Kong's future arose. While the 
territory at the south of Boundary Street was ceded to Britain through international treaties, the area 
northwards was leased territories and the lease would expire on 1st July 1997. In late 1970s, 
businessmen and bankers worried about mortgages as the deadline was approaching, and demanded 
the problem to be solved. Sir Murray MacLehose, the Governor of Hong Kong then, visited Beijing 
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in 1979 for this matter and realized that the Chinese Government was determined to recover Hong 
Kong (Tsang 2004:212-5). Initially the Chinese determination was not noticed by the general 
public, but in 1981 the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party formally decided to recover the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997 (p.217). Lengthy negotiations between China and the United 
Kingdom began in 1982. The Chinese Government dismissed the idea of "three-legged stool", 
which meant that it considered the negotiation as the matter of two sovereign states and thus denied 
Hong Kong a direct role (p.222). Eventually, the Joint Declaration was signed on 26th September 
1984, and it was agreed that Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China from July 1997 onwards (Pp.225-7). At this moment the influence of 
London and Beijing would inevitably affect the politics of Hong Kong. As Beijing became the 
future sovereign of the territory, its relations with the business sector would be a factor affecting the 
state-business relations. 
5.2.2. Beijing-Business Relations 
The relations between Beijing and the business sector were not intimate at the beginning. 
The People's Republic of China is a communist country, and its economic reform was in its infancy 
at the wake of the 1980s. The business sector, as expected, favoured capitalist economy and was 
anti-communist. Because of these reasons, they were friendly with the colonial government and 
wished to maintain the status quo (Goodstadt 2005:107). 
Public opinion in early 1980s showed that the public wished to maintain the British presence 
in Hong Kong. Some suggested ignoring the treaty of Peking in 1898.Some suggested continuing 
British governance while admitting the Chinese sovereignty over Hong KongSome hoped Britain 
could extend the lease of New Territories for 30 years (Chung 2001:34-5). The business sector once 
expected that they could make use of the economic advantages to persuade Beijing to put aside their 
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political considerations (Scott 1989:203-4). A local tycoon even called for the maintenance of the 
status quo in exchange for joint ventures in China (Hong Kong Standard, 29/7/1982). 
As preparation of recovering Hong Kong's sovereignty, Beijing initiated its united front 
work in Hong Kong. United front was a strategy commonly used by the Chinese Communist Party. 
It aimed at gaining the support of non-communists as a means to achieve the goal of the party, or to 
isolate the enemy of the party (Goodstadt 2000:725). The united front work was considered as 
necessary, sinceBeijing needed the help of local elite in ruling Hong Kong. Although a number of 
members of the Chinese Communist Party resided in Hong Kong, Beijing did not regard them as 
the candidates of the future's ruling elite. Most party members in Hong Kong joined the party 
before the Cultural Revolution, and most of them were elderly and blue-collar workers. Some 
younger party members had professional backgrounds, however, most of them had arrived in Hong 
Kong for a relatively short period and were not familiar with the operation of the colonial 
government (Ma 2007:35). In fact, Deng Xiao Peng, then the leader of China, rejected the 
possibility of ruling Hong Kong by communists. He stressed that "the people who rule Hong Kong 
must include leftist, but the fewer the better. There should also be some rightists, but more 
moderates should be picked. This will make everybody happier (Deng 1997)." Leaders in the 
Chinese Government, being Marxists, believed that Capitalist societies like Hong Kong were 
dominated by businessmen. The business sector thus became the major target of united Front work, 
as they were supposed to be a major constituent of the post-handover ruling elite (Goodstadt 
2000:727). 
The economic reform initiated in late 1970s was also a reason for Beijing's special attention 
on the business sector. At the moment China was thirsty for foreign investment, and capital from 
Hong Kong was the main source of the much needed investment. In the period between 1979 and 
1995, capital from Hong Kong constituted nearly two-third of all foreign investment in China. In 
the period, a number of Hong Kong business firms decided to be re-domiciled elsewhere, while 
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there had been capital outflow from Hong Kong since 1983 (p.728). This triggered the nerves of 
Beijing, as this would lead to a braindrain from Hong Kong, as well as the reduction in its potential 
source of foreign investment. As a result, to attract businessmen to invest in the mainland became a 
major target of united front work (Wong 1997:108). 
Initially the united front work was performed by Xinhua New Agency, the representative of 
Beijing in Hong Kong, which was mainly targeted on the emerging local Chinese businessmen (Xu 
1993:132). The united front work was mainly conducted through informal channels, for example, 
dinners and banquets held by the officials of Xinhua New Agency for meeting local businessmen. 
Personal friendship was build up as a means to win the businessmen's support (Wong 1997:116). 
The early stage of united front work was performed in an inclusive manner. Although the business 
sector was the major target, various groups of social elite were also contacted (p. 117). Relations 
with democrats were also maintained through promising the prospect of democratic reforms 
(Goodstadt 2000:732-3). 
The establishment of Beijing-Business alliance was triggered by a consultative document 
published by the colonial government. As mentioned earlier, this document related to the 
constitutional reform of the colonial government suggested a possibility of democratization. The 
document angered the Chinese Government, as they worried that it would be a British conspiracy to 
retain its control. Beijing was sensitive towards the matter of sovereignty, and they believed that 
sovereignty meant complete control. Representative politics, according to this view, would diminish 
the ability for Beijing to control Hong Kong, and therefore led to conflicts and disorder (Scot 
1989:286). Furthermore, businessmen in Hong Kong also disliked democratization, as this would 
end their political privileges in the existing system. They also worried that democracy would made 
Hong Kong a welfare state and did harm to the economic environment (p.281). After this event, the 
business sector became a close ally of Beijing. They worked hand-in-hand to oppose possible 
British proposal for democratization, as well as to resist the democrats who supported democratic 
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reforms. Beijing set up its own political bodies and absorbed business elite into them. In 1985, the 
Basic Law Drafting Committee was established to draft the Basic Law, the constitution of post-
handover Hong Kong. In the committee, 23 of the committee members represented Hong Kong, and 
16 of them had business or professional background. The Basic Law Consultative Committee was 
also set up to support the running of the Drafting Committee, which was also dominated by 
members with business or professional background (Goodstadt 2000:729). 
Although the business sector became a major ally of Beijing, the united front work of the 
latter remained open-ended up to 1988. Although Beijing became increasingly skeptical about the 
democrats, they remained a target of political absorption (Pp.732-3). A smooth transition was 
expected, and the role of administrative officers in the polity of Hong Kong had not been 
questioned yet. 
5.2.3. Localization of the Business Community 
In the period between 1982 and 1988, there was also a wave of localization in Hong Kong's 
business community. This trend was initiated in late 1970s, and it reached the climax in early 1980s 
and did not end until the 1990s. Many expatriate-owned HSIC firms, including the prominent ones, 
shifted hands. 
In most of the colonial period, business in Hong Kong was dominated by business firms 
under the control of expatriates. These firms played a significant role in the founding of the colony 
in mid-nineteenth century, and they controlled most of the public utilities of the town (Feng 1996:2-
71). In the early post war era, the economy of Hong Kong was dominated by four hongs and a bank. 
These conglomerates, including Jardine Matheson, Hutchison International, John Swire and Sons, 
Wheelock Marden and HSBC, were under the control of expatriates (Pp. 136-212). These expatriate 
firms were not only prominent in terms of economy, but also in terms of power. There was a 
quotation which described the city as being "run by the Jockey Club, Jardine and Matheson, the 
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Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) and the Governor - in that order" (Hughes 1976). Although 
this account was too exaggerated, directors from major hongs still dominated a large portion of 
seats in the Executive Council, Legislative Council and other advisory bodies up to late 1970s 
(Davies 1977). 
The tide changed in late 1970s, and local Chinese businessmen replaced expatriates as the 
dominant players in Hong Kong economy. During the financial crisis in 1973, Hutchison 
International suffered from a series of failed investments, and it was at the edge of bankruptcy in the 
following year. Eventually it had to sell 33.65% of its stocks to HSBC, who wished to sell the firm 
after it returned to profit, in 1975. The management team appointed by HSBC returned the firm to 
profit in a year's time and restructured the firm as Hutchison Whampoa in the following year (Feng 
1996: 164-7). On 25th September 1979, HSBC reached an agreement with Li Kar-Shing, and the 
old-brand expatriate hong was then under the control of an emerging local Chinese tycoon (p.240). 
A batch of expatriate firms shifted hands in early 1980s, while Li Kar-Shing purchased Hong Kong 
Electric from Jardine Matheson in 1985 (p.247), another Chinese tycoon Pao Yue-Kong purchased 
Wharf from Jardine in 1980 (Pp.254-60) and turned Wheelock Marden into his flagship in 1985 
(p.263). Some of the surviving expatriate firms internationalized itself and diverted their investment 
out of Hong Kong. Jardine Matheson re-domiciled the firm to Bermuda in 1984 (p.293) with its 
stocks de-listed from Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1995 (p.350).HSBC restructured itself into a 
global bank registered in London in 1989 (Pp. 305-9) and moved its headquarter to London after 
merging with Midland Bank in 1992 (p.339). Other expatriate firms took a more low-profile stance 
and their dominance over Hong Kong economy was over. 
Political change might cause some of these expatriate firms to retreat from Hong Kong, as 
illustrated by Jardine Matheson's action. This could not explain the decline of expatriatea, as many 
of them suffered from poor performance before the handover became an issue. One of the reasons 
for their failure was their history as hongs which focused on trade between treaty ports in China. 
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Based on their past experience, as well as a sense of racial superiority, they avoided direct contact 
with the locals or direct investments into the colony (Goodstadt 2005:160-1). They relied on local 
compradors in the management of their business. This mode of business was successful in pre-war 
China, when China relied on reputed foreign firms to access much needed capital, technology and 
business opportunities. This was not the case in post-war Hong Kong, when treaty ports in China 
were closed after the establishment of People's Republic of China in 1949. The rise of local Chinese 
business upon industrialization also accelerated the decline of expatriate firms. Initially local 
industrialists relied on expatriate firms to deal with foreign buyers, but they were increasingly 
independent when their business bloomed. After the 1970s, most of these local Chinese fimis could 
deal with the foreigners through their own efforts (p. 162, Feng 1996:281). The investment strategy 
of expatriate firms also hindered them from success. Realizing their expatriate identity, these firms 
treated Hong Kong as a borrowed place and they hesitated about putting their investment into the 
city. They feared that their investment might be in vain if Hong Kong was handed back to China 
(Feng 1996:278). As a result, they diverted their investment and therefore gained little from the 
economic takeoff in Hong Kong (Feng 1997:386). In the 1950s, Hong Kong changed its role from 
an entrepot to an industrial city. However, most expatriate firms invested little in industry and relied 
on the trading of raw materials. Local Chinese businessmen were the major investors in industry. It 
could be expected that they benefited most from the industrial development (p.388). Many 
expatriate firms also decided to sell their real estate properties when the Cultural Revolution began 
in China in 1966. Therefore they missed the bloom in real estate market in the 1970s. Their 
insensitivity towards the changes in China also caused them to miss the opportunities created by the 
Chinese economic reform since 1978 (Feng 1996:279). 
This trend of localization challenged the established pattern of state-business relations in 
two ways. At first, the arrangements and agreements of state-business relations were settled while 
expatriate firms dominated Hong Kong's economy. The patterns of state-business interactions were 
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expected to be transformed as the players were different. Localized firms also behaved differently in 
the business community while compared with the expatriate firms. These issues will be discussed in 
details in the following section. 
5.3. Impacts of the Events 
5.3.1. Impacts from the Role of Sovereigns 
The political future of Hong Kong reduced the relative autonomy of the territory. While the 
idea of three-legged stool was rejected by Beijing, the influence of London and Beijing on policy 
issues spanning across 1997 would be inevitable. The stance of the new and old sovereigns would 
affect the state-business relations in Hong Kong. This could be illustrated by the alliance between 
Beijing and the business sector. Through this political alliance, the business sector successfully 
defended its political privileges and stopped the colonial government from implementing an early 
political reform. The Beijing government became a new channel for the business sector to affect 
colonial policies. At the same time, political reform was no longer a local issue as the opinion of 
Beijing became influential. 
State-business relations in Hong Kong therefore became increasingly complex, because it 
became the issue of four parties: the business sector, the colonial government, London and Beijing. 
Although the latter two seldom participated in the affairs of Hong Kong on a daily basis, their 
presence started lo be considered in state-business relations. One of the informants expressed that "I 
am not the typical elite that could be found in the Executive Council. I was being appointed as they 
need someone who could communicate with Beijing, when the fate of Hong Kong became 
apparant." The informant had connections with Beijing as a representative of professional bodies. 
This was likely to be the reason behind the appointment. Although the opinions from the informant, 
according to the informant's personal account, carried less weight while compared with those of 
business representatives, it was another story in issues related with post-handover arrangements. "In 
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such case my opinions would be essential and influential, and they were not sure whether their 
decison would be accepted by Beijing", the informant revealed. The case illustrated that the 
attitudes of Beijing would always be taken into consideration during state-business interactions. 
The influence of London and Beijing did not reach its full extent in the period between 1982 
and 1998. The alliance between Beijing and the business sector remained relatively limited while 
compared with the subsequent period. In any case, the problem of political future paved ways for 
London and Beijing to exert their influence on the internal politics of Hong Kong, while the initial 
cooperation between Beijing and the business sector made their more intimate relations in the 1990s 
possible. The effect of sovereign factor and Beijing-Business alliance became much more 
significant in the period between 1989 and 1996, as the tension in Sino-British relations intensified. 
We will discuss it further in the next chapter. 
5.3.2. Impacts from Localization of the Business Sector 
The localization of the business sector had changed the composition of HSIC firms since the 
1980s. Although a large portion of HSIC firms remained expatriate in the period despite the wave 
of takeover, the effect of this wave emerged in the subsequent period. In the 1980s, around one third 
of HSIC firms were under the control of expatriate capital. The expatriate component of HSIC firms 
was reduced greatly after mid-1990s. Only 18.18% of HSIC firms were expatriate in 1997, and the 
figure further decreased to 12.12% in 2004 (table 5.2). The general trend was that local Chinese 
capital replaced their expatriate counterparts and dominated the economy of Hong Kong. The role 
of the Mainlandaiso increased after the handover. In 1997, there were only three HSIC firms being 
controlled by Mainland capital, and the figure increased to nine in 2004. This indicated that at the 
end of the studied period, nearly one-third of HSIC firms were controlled by Mainland capital (table 
5.3). 
77 
Table 5.2. HSIC Firms under the control of expatriate capital 
Year Expatriate HSIC firms Number % among Average Average Average Average 
studied Prom, of Prom, of Prom, of Prom, of 
HSIC Expat. all firms 2 non-exp. local 
firms firms ‘ firms ^ firms 4 
1982 HSBC 
Hong Kong Telephone 
Hong Kong Electric 
Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering 
Jardine Matheson 
Jardine Security 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel 12 37.50% 4.67 4.18 3.9 3.9 
Wheelock Marden 
Wheelock maritime 
China Light and Power 
Swire Pacific 
Hong Kong Land 
1986 HSBC 
Hong Kong Land 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel 
Swire Pacific 
Jardine Matheson g 28.13% 3.88 3.75 3.7 3.7 
Jardine Security 
Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering 
China Light and Power 
Hong Kong Telephone 
1990 HSBC 
Hong Kong Land 
Swire Pacific 
China Light and Power 
Cathay Pacific 
Mandarin Oriental 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel 12 36.36% 4 4.03 4.05 4.05 
Jardine Matheson 
Jardine Strategy 
Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering 
Dairy Farm International 
Hong Kong Telecom 
1997 Hong Kong Telecom 
China Light and Power 
Swire Pacific 6 18.18% 3.5 2.9 2.78 3 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel 
HSBC 
Cathay Pacific 
2000 Hong Kong Telecom 
China Light and Power 
Swire Pacific 5 15.15% 3.8 2.48 2.25 2.56 
Cathay Pacific 
HSBC 
2004 Cathay Pacific 
� � … ^ n 4 12.12% 4.25 2.33 2.07 2.4 China Light and Power 
Swire Pacific 
‘ANOVA: dfi=5, d f 2 = 4 7 , F=1.172, p=0.339 
2ANOVA: df,=5, df2=190, F=7.443, p<0.001 
3 ANOVA: df,=5, df2=147, F=5.698, pO.OOl 
4 ANOVA: df,=5，df2=130, F=10.620, p<0.01 
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Table 5.3. HSIC Firms under the Control of Mainland Capital 
Year Mainland HSIC firms Number % among Average Average 
studied HSIC Prominence Prominence 
firms of Mainland of all firms 
firms 
1997 CITIC Pacific 
Guangdong Investment 3 9.09% 1 2.9 
China Resources 
2000 Shanghai Industrial 
CITIC Pacific 
China Mobile 5 15.15% 0.8 2.48 
Legend 
China Resources 









The change from expatriate dominance to Chinese dominance altered the structure of the 
business community. As discussed in the last chapter, there was a fragmentation of the business 
community in the 1990s. There was a significant change in the average prominence of HSIC 
firms.The average prominence ranged from 3.75 to 4.18 before 1990, and it then decreased to a 
range between 2.33 and 2.90 from 1997 onwards (table 5.2). This change was mainly caused by the 
decrease in closure score of HSIC firms (table 4.3), which indicated an increased fragmentation of 
the clusters formed by these firms (appendix 3). We could also notice that there was no significant 
change in the average prominence of expatriate firms, and they scored higher than the average 
prominence of all HSIC firms except in 1990. The difference was more dramatic from 1997 
onwards, when there was a drop in the average prominence of all HSIC firms. This drop of average 
prominence occurred at the same time as the proportion of expatriates among HSIC firms 
decreased. This suggested that when compared with expatriate firms, local Chinese firms and firms 
from the Mainland were less likely to form large clusters. As the expatriate component among 
HSIC firms diminished, the community of HSIC firms became more fragmented and the average 
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prominence dropped. These changes also indirectly decreased the political power of the business 
sector in general, as average prominence and business power were positively correlated (table 4.8). 
The increasing role of Mainland capital might worsen the problem, since the average prominence of 
Mainland firms was much lower than the average of all firms (table 5.3). 
A similar pattern could also be found in some previous research. In a study comparing the 
interlocking directorship of Hong Kong business firms in 1976, 1981 and 1986, an increasing role 
of local Chinese business and a simultaneous decline in inter-firm linkages were discovered (Wong 
1996). Business groups led by local Chinese emerged in 1981 (p. 104). These newly formed group 
dominated the business community in 1986, and the number of expatriate business groups 
decreased. When compared with 1976 and 1981, the linkage between business groups in 1986 
decreased in terms of both ownership and directorship. Capital and directors were focused into 
smaller clusters (Pp. 107-8). Another study compared the interlocking directorship in 1983 and 
1998It was found that while local Chinese capital replaced their expatriate counterparts for over 
fifteen years, the new business groups led by local capital were more fragmented than those led by 
expatriate capital more than a decade before (Lui and Chiu 2004:42). 
There were some studies about the interlocking behaviour of Chinese business firms, 
including Wong Siu Lun's (1985) study on Chinese family firms, Numazacki's (1986) study on 
Taiwanese firms and Hamiliton's (1987) study on East Asian enterprise groups. Many of these 
studies pointed out that the Chinese business community had a low level of impersonal ownership, 
and family ownership remained a dominant feature. The business groups formed by Chinese 
business were likely loose overlapping structures tied together through personal relations. These 
groups often broke down while new groups often emerged, as Chinese businessmen dispersed 
inheritance among all of their sons (Scott 1992). 
After a series of in-depth interviews with Hong Kong industrialists who were ethnically 
Shanghaiese, Wong Siu Lun (1988) reported a way how Chinese businessmen ran businesses. 
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Nepotism was a common feature among those studied firms. The business would not only be owned 
by a family, but the key decision making positions would also be occupied by core family members 
(p. 141). The purpose of these practices was to prevent dissipation of family properties and business 
profits to outsiders. Even when these firms were partnerships, or when these firms were developed 
into public listed companies, these characteristics of family enterprises would be preserved (Pp. 148-
9). Most Chinese business firms were family enterprises, and they emphasized the control of the 
firm by family members. Besides securing the ownership of their firms, they would also ensure the 
management was controlled by family members, rather than leaving it to professionals outside. As a 
result, family members would occupy and seize the control over the board of directors, and the 
whole firm would be led by a family leader who would manage the firm in a paternalistic manner 
(Feng 1997:511-2). When these family leaders decided to retire, they would expect their role could 
be succeeded by their descendants. Hence, they invested heavily in the education of their children, 
and exposed them to the business network early as a means of leadership training (Zheng and Wong 
2004:83-8). In western societies, the division of ownership and management is a common 
phenomenon in business firms. In case of succession, the descendants often leave the management 
to the directors and act as rent seekers. However, this is not the case in Chinese business firms. 
As a result, the board of directors of a Chinese firm was mainly composed of family 
members under the leadership of the leader. New directors would usually come from the younger 
generation of the same family. Compared with firms owned by westerners, there were less outsiders 
in the board of directors, and the interlocking of directors between Chinese business firms was 
expectedly less extensive. More inter-firm interactions would be expected between firms owned by 
the same family, rather than firms which were not. 
There was mutual mistrust between Chinese businessmen.Their relations could be quite 
hostile despite the apparent harmony. Simon Murray, a senior administrator in Hutchinson 
Whampoa, was once invited by Cheng Yu-Tung, the chairman of New World Development, for a 
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personal gathering. Murray believed that it should not be problematic, as Cheng often played golf 
with his boss Li Kar-Shing. It turned out that Li was not happy about this invitation, and warned 
Murray to take care as Cheng was cunning (Studell 2007:79). 
The social network formed by Chinese firms therefore tended to be more fragmented. The 
rise of Chinese business and the fall of their expatriate counterparts contributed to the overall 
fragmentation of the business community. In a fragmented business community, there would be 
severe competitions between business firms. This would lead to a decrease of consensus within the 
business sector, and subsequently made the negotiations between the state and the business more 
difficult (Lui and Chiu 2004:46-8). This could explain why the business power declined after late 
1980s, when the division within the business community intensified. 
However, while communities of Chinese business firms tends to be fragmented, the 
fragmentation of Hong Kong's business community was initiated only after the start of the 1990s. 
The average prominence score of non-expatriate firms was between 3.7 and 4.05 in the 1980s, and 
significantly decreased to 2.78 in 1997. The figure then further declined to 2.07 in 2004. If we 
excluded the influence of those firms controlled by Mainland capital, the average prominence of 
local firm declined from 4.05 in 1990 to 3 in 1997. It then further dropped to 2.40 in 2004 (table 
5.2). A possible explanation was that while Chinese firms tended to form poor cooperate networks, 
this was only a prerequisite of fragmentation rather than the cause of it. Events in the 1990s were 
likely to be the direct cause of the fragmentation in the business community, and we will cover them 
in the following chapter. 
5.4. Summary 
In early i980s, the state-business relations remained stable. Business representatives had 
significant influence within the Executive Council, as reflected from our findings.There was also a 
synarchy of the state bureaucrats and the business elite. Prominent business firms were well 
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represented in the council, while the business community remained united as indicated by the inter-
connectedness of the network of interlocking directors. This network characteristic of the business 
sector probably contributed to their political influences. 
The political environment and the composition of the business community, however, 
underwent a massive transformation in the same period. As the fate of Hong Kong was settled in 
the Joint Declaration, the diplomatic tug-of-war between London and Beijing hampered the 
autonomy once enjoyed by the colonial government. The business sector started their contact with 
the new sovereign in Beijing, and eventually was allied with the sovereign for their common 
political interest. Last but not least, the rise of local Chinese capital ended the expatriate hegemony 
in Hong Kong economy, and they behaved differently from their expatriate counterparts. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, these transformations influenced the state-business relations in the 
following decades. 
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Chapter 6. State-Business Relations from 1989 to 1996: Transition and 
Transformations 
The period between 1989 and 1996 was called the transitional period. During these seven 
years, Hong Kong had to prepare itself to become part of the People's Republic of China in 1997. A 
process of rapid decolonization and political realignment was therefore expected. In addition, 
complications from a deteriorating political environment hampered the plan of smooth transition. 
This resulted in transformations in state-business relations and the structure of the business 
community, which had a profound impact on the post-handover political landscape. 
6.1. Findings in the Period 
Business power was weak in the period between 1989 and 1996. Business power decreased 
from 3.40 in 1988 to 0.67 in 1989, and further decreased to 0 in 1993. The state power in the period 
was much stronger with a power index score of 5 throughout the period. There was not much 
change, however, when the state power was compared with the previous period. The pattern of 
Table 6.1. Summary of Findings, 1989-1996 
Year Average State Business Average No. of No. of No. of Ave. 
Power Power Power Prom. Prom. Prom. HSIC Power of 
Firms Firm Rep. HSIC 
Reps Rep. 
1989 1.21 5 0.67 3 5 0.67 
1990 1.13 5 0.67 4.03 13 3 3 0.67 
1991 1.13 5 0.67 3 3 0.67 
1992 1.21 5 0.67 3 3 0.67 
1993 1.56 5 0 2 2 0 
1994 1.15 5 0 2 2 0 
1995 1.15 5 0 2 2 0 
1996 1.07 5 0 2 2 0 
1997 (for comparison) 0.18 1 0 2.90 5 1 2 0 
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state-business relations fitted the description of the partisan state model. The relative power of the 
business sector was weak and the state was expected to enjoy more autonomy. 
The number of prominent firm representatives was declining. It dropped from 5 in 1988 to 3 
in 1989, and further decreased to 2 from 1993 onwards. A similar decline could be found in the 
number of HSIC representatives. The figure was 5 in 1989, dropped to 2 in 1990 and had decreased 
to 2 since 1993. The average power of all HSIC firms was not better than that of the prominent 
firms, which was 0.67 from 1989 to 1992, and became 0 afterwards. 
The social network in the business community was also transformed in the period, although 
the decline of average prominence score, measured by the brokerage and closure of business firms 
in the business community, occurred after the decline of business power and the number of business 
representatives in the Executive Council. In 1990, the business sector remained a well-connected 
network. The average prominence score was 4.03, and 13 out of 33 HSIC firms had their promince 
score equal to or more than five. There was not much difference from the previous period. The 
situation was much different after the end of the period. In 1997, one year after this period, the 
average prominence score dropped to 2.90, and there were only 5 prominent firms with prominence 
score not less than five. As mentioned in chapter 4, this was caused by the decrease in closure 
scores resulted from the fragmentation of the business community. 
In summary, business power declined at the beginning of the period, and so did the number 
of Executive Councilors representing prominent business and HSIC firms. The state power, 
however, remained intact, and this increased the relative power of the state. While average 
prominence of HSIC firms remained high at the beginning of the period, the business community 
became much more fragmented one year after the end of the period. These findings rejected the 
possibility that the change of business power was caused by the transformation of the business 
community alone. While it was possible that the change of business power might affect the business 
network, it was likely that these changes might interact with each another and be initiated by other 
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causes. We need to look into the historical events in order to clarify the causes of those changes in 
the period. 
6.2. Events in the Period 
6.2.1. Changes in British Policy 
Up to the end of the 1980s, the British government adopted a compromising approach 
towards Beijing. Confrontations with the Chinese government were avoided, and London often 
made concessions while dealing with Beijing. This could be illustrated in the issue of political 
reform. Shortly before the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984, the Hong Kong government 
published a consultative document on the issue of political reform, which suggested a possibility of 
democratization. Beijing resented this document and considered it as a British plot to sustain its 
influence after the handover. China emphasized that convergence would only happen if their 
demand of slowing down the speed of political reforms was satisfied. Britain realized this demand 
and compromised on it. The introduction of direct elections in the Legislative Council was delayed, 
and secret diplomacy was initiated to assure Beijing's cooperation. The public believed that they 
were betrayed by the British government, as it turned the colonial government into an impotent 
"lame duck" (Tsang 2004: 231-5). 
The British policy towards Hong Kong changed significantly after the Tiananmen Incident 
in 1989. Student demonstrators in Beijing demanded political reforms in China, and the movement 
won the sympathy of many Hong Kong citizens. Many Hongkongers supported the movement and 
expected that it would lead to a brighter future of China, as well as that of Hong Kong. The 
crackdown against the movement by military forces in 4th June 1989 resulted in a crisis of 
confidence (Pp.245-8). As a means to restore the confidence of Hong Kong citizens, the colonial 
government announced a massive infra-structural project, which included the building of a new 
airport in Northern Lantau Island. The plan which was aimed at stabilizing the colony could not win 
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the appreciation from Beijing. The Chinese government was suspicious about this plan, and it 
worried the plan would be a British conspiracy to deplete the financial resources of Hong Kong 
prior to the handover. Eventually Beijing agreed to reach an agreement over the new airport issue, 
under the condition that they should be consulted before any major policy matters in Hong Kong 
were decided (Pp.252-3). 
At the same time there were voices from Hong Kong and Britain demanding the British 
government to take a hardliner approach against Beijing. An informant serving in the Executive 
Council during this period revealed that some councilors lobbied London to replace Sir David 
Wilson, the Governor of Hong Kong then, as they resented the weakness of Wilson in front of 
Beijing. Some of these councilors were representatives of British-owned business. Some public 
opinions even suggested tearing up the Sino-British agreement and breaking off all negotiations 
with China (p.248, Miners 1998:27). Politicians in London were not satisfied with the British policy 
towards China. Chris Patten, the last Governor of Hong Kong, commented that "Chinese harassing 
and harrying of my predecessor, particularly over the plans to build a new airport, undermined him 
politically. They made a decent and intelligent man seem weak, when in fact what he was 
attempting to do, believing it to be in Hong Kong's interest, was to win Chinese understanding and 
consent for his policy initiatives (Patten 1998:15)." He believed that British diplomats were 
humiliated by the Chinese despite their good conscience, and this indicated that their compromising 
approach did not work. 
Eventually John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom then, decided to stiffen 
British policy towards Beijing. He appointed Chris Patten, his former compadre in the Conservative 
Party, as the last Governor of Hong Kong in 1992. The arrangement aimed to assure an honourable 
exit from Britain's last remaining colony (Miners 1998:29; Tsang 2004:254). The British decided to 
accelerate the democratization process after the Tiananmen incident (Tsang 2004:249), and this was 
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implemented by Patten through his controversial reform of the electoral arrangements of the 1995 
Legislative Council election (p.256). 
Before Patten could initiate his proposal of political reform, he had to overcome the 
resistance from the Executive Council. Many Executive Councilors, especially those representing 
business interest, opposed the suggestion of altering the arrangement of the 1995 election. Lee Pang 
Fei, a businessman representative, even confronted Patten directly during the meetings. After some 
dispute with Executive Councilors, Patten adjourned the council and expressed his wish to 
reorganize it (Lee 2004:34-5). Lydia Dunn, the senior councilor then, who was also a senior 
executive in British-owned Swire Group, offered her resignation and was followed by the rest of the 
council. According to an informant who resigned from the council at that time, Dunn was loyal to 
Patten as she represented the interest of a British firm. She also advised Patten to appoint those she 
considered as loyal to the British Government. Baroness Dunn and Sir William Purves, the 
chairman of London-based HSBC at that time, were the only councilors who could be reappointed 
into Patten's council. The practice of appointing Legislative Councilors into the Executive Council 
was also discontinued. Besides Lydia Dunn, none of the unofficial councilors were notable public 
figures. The Governor thus controlled the council firmly after this reorganization (Miners 
1998:82b). Patten was supported by his seniors in London who would intervene while necessary. 
When the bill of Patten's reform reached the Legislative Council, it was opposed by councilors with 
business background. M.G. Barrow, a senior manager in Jardine Matheson, was one of them. 
Eventually the Prime Minister phoned Barrow's senior in Britain, making Barrow abstain from the 
vote (Lee 2004:42-3). The change in London's Hong Kong policy resulted in the controversial 
governorship of Patten, which in the end triggered the nerves of Beijing. 
We should notice that Patten's arrival changed tha nature of the Executive Council. While 
the council was once the venue for major business elites and senior bureaucrats to make decisions, 
Patten's restructuring of the council after 1993 turned the council into a platform supporting his 
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Table 6.2. Businessmen and Professionals in Political Bodies Established by Beijing in the 1990s 
Political Bodies Number of Hong Kong Number of Hong Kong Proportion of Businessmen 
Representatives Representatives with or Professionals among 
Business or Professional Hong Kong 
Background Representatives 
Hong Kong Affairs Advisor 185 133 71.89% 
District Affairs Advisor 667 368 55.17% 
Preliminary Working Com. 37 25 67.57% 
Preparatory Committee 94 66 70.21% 
Selection Committee 400 291 72.75% 
Provisional Legislature 60 37 61.67% 
Source: Goodstadt 2000:737 
political reform agenda. Prominent business elites were treated as obstacles of the political reform 
and were removed from the council. As a result, our findings could not reflect the change in 
business or bureaucratic influence in a non-distorted manner. Little was known about the degree of 
this distortion, and triangulation was not possible as none of our informants served in the council 
after 1993. We should keep this limitation in mind while interpreting the findings. 
6.2.2. The Strengthening of Bejing-Business Alliance 
The relations between the business sector and the Chinese government became increasingly 
intimate after the start of the 1990s. After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, there was a complete 
breakdown in the relations between Beijing and the democrats. The latter supported the student 
movement, and was thus considered as subversive (Ma 2007:41). As the democrats won a landslide 
in the Legislative Council Election in 1991 (Tsang 2004:252), this imposed a major threat to 
Beijing. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO) replaced Xinhua News Agency, 
which was more sympathetic to the students in 1989, as the coordinator of united front work. 
HKMAO adopted a more hardliner approach so as to prevent the participation of democrats in its 
political bodies. On one hand, the political absorption by Beijing became more extensive, and the 
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Table 6.3. HSIC Representatives in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 1998-
2003 
Representatives Represented HSIC Firms 
Cheng Kar-shun New World 
Cheng Yiu-chung CITIC Pacific 
Fung Kwok-lun William Li and Fung 
Kwok Ping-sheung Walter Sun Hung Kei Properties 
Lee Hon-chiu Hysan 
Lee Ka-kit Henderson 
Li Kwok-cheung Bank of East Asia 
China Mobile 
Li Tzar-kuoi Victor Cheung Kong Holdings 
Woo Kwong-ching Peter Wharf 
Wheelock 
Yung Chi-kin Larry CITIC Pacific 
Source: Ho 2001:488-9 
united front work was extended to the community level. On the other hand, the work became more 
exclusive as they only welcomed those who were politically conservative (Wong 1997: 118). 
The worsening Sino-British relations and Patten's reform further encouraged the 
strengthening Beijing-business alliance. The economic integration between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland also contributed to closer Beijing-Business cooperations. While businessmen in Hong 
Kong were major foreign investors in the Mainland since the 1980s, most of these investors were 
medium-scaled firms. The larger firms started their massive investment in the Mainland after the 
beginning of the 1990s, further increasing the economic interdependence between Hong Kong and 
the Mainland (Huang 2003:48). At the same time, political affiliations would affect one's business 
opportunity in the Mainland. In 1995, Jardine's proposal to build a container terminal in the 
Mainland was rejected by the Chinese government, on the grounds that the firm supported Patten's 
political reform (p.55). The mutual relationship between Beijing and the business sector thus 
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developed: while the Chinese government relied on the business sector in its struggle with the 
British and the democrats, the latter relied on the former for economic benefits. 
A series of political bodies was set up to facilitate these political absorptions. Hong Kong 
Affairs Advisors and District Affairs Advisors were appointed, although these posts were mainly 
honorific in nature. In 1993, Preliminary Working Committee, which prepared for the establishment 
of Preparatory Committee in 1996, was set up. The Preparatory Committee was responsible for the 
discussion about the method of formation of the SAR government and the first term of the 
Legislative Council after the handover. A Selection Committee, which was responsible for electing 
the first Chief Executive, was formed in consequence of these discussions. When convergence was 
proved impossible as a result of Patten's reform, a Provisional Legislature was appointed so as to 
serve as the Legislative body, before the formation of the first Legislative Council after the 
handover (Goodstadt 2000:729-32). As indicated in table 6.2, most of the seats of these political 
bodies were dominated by those with business or professional background. Businessmen from large 
business firms were also appointed into the political bodies in national level, particularly in the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the practice continued after the handover 
(table 6.3). 
While Beijing once hoped the administrative officers could form the basis of the post-
handover government, the initial plan was interrupted by the political environment. It was planned 
that in the last few years of the colonial rule, an administrative officer would be selected as the 
Vice-Govemor, who would become the Chief Executive after the handover,. However, the plan was 
cancelled as Beijing worried that Patten would influence his senior officials (Cheung 1997:100). 
Civil servants were responsible for supporting and implementing those controversial colonial 
policies including the Pattern's reforms, which made their situation after the handover embarrassing 
(Ma 2007:61; Lau 2002:12). Eventually Tung Chee Hwa, the former chairman of the Hong Kong 
based shipping company OOCL, was elected by the business dominated selection committee as the 
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Chief Executive. Businessmen allied with Beijing became the basis supporting the first SAR 
government. 
6.3. Impacts of the Events 
6.3.1. The Pushing Effect of London 's Policies 
The changing of British policy towards Hong Kong, which resulted in Patten's reform, 
decreased business influence on politics in the last days of the colonial rule. Business 
representatives who could threaten Patten's autonomy were removed from the Executive Council, 
while the new councilor did not have much prestige and did not share a common social network. On 
the other hand, administrative officers were trusted by Patten and London, and could still play a 
significant role in Hong Kong's politics. Three administrative officers including Anson Chan, Chan 
Cho Chak and Sze Cho Cheung were appointed into the council as unofficial members after 
Patten's arrival (Miners 1998:82b). The overall effect of British policy in the period was the 
maintenance of state power on one hand, and the diminution of business power in another. We could 
notice that the mean power index score of non-govemmental councilor suffered from a drop in 
1993, from 0.22 the previous year to zero then. This drop was mainly contributed by the reduction 
of closure score, as their brokerage score decreased to zero much earlier (table 4.1). The mean 
power index score of prominence also dropped from 0.66 in 1992, to zero in 1993 (table 4.5). 
The policy of the colonial government under Patten pushed business support away. 
Businessmen were increasingly treated as obstacles of colonial policy rather than the government's 
partner. With the support of London, the influence of businessmen was swept away from the long-
established synarchy. On the other hand, as the time of British rule was limited, cooperating with 
the colonial government had already become decreasingly attractive. The opportunity cost of a 
cooperative became very great, since Beijing was both their future sovereign as well as business 
partner. The policies of Patten's government fueled the strengthening of Beijing-Business alliance. 
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6.3.2. The Pulling and Fragmenting Effect by Beijing 
As the time factor and the economic environment were favourable, Beijing successfully built 
an alliance with the business sector, while the latter became a successful societal force against 
political reforms suggested by the British or the democrats. The design of the Beijing-Business 
alliance, however, did nothing to prepare the business sector to be a competent ruling elite. The 
design of united front work was to fight against common enemies by including non-communist 
friends, and those who were united were not supposed to provide governance. These allies often 
shared different backgrounds with conflicting interests. In fact, the united front work might actually 
increase the cleavage of the allies, and they would compete for the blessing and patronage of 
Beijing (Ma 2007:49). This was particular harmful to the business community which was mainly 
comprised of Chinese businessmen, as we have illustrated in the last chapter that the social network 
between Chinese firms had the tendency to break down. 
Those who joined the united front work came from diversified backgrounds, which could be 
classified into five different types. Members of the united front work included those loyalists who 
supported the Chinese Communist Party for a long time, intellectuals and academics, ex-elite of the 
coloniai establishment, unstable elite who would become critical to Beijing, as well as those 
opportunists having a low profile. Among those coming from the business sector, they could either 
be loyalist, ex-elite or opportunists (Lo and McMillen 1995:121-4). According to another study, 
there were three main themes of conflict in the united front work. Firstly, it was the conflict 
between the grassroots and the capitalists. Besides, it was the conflict between the loyalists and the 
critics. There were also the conflicts between old patriots and new patriots. The old patriots referred 
to those remaining loyal to the Communist Party for decades, while the new patriots were those 
who newly joined the pro-Beijing camp through united front work. Cheng Yu long, a senior 
member of the pro-Beijing Federation of Trade Union, criticized the new patriots that "we would 
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not differentiate between new patriots and the old ones, but we have to differentiate the real patriots 
from the false ones" (Wong 1997:122-4). Those who were absorbed through united front work were 
indeed competing by showing off their loyalty to Beijing, as well as accusing their rivals of being 
unpatriotic. It was quite often that the Central Government in Beijing needed to act as an arbiter 
(P.125). 
The unity of the allies was fragile as the basis of these patron-client relationships were often 
material interests. One might argue that the relations between the colonial government and the 
business sector were also built on these interests, while this did not fragment the business 
community. This argument did carry some truth, but the interest-exchange mediated by the colonial 
government followed some known sets of procedures and was never explicit. A retired Executive 
Councilor who served as our informant compared the different styles of state-business interest 
exchange. As an insider, the informant realized that the new airport project, initiated years before 
the retirement, would be an opportunity for the colonial government to do the British-owned firms 
the last favour. For example, the construction contract of the Tsing Ma Bridge was given to a British 
construction firm rather than a Korean firm which provided better terms in their proposal. This 
interest-exchange, however, largely followed procedural justices. There was public bidding before 
the decision was made, and the government was able to explain the decision in technical terms. 
Although there were preferential treatments, the terms of winning the bid were made clear to the 
public. In contrast, the interest-exchange with the Chinese government was much more explicit. The 
informant commented that "The colonist way dealing with the business was clever., as it was 
apparantly fair. I was angered by the way how the business received the stocks nowadays. It's a 
naked exchange of interest!" While a series of state-owned enterprises sold their stocks in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, a number of Hong Kong firms were invited as strategic investors. This 
implied that these firms could bring a portion of the stocks before it was available in the market, 
and they would have a better chance to make a profit when compared with ordinary investors. The 
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procedure of selecting strategic investors was not transparent, and clear guidelines were absent. It 
was likely that political loyalty and patron-client-ship played a role in the selection. 
If the informant's account was reliable, we could conclude that the Chinese style of interest-
exchange was one of the causes of the fragmentation of the business community in early 1990s. As 
there was a lack of procedures and regulations, business firms would have to negotiate for their 
interest under the table. Building up patron-client relationships through personal contacts would be 
the primary means for business firms to gain material interest from Beijing. While this could 
encourage loyalty towards Beijing, the process of interest exchange would not be transparent and 
fairness could not be shown. In this scenario, conflicts between the haves and have-nots would be 
ensured, because the latter would question the legitimacy of the gains by the former. The 
competitions and bad-feeling among business firms ensured the disunity of the business community. 
6.4. Summary 
From 1989 onwards, we witnessed the decline of business influence over Hong Kong 
politics. Business influence dropped to a minimum, as the number and the power index score of 
business representatives decreased rapidly at the close of the 1980s. This was probably the result of 
the business preparation for the prospects after the handover, as well as the Beijing-Business 
alliance against the colonial government. 
The tragedy in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent change in British foreign policy 
intensified the conflict between London and Beijing. This further strengthened Beijing's united front 
work towards the business sector, particularly after the arrival of Chris Patten. Beijing lost its hope 
of any "through-train" arrangements, and expected the business sector to be the post-handover 
ruling elite. However, as the alliance between Beijing and the business sector was based on patron-
clientism and material interest, it encouraged members within the business sector to compete for 
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Beijing's blessing. The fierce competition had a centrifugal effect, which could be reflected in the 
decreasing inter-connectedness of business firms, as well as the dispute among the pro-Beijing elite. 
This fragmented business community was supposed to be the master of post-handover Hong 
Kong. A former businessman was arranged to be the first Cheif Executive in post-colonial Hong 
Kong, and his allies with business background would occupy important positions in the new 
government. The consequence was shown to be disastrous, and we would continue the analysis in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7. State-Business Relations from 1997 to 2005: From Fragmentation to 
Dis-articulation 
The period after the handover in 1997 was one of the most troubled years in the political 
history of Hong Kong. There was a series of incidents revealing the poor performance of the new 
SAR government, ranging from the mess during the opening of the new airport to the devastating 
epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. There were endless 
confrontations between the government and the society, and within the government itself. 
Legitimacy crisis erupted and led to the step down of the first Chief Executive of the SAR. In this 
chapter we are going to review how the changes in the previous period, as well as the events during 
the period, created the problem. 
Table 7.1. Summary of Findings, 1997-2002 
Year Average State Business Average No. of No. of No. of Ave. 
Power Power Power Prom. Prom. Prom. HSIC Power of 
Firms Firm Reps Rep. HSIC 
Rep. 
1997 0.18 1 0 2.90 5 1 2 0 
1998 0.14 1 0 1 2 0 
1999 0.14 1 0 1 2 0 
2000 0.15 1 0 2.48 3 0 2 0 
2001 0.15 1 0 0 2 0 
2 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Table 7.2. Summary of Findings, 2003-2005 
Year Average State Business Average No. of No. of No. of Ave. 
Power Power Power Prom. Prom. Prom. HSIC Power of 
Firms Firm Reps Rep. HSIC 
Rep. 
2003 1.68 5 0 1 2 1 
2004 2.21 6 0 2.33 4 0 1 0 
2005 2.00 6 0 0 1 0 
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7.1. Findings in the Period 
The state-business relations in the post-handover period could be divided into two phases. In 
the first phase between 1997 and 2002, the average power of both representatives of the state and 
the business was weak. While business power remained zero, the state power dropped from 5 in 
1996 to 1 in 1997. The figure dropped further to zero in 2002. There were few state representatives 
in the Executive Council in the period. While business representatives dominated the council, they 
failed to form a consolidated group of ruling elite. The second phase started from 2003, and 
dominance of administrative officers recurred. Business power remained zero while state power 
increased from zero in 2002 to 5 in 2003, and increased further to 6 in the following years. 
The fission of the business community continued after the handover. The average 
prominence score, which reflected the degree of inter-connectedness of HSIC firms, was 2.90 in 
1997 and further decreased to 2.48 in 2000 and 2.43 in 2004. The drop was mainly caused by the 
decline of average closure score. 5 out of 33 HSIC firms had their prominence score not less than 5 
in 1997. The figure was 3 and 4 in 2000 and 2004 respectively. Representatives of prominent 
business disappeared from the Executive Council in the interval between 2000 and 2002, as well as 
the period after 2004. There were only 2 HSIC representatives in the period between 1997 and 
2003. It then further decreased to 1 from 2004 onwards. 
If we review the trend from 1989 onwards, we will discover the general picture in which 
there was a gradual decline of business power while the state power was grossly maintained. The 
business sector was increasingly fragmented and the number of business representatives in the 
Executive Council was dropping. The change after the handover generally followed this trend, 
except that the state power was greatly reduced between 1997 and 2002. Several questions arose 
from this atypical pattern: why did state power decrease rapidly in 1997? How could the power of 
administrative officers suddenly rebound to the peak in 2002? What happened in the period which 
created these tremendous changes? 
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Table 7.3. Backgrounds of Executive Councilors, 1982-2005 
广 ‘ T^  1 1 Directors or Executives in … ^ 
Government Employees ‘ „ . � • Others Total 
Business Sector 
5 (33.33%) 8 (53.33%) 2(13 .33%) 15(100%) 
1983 5 (33.33%) 9 (60%) 1 (6.67%) 15(100%) 
1984 5 (29.41%) 11(64.71%) 1 (5.88%) 17(100%) 
1985 5 (31.25%) 10(62.5%) 1(6.25%) 16(100%) 
1986 5 (35.71%) 8(57.14%) 1(7.14%) 14(100%) 
1987 6 (37.50%) 6 (37.50%) 4 (25%) 16(100%) 
1988 5 (35.71%) 5(35.71%) 4 (28.57%) 14(100%) 
1989 5 (35.71%) 5(35.71%) 4 (28.57%) 14(100%) 
1990 5 (33.33%) 5 (33.33%) 5 (33.33%) 15(100%) 
1991 5 (33.33%) 5 (33.33%) 5 (33.33%) 15(100%) 
1992 5 (35.71%) 5(35.71%) 4(28 .57%) 14(100%) 
1993 6 (37.5%) 7 (43.75%) 3(18.75%) 16(100%) 
1994 4 (30.77%) 6(46 .15%) 3 (23.08%) 13(100%) 
1995 4 (30.77%) 6(46.15%) 3 (23.08%) 13 (100%) 
1996 4 (30.77%) 6(46.15%) 3 (23.08%) 13 (100%) 
1997 3 (27.27%) 4(36 .36%) 4 (36.36%) 11 (100%) 
1998 2 (14.29%) 8(57.14%) 4 (28.57%) 14(100%) 
1999 2(14 .29%) 8(57.14%) 4 (28.57%) 14(100%) 
2000 2 (15.38%) 7 (53.85%) 4 (30.77%) 13(100%) 
2001 2 (15.38%) 7 (53.85%) 4 (30.77%) 13 (100%) 
2002 1 (8.33%) 7 (58.33%) 4 (33.33%) 12(100%) 
2003 7 (36.84%) 6(31.58%) 6(31.58%) 19(100%) 
2004 8(42.11%) 5 (26.32%) 6(31.58%) 19(100%) 
200 5 8(38.10%) 7 (33.33%) 6 (28.57%) 21 (100%) 
1 Not include those employed through political appointments 
7.2. Events in the Period 
7.2.1. Business Invasion and the Decline of the State 
After the handover, Tung Chee Hwa, a former businessmen, became the Chief Executive of 
the newly founded Special Administrative Region. During his reign, the Executive Council became 
dominated by the business sector, and businessmen were appointed to official posts originally 
perserved for administrative officers. If we classified Executive Councilors according to their 
reported occupation, the proportion of those reporting themselves as directors or senior executives 
increased in the period between 1998 and 2002. More than half of the councilors in the period had 
business background, while business majority had ceased to exist in the council since 1987 (table 
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7.3). After Tung became the Chief Executive, Anson Chan and Donald Tsang became the only 
administrative officers in the council, while none of the unofficial councilors were appointed from 
the civil services. The business sector expected the rise of Tung could make the government more 
inclined to business interest, and hoped for the reversal of liberal reforms initiated in late colonial 
period (Lau 2002:9). If the occupation of official positions was equivalent to the gain in political 
power, we could conclude that post-handover politics was under the control of the business sector. 
As we will discuss later, this was not the case as the business sector never achieved effective control 
through these posts. 
As civil servants, especially the administrative officers, obeyed Patten's command before the 
handover, their relations with the Beijing-Business alliance became tense. Shortly before Tung 
started his duties as the Chief Executive, he announced that he would de-politicize the civil 
services. He intended to be a strong leader and wished to reduce the civil services as mere followers 
of his command (Cheung 1997:102-3). The value of civil servants also conflicted with that of Tung, 
because they put more emphasis on procedural justice and were relatively more liberal, while Tung 
tended to follow the lines of Beijing and was conservative politically. The civil services questioned 
whether Tung could respect the value of the civil servants (Scott 2003:678), and the relations 
between Tung and the civil services deteriorated after the handover. 
The poor relationship between Tung and civil servants could be reflected in his tension with 
Anson Chan, who was the Chief Secretary as well as the head of civil servants. While Tung was a 
businessman and most of his allies had business background, Chan did not have a good impression 
on the business sector. With dislike of the manner of the business sector in threatening the 
government for their demand, Chan "[had] little respect for most of the big business people in Hong 
Kong (Studell 2007:80)". They also disagreed on various policy issues including education reform, 
the bid for hosting the 2006 Asian Games and the appointment of the new chairman of the Airport 
Authority Board (Lo 2001:127). Chan tended to defend liberal value even if she had to criticize 
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Beijing publicly, while Tung tended to avoid open confrontation with Beijing. While Beijing 
criticized two media organizations in Hong Kong, including RTHK ad Cable TV, for the anti-
government stance of the former and an interview with the Vice-President of the Republic of China 
in Taiwan by the latter, Chan stood up to defend these organizations. The response from Tung was 
much more evasive (p.131). The ultimate conflict between Chan and Tung was induced by Robert 
Chung's incident in 2000. At that time Tung considered that the public opinion survey by Robert 
Chung, a professor in the University of Hong Kong, showed unfavorable results. Andrew Lo, who 
served in the Chief Executive's office, contacted the Vice-Chancellor of the University to reflect 
Tung's resentment against Professor Chung's surveys. Chan openly questioned Lo's credibility and 
demanded his dismissal from the civil services, while Tung continued to trust Lo and questioned the 
motive behind Chan's request. Eventually, the director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 
openly criticized Anson Chan and the civil services of Hong Kong, as they failed to support Tung's 
policies (p. 129). These incidents were only the tip of the iceberg, as the conflict between the civil 
service and the allies of the Chief Executive was not simply the personal disputes between Chan 
and Tung. It was reported that a number of policy secretaries had difficulties in cooperating with 
Tung and the business-dominated Executive Council (Hong Kong iMail, 21/6/2000, A4). 
In his term, Tung tried hard to remove political power from the civil service. In the first few 
years after the handover, several scandals shocked the legitimacy of the civil service. Several civil 
servants' corrupt behaviour of was discovered, while the chaos arose in the bird-flu epidemic, and 
the opening of the new airport further reflected the inefficiency and insensitiveness of the civil 
service (Lo 2001:95-100). This provided the opportunity for Tung to reduce the power of civil 
servants. Reform in the civil service system was initiated, and the apparent goal was to simplify the 
bureaucratic structure and reduce expenses. However, the introduction of contract terms enabled 
Tung's allies in the business sector to serve in the bureaucracy and exert control (pp.88-91). 
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7.2.2. Principal Officials Accountability System: The Heffalump Trap 
While administrative officers were once responsible for policy formulation, Tung tried to 
make some of the unofficial councilors take up the role. For example, Leung Chun Ying was 
assigned to be responsible for housing policies, while Anthony Leung Kam Chung was in-charge of 
educational policies (p.133). The plan was not successful as civil servants resisted the idea, while 
Executive Councilors relied on the help from the civil service as they lacked institutional support 
(Ma 2007:62). Chung Sze Yuen, a retired Executive Councilor reappointed by Tung, commented 
that while Executive Councilors had voting rights in the council, they were not responsible for 
policies. On the other hand, senior officials were often administrative officers who were responsible 
for policies, while they could not vote in the council. Chung suggested that the Executive Council 
should mainly consist of senior officials, mimicking the cabinet in Britain and America, so that they 
could have both the rights and the responsibilities (Chung 2001:231). Eventually, Principal Officials 
Accountability System (POAS) was introduced in July 2002. In this new system, senior officials 
were no longer dominated by administrative officers. Senior officials were appointed by and 
accountable to the Chief Executive, and they were no longer civil servants. All senior officials 
would automatically become official members of the Executive Council. On the other hand, civil 
servants became politically neutral, and their role shifted from formulating policies to supporting 
their politically appointed seniors (Constitutional Affairs Bureau 2002). In this new system, the 
Chief Secretary ceased to be the chief of all civil servants, and he no longer played a role in 
coordinating policy formulations (Lian 2005:64). In short, Tung could assign his own team of 
senior officials by appointing his allies from the business sector. With the change in the role of the 
Chief Secretary, none of the senior officials could confront the Chief Executive by leading a team of 
civil servants, which means that Tung could be secured against the threat of another Anson Chan. 
Tung's policies provided opportunities for the business sector to control the state apparatus 
completely. However, the business sector could never control the state effectively, and subsequently 
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they could not dominate post-handover politics. Although there was a business majority in the 
Executive Council in Tung's first term, the Chief Executive failed to appoint representatives from 
prominent business firms. The average power index score of non-govemmental councilors was as 
low as zero, since there were very few social linkages between these councilors. The political power 
of administrative officers was significantly reduced in the period, however. While the motive 
behind the implementation of POAS was to remove political power from the civil service, the effect 
of POAS was just the opposite. Six out of fourteen newly appointed senior officials came from the 
administrative services, and the business sector lost its majority in the Executive Council from 2003 
onwards (table 7.3). As these ex-administrative officers were the only consolidated group in the 
council, state power became much stronger than business power, and the situation of Hong Kong 
again fitted into the description of the partisan state model. 
7.3. Analysis of Findings and Events 
Post-handover politics was basically the struggle between the state and the business. The 
business sector led by the Chief Executive, with the support of Beijing, tried to reduce the state 
apparatus into their rubber stamp. On the other hand, civil servants, especially administrative 
officers, were on the defensive and struggled to secure the power granted by the pre-handover order. 
After the discussions above, it was without doubt that the offensive side lost the battle. 
While the business sector was given a golden opportunity to occupy the state apparatus, how could 
their invasion fail despite being blessed by Beijing? What character made civil servants, particularly 
administrative officers, survive this long battle? 
7.3.1. Business Sector: A Disunited and Incompetent Ally 
In the first term of Tung, both state power and business power were weak. This meant that 
neither the business sector led by Tung, nor those administrative officers who controlled the state 
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apparatus, could control the decision making process in the Executive Council effectively. There 
was no evidence showing direct interventions from Beijing, and we could notice that Tung and his 
allies in the business sector were actively maximizing their influence. Although the executive-led 
design of post-handover politics emphasized Chief Executive's authority over all government 
apparatus and the Legislature (Lau 2000), in reality his control was far from effective. This resulted 
in the incoordination between the Executive, the Legislature and the Civil Service. Each of these 
three parties had their own agenda respectively, and the latter two refused to cooperate with the 
former. The antagonism between these three bodies resulted in a disarticulated political system 
(Scott 2003). 
The major problem of Tung was that he lacked a team of reliable political allies. It could be 
said that Tung was parachuted into the SAR government as he lacked the basis to consolidate his 
political control. His allies in the Executive Council did not share the same political vision, and they 
merely served in their own interest. They also lacked the much needed talents and interpersonal 
networks (Lau 2002). While Tung once had the opportunity to form a ruling coalition with the 
business sector, many talented minds in the business and professional sector refused Tung's 
invitation (Ma 2007:66). The difficulties encountered by Tung were caused by the disunity of the 
elites, including those coming from the business sector, which made them difficult partners to 
cooperate with (Lau 1999). As mentioned before, the business community became increasingly 
fragmented in the 1990s owing to the rise of Chinese business firms and Beijing's united front 
work. Tung's identity as a former businessman did not make him an effective broker between 
conflicting interests, as this identity forbade him to claim neutrality. While the colonial government 
often acted in a manner favouring certain business firms, they would avoid subsidizing these firms 
directly so as to maintain formal neutrality. This contributed to the substantive consent among the 
colonial government and different business interests (Ngo 2002:112-3). 
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Unfortunately, Tung adopted an explicit and particularistic manner in state-business interest 
exchange. As a result, he followed the same mistakes as in Beijing's united front work. While it 
would be impossible for the government to satisfy all business interests, the post-colonial regime 
further worsened the situation because it failed to act as an impartial broker. This resulted in the 
resentment of the have-nots against the haves, and the government gradually became the centre of 
all resentment. For example, the government's decision to grant PCCW the right to develop 
Cyberport attracted criticisms from ten real estate developers. In an open statement, these 
developers accused the government of showing favoritism towards the family of Li Kar Shing 
(p. 109). This kind of state-business interactions would weaken the bonds within the business 
community, which was already very fragile (Ma 2007:78). Eventually, the fragmentation in the 
business community resulted in the disharmony among the business representatives in the Executive 
Council. Many of these councilors had their own agendas, and they competed with each other. For 
example, Leung Kam Chung, Anthony, was found to have bought a car in early 2003, just before he 
announced a rise in licence fee. This was later reported by the local media, and public opinion 
considered the act as a scandal. It was later known that the source of information came from the 
Executive Council, although he was not supposed to reveal anything in the council to the public 
(p.69). In another case, Chien Kuo Feng and Tarn Yiu Chung openly criticized a proposal to build a 
casino, which was proposed and supported by their colleagues including Donald Tsang and Tang 
Ying Yen. The open criticism between councilors certainly violated the regulations of the Executive 
Council (Lo 2001:132). 
The embarrassing role of the SAR government in a fragmented business community could 
be illustrated by the controversies arising from the proposal of West Kowloon Cultural District. The 
project was proposed by Tung himself (Tung 1998), and eventually the government decided to 
choose a single developer to construct and manage the cultural district (Sing Tao Daily, 29/4/2002, 
A04). The rights to develop residential and commercial properties in the district would also be 
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rewarded to the selected developer (Ming Pao, 21/10/2002, A02). As the design of the district 
included a giant canopy covering the whole area (Ming Pao, 8/4/2002, A09), only large developers 
could have the ability to bid for the project. While public opinion criticized this as an act of "state-
business collusion," the anger within the business community was considerable. The Real Estate 
Development Association of Hong Kong, a trade association of real estate devlopers, repeatedly 
criticized the idea of granting the development rights to a single developer (Sing Tao Daily, 
19/5/2004, A14; Ming Pao, 11/12/2004, Al l ) . Stanley Ho, the chairman of the association, even 
criticized the government for "state-business collusion" , although he was also a businessman (Sing 
Tao Daily, 15/1/2005, A25). Even those larger developers voiced their objections to the 
arrangement, including Sino Group and Sun Hung Kei Properties which were qualified for the 
bidding (Sing Tao Daily, 8/1/2005, A12). It was possible that some Executive Councilors were 
involved in the conroversies as well. Some news reports suggested that Tang Ying Yen, the 
Financial Secretary at that time, was reserved about the project, and he didn't take part in the 
community monitoring the project (Sing Tao Daily, 20/11/2004, AlO). James Tien, a business 
representative in the council, attacked Donald Tsang, the Chief Secretary at that time, who was also 
responsible for the project. Tien hinted that the project favored Cheung Kong Holdings and Sun 
Hung Kei properties, and he suggested that Tsang made these arrangements so as to pave his way 
for becoming the Chief Executive (Sing Tao Daily, 24/12/2004, A06). 
This example showed that the members in the business community were highly sensitive to 
the issue of favoritism. While they were thirsty for the government's blessing, they would the 
goverment if they were not benefited. Executive Councilors with business background were also 
involved in these controversies, and they would attack the senior officials and their fellow 
councilors if their interest was violated. This created disharmony within Tung's "coalition" and 
impaired its effectiveness. 
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Several rumours in respect to the role of Beijing are also worth our attention. Shortly before 
Tung was re-elected as the Chief Executive in 2003, it was reported that a group of real estate 
developers lobbied the central government and reflected their resentment at Tung (Ming Pao, 
4/3/2003, A04). Some news reports also suggested that discontented businessmen contacted 
officials in Beijing to complain about the unfairness of the arrangements (Ming Pao, 27/11/2004, 
A03). These rumours and speculations did not end by the downfall of Tung. In early 2008, Walter 
Kwok was suspended from his duties as the chairman of Sun Hung Kei Properties, under the 
pressure of his mother and brothers. Some undisclosed sources revealed that he contacted Beijing, 
hoping that the central government would press for the resumption of his duties (Ming Pao, 
10/5/2008, AOS). While Beijing's united front policy in the 1990s had already imposed a 
centrifugal effect on the business sector, the gossip reminded us that Beijing's role in local politics 
might further worsen the scenario. 
The business sector was already in a state of disunity at the point of the handover. Officials 
in Beijing and Tung, however, failed to recognize it and adopted approaches which further 
diversified the business community. As a result, even when the head of the government was a 
former businessman, and policies favoring business political participation were introduced, 
effective control of the state by the business sector could not be achieved. While the business sector 
successfully reduced the political influence from the civil service, they failed to take over civil 
servant's role. The state apparatus in the period between 1997 and 2002 was therefore controlled by 
nobody. 
7.3.2. Administrative Officers: The Ultimate Survivor 
When POAS was introduced in 2003, Tung failed to seek help from his allies in the business 
sector. Most of the vacancies of principal officials were filled by former administrative officers, and 
they became the utlimate survivors of the state-business struggle. The average power index score of 
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administrative officers had rebounded since 2003, and the Chief Executive was eventually replaced 
by a former administrative officer in 2005. Business influence in the SAR government was reduced 
and state autonomy was restored. However, how could administrative officers fight against the odds 
in Tung's era and became the ultimate survivors? 
Unlike the business sector, administrative officers were more consolidated owing to their 
strong esprit de corps. In the early colonial era, administrative officers were often elite graduated 
from Oxbridge and were recruited and promoted on the basis of merit (Tsang 2007:18). They had a 
strong self-esteem and considered themselves as a group of elite who were also the guardian of 
Hong Kong's interest. This belief gave them a common sense of belonging and turned them into a 
close-knit group (pp.44-5). Although administrative officers were no longer the most educated 
persons in the territory, they remained a cohesive group sharing a heritage institutional culture. This 
was made possible by the system of recruitment and promotion, which enabled serving 
administrative officers to recruit and promote people like themselves. New recruits were selected 
through a series of examinations and interviews. There were two parts in the examination, in which 
the first part examined the language skills and aptitude of the candidates, while the abilities to 
analyse and solve problems were tested in the latter part. Only a minority of the candidates could 
participate in the interviews, and the figure was as low as 2.4% from 2001 to 2002. The interview 
consisted of three parts. At first, the candidates would be interviewed by two senior administrative 
officers accompanied by representatives of the Public Services Commission. Successful candidates 
would then be interviewed by five top-level administrative officers, including senior officials. 
Eventually, there would be a group interview arranged for those who had survived the second 
interview, so as to test the candidates' ability to work together. An individual interview would then 
follow to evaluate their performance in the discussions. Only around 1% of all candidates could 
become an administrative officer successfully (Bums 2004:118-9). All recruited administrative 
officers would receive training, and their performance would be assessed by their seniors annually 
108 
(pp. 122-3). New administrative officers in this competitive system of recruitment and promotion 
would probably be influenced by the spirit instilled by their seniors. They would be confident, and 
consider themselves as part of a team of elite who acted as the guardian of public interest (Tsang 
2007:162-3). 
Besides sharing a similar vision, a policy making network was formed among administrative 
officers through institutional arrangement. During the colonial period, Governors seldom got 
involved in the discussion of the details of policies, and he would only suggest the general direction 
of policy making. Policies were formulated by administrative officers, and were coordinated by the 
Chief Secretary (Lam 2002:16-7). The McKinsey reform in the 1970s suggested the reorganization 
of the bureaucracy and the decentralization of power to policy branches (McKinsey and Company 
1973:16). Although the reform failed to decentralize bureaucratic structure, it improved the process 
of policy planning (Scott 1989:140). These policy branches coordinated the conflicts among 
different departments (Lam 2002:21), and their role was important in an expanding bureaucracy. 
The bureaucrats were also coordinated by the Chief Secretary Committee (p. 19), briefing sessions, 
steering committees and working groups (p.23). These institutional designs turned administrative 
officers into a relatively efficient team of policy formulation. Although it was the Executive Council 
which made the final decisions, they seldom formulated the policies by themselves. They might 
vary or amend policy proposals, while in some cases they might refer to them for further studies. 
Even in this situation, however, the new policies were likely to be formulated by the bureaucracy 
(Miners 1998:80). This indicated that administrative officers were the only group of people who 
were experienced in policy formulation. It also meant that they had a better chance to form policy 
network than their business counterparts. The build-up of these networks became the social capital 
of the administrative officers, which enabled them to withstand the challenge of the anti-
bureaucratic environment after the handover. When Tung and his business allies became too 
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fragmented to form a ruling coalition, senior administrative officers could seize the chance provided 
by POAS and resumed state autonomy, although they had lost their tenure in the struggle. 
It should be mentioned that our methodology could have over-estimated the political 
influence of administrative officers. While it is reasonable to suggest that fractions existed within 
government administrative services, their existence left no traces on existing records. According to 
our network analysis, the strength of relations between all administrative officers is assumed to be 
the same, and therefore bureaucratic power in our model is simply the faction of the number of 
administrative officers being appointed into the Executive Council. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
we believe that our model still provides a useful estimation on the rise and fall of bureaucratic 
power. The number of administrative officers being appointed into the council could reflect whether 
the political climate of the time is favorable to them or not. Evidence also showed that there was a 
strong esprit de corps within the government administrative services. Despite the possiblity of 
factionalism, we could believe that the bureaucratic community would be more consolidated than 
their business counterpart. 
7.4. Summary 
The development of post-handover politics revealed the importance of social network in the 
possession of political power. The first SAR government was led by a pro-business Chief Executive 
who was a former businessman himself. Despite the efforts to limit bureaucratic influences and 
promote business participation in the government, Tung's attempt to enhance business control over 
the state was destructive rather than constructive. 
Although the power of administrative officers was reduced temporarily from 1997 to 2002, 
business sector gained little in the process. The politics of Hong Kong became dis-articulated and 
nobody could control the state apparatus effectively. This was contributed by the fragmentation of 
the business sector, which was an aftermath of the Beijing-Business alliance in the 1990s. Tung's 
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particularism and Beijing's patronage while dealing with the business only worsened the situation. 
In contrast, administrative officers were bound together through organizational culture and 
institutional arrangements. The social network among them enabled them to cope with the 
adversities in Tung's era, and eventually they resumed their influence upon the introduction of 
POAS and once again dominated the politics of Hong Kong. 
I l l 
Chapter 8. Prospects: State-Business Relations in Post-Tung Hong Kong 
After Tung stepped down from the post of Chief Executive in 2005, administrative officers 
became the ruling elite of Hong Kong. The new government led by Donald Tsang, who was a 
former administrative officer, introduced measures to consolidate the rule of his team-mates which 
mainly consisted of administrative officers. However, as the task of governing Hong Kong was 
increasingly complex and the public demand for democracy was on the rise, reforms of the political 
system became inevitable in spite of the hesitations of Beijing and the establishment. In other 
words, further transformation in state-business relations could be expected. 
8.1. Dominance of Administrative Officers 
Tsang reorganized the Executive Council soon after the start of his term. It was decided 
senior officials, except Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Attorney General, would be absent 
in council meetings unless it would be necessary. Principal officials would be responsible for their 
own policy decisions, and they could reject the opinion of the Executive Council (Ming Pao, 
7/6/2005, AOS). Although Tsang appointed six new Executive Councillors from the business sector 
(Ming Pao, 15/10/2005, A02), they played a minimal role in the politics of Hong Kong as the role 
Table 8.1. Former Administrative Officers as Principal Officials 
2005 2007 
Donald Tsang* Cheung Kin Chung 
Ip Shu Kwan Eva Cheng 
Lam Sui Lung Lam Cheng Yuet Ngor 
Lee Siu Kwong Lam Sui Lung 
Suen Ming Yeung Lee Siu Kwong 
Tsang Chun Wah Suen Ming Yeung 
Wong Wing Ping Tsang Chun Wah 
Yau Tang Wah 
Yue Chung Yee 
Total: 7 Total: 9 
Proportion: 50% Proportion: 60% 
-Donald Tsang's position as Chief Secretaty was replaced by Hui Si Yan, another former administrative officer, after 
Tsang became the Chief Executive. 
Source: Ming Pao, 24/6/2007, A02 
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of unofficial councillors was diminished. Some critics considered these as Tsang's plan to centralize 
his power (Ming Pao, 8/6/2005, A04). Although Tsang denied these accusations, it was known that 
he dismissed the idea of power sharing in the council. Ambitious persons were barred from the 
council, while the seats were also not reserved for various pro-establishment parties (Ming Pao, 
15/10/2005, A02). Tsang focused on those accountable principal officials, and put aside the rest of 
the council. Most of the unofficial councillors in Tsang's era were old allies of Tung, while many of 
them were aging. While senior officials became the core of Hong Kong's politics, the Executive 
Council became merely an advisory body serving as a decoration (Ming Pao, 22/6/2007, A06). 
After Tsang was re-elected as the Chief Executive in 2007, there was a further increase of 
the influence of previous administrative officers. New principal officials were appointed, and most 
of them came from government administrative service. Just before Tung's resignation, half of the 
principal officials were previous administrative officers. The figure rose to 60% after Tsang's 
attempt to reorganize the team of principal officials (table 8.1). Tung's allies, including those 
previous administrative officers loyal to Tung, were replaced (Ming Pao, 23/6/2007, A06). Three 
administrative officers once worked under Tsang, in spite of their young age, leapt across the rank 
and became government secretaries. While some of the newly appointed officials were not 
administrative officers, most of them had the experience in co-operating with the bureaucracy 
(Ming Pao, 24/6/2007, A06). 
While there was disarticulation of politics in Tung's era, the problem was solved as former 
administrative officers dominated the politics under the reign of Tsang. The public was satisfied 
with the reintroduction of effective governance. Shortly before Tung's resignation, 43.6% of 
respondents considered Tung had performed badly, and only 14% praised Tung for his performance 
(Chung 2005). Two years later, more than half of the respondents appreciated Tsang's performance 
and regarded it as good, and only 6.5% considered his performance as bad (Chung 2007). The 
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dominance of administrative officers was secured by both institutional arrangements and 
performance legitimacy. 
8.2. Transformations Expected in the Future 
Although the rule of administrative officers under Tsang was popular, it was increasingly 
clear that the status quo was not sustainable. The existing political system preserved most of the 
elements of a colonial system which was designed a century ago, while the political envimoment 
and public demand had been transformed greatly. Though changes were unwelcomed by the 
establishment, they had to plan for it eventually. 
8.2.1. Weakening of Bureaucratic Networks 
Although administrative officers survived Tung's political arrangements, these policies 
partially destructed the social network among administrative officers. Tung's government took a 
proactive approach in policy initiatives. The Chief Secretary ceased to be the chief coordinator, and 
the coordination between policy branches and departments was impaired. As many of Tung's 
commands were devoid of substantive contents, coordination became a game of second-guessing 
which harmed the trust between policy branches and departments. When the situation progressed, 
some administrative officers competed for connection and patronage from Tung and his allies. This 
disintegrated administrative officiers into different cliques (Lam 2002:25-6). While administrative 
officers were consolidated if compared with the business sector, new fissures started to develop 
when Tung was in the office. 
For example, it was reported that while Anson Chan was the senior of Regina Ip, Ip simply 
ignored Chan and reported duty to Tung directly (Next Magazine, Volume 567, 18/1/2001, p.48). 
The existence of intra-bureaucratic fissures affected Tsang's plan in reorganizing his government. 
Shortly prior to Tsang' appointment of new principal officials in June 2007, some undisclosed 
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sources revealed that some administrative officers resented Tsang. Although they could do nothing 
to Tsang, they intervened in the promotion of Tsang's followers (Apple Daily, 22/6/2007, A31). A 
number of Tsang，s new principal officials were young administrative officers in relatively junior 
ranks. The fact that Tsang appointed them across the ranks might possibly reflect Tsang's difficult 
relations with several senior administrative officers (Apple Daily, 15/6/2007, A31). While 
administrative officers were consolidated, they would eventually encounter the problem of 
fragmentation. 
The civil service reform initiated by Tung also hampered administrative officers to be an 
effective ruling team after his resignation. The introduction of contract terms affected the morale of 
the civil service, because long-term employment was no longer guaranteed. Although many former 
administrative officers were appointed as principal officials, these posts were appointed through 
political appointments rather than internal promotions. A number of administrative officers defected 
from their post, and it was suggested that this was caused by the decrease in opportunities within 
the administrative service (The Sun, 3/4/2008, A28). This brain drain indicated that new 
mechanisms, other than the career path of administrative officers, would be needed for the selection 
and trainning of future political leaders. 
8.2.2. Increasing Public Demands 
At the same time, the public of Hong Kong became increasingly demanding. The colonial 
government secured performance legitimacy by the 1980s. At that time, Hong Kong was 
developing in an exponential manner.The civil society remained weak, and citizens could be 
satisfied by economic gain. Nonetheless, this was no longer the case in the 1990s: economic growth 
started to plateau, and citizens expected better public service, while some citizens started to demand 
political participation. In the era of Tung, the civil society of Hong Kong became mature. Fights for 
public service and public participation were much more common than decades ago. The capacity of 
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the status quo might not be able to cope with these increasing demands and thus led to institutional 
incongruity (Lee 1999:944-6). 
The increasing demand of Hong Kong citizens could be revealed in the Star Ferry Incident 
in 2006. As a result of reclamation work in Central, the 49-year-old Star Ferry pier was relocated in 
November, and the pier as well as the belfry on it would be demolished in December (Ming Pao, 
10/11/2006, A06). Although 150,000 citizens visited the pier for farewell on the last day of the pier 
(Sing Tao Daily, 12/11/2006, A06), at that moment such nostalgic mood was nothing political. As 
revealed by a principal official, the plan to demolish the pier had been consulted in the District 
Council of that district, the Legislative Council and related advisory committees. There was little 
disagreement in the consultatory stage, and it was emphasized the plan was essential for the 
development of Hong Kong (Suen 2006). If such an incident had happened decades earlier, there 
would not have been any political consequences. Many historical buildings were demolished, while 
the citizens were happy as long as there were procedural justice and economic development. It was 
no longer the case, however. There were demonstrations against the demolition work (Ming Pao, 
13/11/2006, A06; Sing Tao Daily, 4/12/2006, AlO), and the future of the pier became a sensitive 
issue while several demonstrators intruded into the pier to stop the work (Ming Pao, 1/12,2006, 
A17). When the demolition work began, demonstrators clashed with the construction workers and 
were then arrested by the police (Sing Tao Daily, 14/12/2006, A06). The eventual demolition of the 
pier and the belfry led to a few more demonstrations and conflicts (Ming Pao, 17/12/2006, A02; 
Ming Pao, 18/12/2006, A06). As the tension escalated, the incident became political, and the 
opposition in the Legislative Council made use of the opportunity to attack the government (Ming 
Pao, 14/12/2006, A04; Sing Tao Daily, 19/12/2006, A02). 
The incident was a clue revealing that citizens in Hong Kong were no longer satisfied by 
economic development alone (Ming Pao, 14/12/2006, A05). The emerging civil society was more 
conscious of their own identity. They no longer treated Hong Kong as a borrowed place at a 
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borrowed time, and they demanded participation in the affairs of their own city (Ip 2006). 
According to the account of one of the arrested demonstrators, nostalgic mood was not the only 
reason behind his protests. He believed that the citizen lacked a say in the current consultatory 
system, and he wished to fight for the citizen's right to participate in city planning (Chu 2006). A 
sympathizer of the demonstrators suggested that there should be thorough debates and discussions 
in the society before important decisions were made (Leung 2006). While he was not satisfied with 
representation and requested direct participation of citizens, the SAR government lacked both. 
While a government dominated by administrative officers could be an effective one with good 
performance, it was still not a government that welcomed citizens' participation. Although the Star 
Ferry Incident did not have much adverse consequence on the government, it revealed that Hong 
Kong had entered a stage in which a crisis of legitimacy could be triggered without much 
impairment in government performance. 
The situation was further exaggerated by the transformation of the pro-govemment camp. 
Although the composition of pro-govemment advisory elites did not change much throughout the 
studied period, they were increasingly critical of the government. The introduction of electoral 
politics since the 1980s resulted in two dramatic changes. The Legislature became separated from 
the Executive, and the pro-govemment elites within the Legislature ceased to treat the government 
as someone on the same boat. Besides, the introduction of functional representation made pro-
govemment elites more sensitive to sectional interests of businessmen and professionals. They 
developed their own political goal and refused to cooperate with the government passively. While 
they remained close allies of the government, they were willing to bargain with the government 
about the terms of co-operation. Sometimes the pro-govemment elites would even shift sides while 
public resentment became strong (Cheung and Wong 2004). 
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8.2.3. The Path Towards Democracy 
The situation was worsened by the fact that administrative officers were no longer under 
sufficient check and balance. It would reduce the incentive of the Government to act according to 
the demand of its fellow citizens. After the Second World War, the Chinese government, 
Nationalist and Communist alike, adopted an irredentist policy towards Hong Kong. The wave of 
decolonization in post-war era also created pressure on the colonial government. These external 
threats made administrative officers self-restraint concerning the exercise of power, and they would 
be more sensitive towards the need of citizens. They had to do so in order to secure the legitimacy 
of the status quo in front of Chinese Nationalism and Anti-colonialism (Tsang 2007:188-90). These 
mechanisms of counterbalance were no longer available as long as Hong Kong became part of 
China. Without sufficient check and balance, the government would become less sensitive towards 
public needs, and it would be particularly dangerous in an increasingly demanding society like 
Hong Kong. 
Businessmen and administrative officers were once the only ruling elite in the politics of 
Hong Kong. While the business sectors had already become too fragmented to play the role, it 
would be too dangerous to allow administrative officers to become the only players in town. Hong 
Kong needed to develop a new system to build up a new class of political elite. When Chung Sze 
Yuen first proposed the idea of POAS, he did not wish the posts of principal officials to be 
dominated by businessmen or bureaucrats. He made such suggestion under the vision of 
democratization and the development of party politics (Chung 2001:224-6). While the strength of 
the administrative service once guaranteed good governance, the political system would need to be 
recreated in order to preserve the strength in a transformed political environment (Tsang 2007:194). 
This indicated that Hong Kong needed "the introduction of a class of career politicians to serve as 
government ministers above the politically neutral civil servants or administrative officers", and 
"there is no alternative but to hold open and fair elections to be contested regularly by well-
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organized political parties (p. 195)". The issue of democratization was no longer something that the 
govemement could treat it lightly. 
Pressure for democratization had increased since the second term of Tung. The July 1 
demonostration in 2003 triggered a new popular movement for democratization, while thousands of 
citizens marched in favor of an immediate introduction of universal suffrage (Apple Daily, 
10/7/2003, AOl; Ming Pao, 10/7/2003, A04). Although the National People's Congress in Beijing 
rejected the option of political reform in 2007 and 2008 (Apple Daily, 7/4/2004, A02; Ming Pao 
7/4/2004, A02), a large number of citizens continued their march for democracy on the following 
July 1 (Apple Daily, 2/7/2004, AOl; Ming Pao, 2/7/2004, A02), and many continued to show their 
support in subsequent years (Apple Daily, 2/7/2005, AOl; Apple Daily, 2/7/2006, AOl; Apple Daily, 
2/7/2007, AOl). Eventually Beijing permitted the SAR government to initiate political reforms. It 
also agreed that general elections of the Chief Executive could be introduced in 2017, and the whole 
Legislative Council could be elected through univeral suffrage afterwards (Apple Daily, 
29/12/2007, A02; Ming Pao, 29/12/2007, AOl; Sing Tao Daily, 29/12/2007, A02). Although many 
were not satisified with the arrangement, and it might be too early to assess whether the SAR 
government would become a democratic regime, the change of the political system would be 
expected in the next decade. At its best full democratization could be achieved, while at least 
electoral authoritarianism would be the result. If administrative officers wished to maintain their 
influence, or if the business sector wished to resume their influence, they had to prepare for these 
transformations. 
8.3. Prepare for the Future 
8.3.1. Expansion of Political Appointments 
In the first policy adress of Donald Tsang, the new Chief Executive announced that he would 
expand political appointment within the government. New posts would be created to assist the Chief 
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Executive and principal officials to peform political duties. These posts would also create channels 
for young civil servants to aspire to a political career (Tsang 2005, paragraph 25). A plan of this 
expansion was drafted after public consultation. Two new types of politically appointed positions, 
Under Secretaries and Political Assistants to Director of Bureau, were planned to be introduced. 
Candidates including members of political parties, businessmen and professional elite would be 
appointed into these posts. Civil servants could also apply for these posts under the condition that 
they had to leave the civil service after being appointed, which was similar to the criteria of working 
as principal officials (Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau 2007). 
This arrangement was said to be a step to transform government administrative service into 
an "Administrative Officer's Party". A few months before Tsang announced his first policy address, 
Anthony Cheung (2005), who was later appointed as Tsang's Executive Councilor, pointed out that 
Beijing was learning from the Singaporean model. The ruling party of Singapore, the People's 
Actions Party, was closely associated with the civil service. Political elite in PAP丨s government, 
including Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long and former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, were 
originated from the bureaucracy. In a briefing session after Tsang's first policy address, Tsang 
revealed that young civil servants could serve as political assistants. After that they could 
participate in electoral politics, and would have the chance to become Under Secretaries after 
serving as Legislative Councilors for a period. It was speculated that Tsang expressed his wish to 
transform his team of administrative officers into the PAP of Hong Kong (Choy 2005). 
In May 2008, the SAR government appointed 8 Under Secretaries (Ming Pao, 21/5/2008, 
A06) and 9 Political Assistants (Ming Pao, 23/5/2008, AlO). Only two of them were administrative 
officers, and apparently the theory of "administrative officer's party" was disproved if the current 
composition of these new political appointments remained unchanged. However, it was noticed that 
a number of these appointees, including 3 Under Secretaries (Ming Pao, 21/5/2008, AOS) and 2 
Political Assistants (Ming Pao, 23/5/2008, AlO), were closely related with Norman Chan (Some 
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were Chan's colleagues, while some were members of a think tank led by Chan), the director of the 
Office of Chief Executive. Some critics even speculated out that Chan dominated the selection 
process (Ming Pao, 21/5/2008, AOS). Norman Chan was an administrative officer who served in 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority before seeking employment in the private sector. He had a close 
relationship with Tsang, and served as the chairman of Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre, a pro-
government think tank, before being appointed into the Office of Chief Executive (Ming Pao, 
23/6/2007, A06). It might be speculated that Tsang was trying to establish a pro-bureaucratic 
coalition with board public support, rather than transforming the administrative service into a PAP-
like political party. 
8.3.2, Business Sector and Electoral Politics 
While administrative officers under Tsang were preparing for electoral politics by expanding 
the political appointment system, it also provided new channels of power-sharing. However, as we 
are going to illustrate, the business sector was ill-prepared for the coming transformation. 
In the expanded system of political appointment, business sector could still be benefited as 
elite in the sector were eligible for being appointed. The business sector could compete for these 
newly created seats, and they could increase the chance of success by forming political parties. By 
winning popular support in elections, political parties could have more teeth while bargaining with 
the state. In the appointment on May 2008, several representatives from pro-government political 
parties won seats of newly appointed posts. 3 seats were given to members of pro-Beijing 
Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, and 1 seat was given to pro-Business Liberal 
Party. Political parties might not be welcomed by the state, but they were simply too risky to be 
ignored. Forming political parties was also the only means for the business sector to continue their 
political influence. As social networks through interpersonal relations were breaking down, the 
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Table 8.2. Number of Seats Contested by Major Pro-establishment Parties in Legislative Council 
Elections in 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2004 
Democratic Alliance for Liberal Party Hong Kong Progressive 
Betterment of Hong Kong Alliance 
Directly Functional Directly Functional Directly Functional 
Elected Constituency Elected Constituency Elected Constituency 
1995 7 7 1 14 2 1 
1998 20 8 12 11 0 12 
2000 24 7 4 11 5 4 
2004 27 2 3 10 1 1 
Source: Li 2004 
Table 8.3. Number of Seats won by major Pro-establishment Parties in Legislative Council 
Elections in 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2004 
Democratic Alliance for Liberal Party Hong Kong Progressive 
Betterment of Hong Kong Alliance 
Directly Functional Directly Functional Directly Functional 
Elected Constituency Elected Constituency Elected Constituency 
1995 2 4 1 10 0 1 
1998 5 4 0 10 0 7 
2000 7 4 0 8 1 3 
2004 7 2 2 9 0 0 
Source: Li 2004 
Table 8.4. Partiticpations of Democratic Party and major Pro-establishment Parties in District 
Council Elections in 1994, 1999 and 2003 
Democratic Party Democratic Alliance Liberal Party Hong Kong Progress 
for Betterment of Alliance 
Hong Kong 
Contests Won Contests Won Contests Won Contests Won 
1994 133 75 85 39 89 18 8 2 
1999 173 86 176 83 34 15 30 21 
2003 120 95 206 62 27 14 22 13 
Source: Li 2004 
creation of pro-business parties could provide the only chance to consolidate a group of 
businessmen and make them influential. 
The political parties formed by businessmen, however, failed to cope with electoral politics. 
Two political parties led by business figures were formed in the 1990s, including the Liberal Party 
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and Hong Kong Progressive Alliance. These parties were not enthusiastic about the participation of 
direct elections, and most of their electoral success was confined in functional constituencies. In 
most cases more resources would be given to the competition for the seats of functional 
constituencies. The Liberal Party contested more directly elected seats than the seats from 
functional constituenies in the Legislative Council election in 1998. They won none of them, 
however, and they continued to perform badly in subsequent elections. In short, pro-business parties 
were under-motivated in the participation of direct elections with poor electoral performances. 
Their political influence in the Legislative Council was protected by the system of functional 
constituencies which over-represented the interest of the business sector. In the case of Hong Kong 
Progressive Alliance, even their success in functional constituencies was not sustainable, and they 
disappeared from the council after the election of 2004 (table 8.2 and 8.3). 
It might be argued that the poor performance of pro-business parties was caused by their 
pro-establishment stance. Such stance made them unpopular, and this subsequently reduced that 
motive of investing in direct elections. Besides, as they did not favor democratic reforms, it could 
be expected that they would have little interest in gaining popular support through direct election. 
This argument did reflect some reality, but it was not a sufficient explanation of their failure. The 
Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, a pro-establishment party founded by pro-
Beijing politicians, performed much better in direct elections. The result of 1995 election was not 
satisfactory, as only 2 directly elected seats could be won. The party did not give up, however, and 
increased the extent of participation in direct election. The main emphasis of their electoral efforts 
was placed on direct elections, and most of their gain in the Legislative Council came from direct 
election. In 2000 and 2004, they won 7 directly elected seats, which was around one-fourth of all 
directly elected seats (table 8.3). DAB also actively participated in elections at a more grassroot 
level. Their participation in District Council elections was increasingly active. They were involved 
in 85 contests in 1994, and the figure increased to 206 in 2003. The result of the participation was 
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fruitful, and was comparable with those of Democratic Party, a popular pro-reform party in Hong 
Kong. They even won a land-slide in District Council Election 2007 (Ming Pao, 19/11/2007, A02). 
In contrast, the pro-business parties were involved little in these elections. While the efforts of 
Liberal Party were similar to that of DAB in 1994, their enthusiasm for competing the contests in 
District Council election died off in subsequent election, and the number of involved contests was 
decreasing (table 8.4). 
The success of DAB suggested that pro-establishment party could have the ability and the 
will to participate in direct elections. Although the local networking of DAB was better than those 
of pro-business parties, experience in other electoral politics suggested that pro-business party could 
establish their own network as well. If those pro-business parties could increase their participation 
with patience, it would be possible for them to achieve a similar success. The main reason for the 
failure of pro-business parties in direct election was their unwillingness to participate. Why were 
those pro-business parties reluctant to participate in direct elections, while DAB were not? 
One of the Executive Councilors being interviewed was also a founding member of a pro-
business party. The interviewee was a businessman who disagreed with their opponent, the 
Democratic Party, as he believed their welfarist stance would jeopardize Hong Kong's economy. 
However, he also believed that Hong Kong would need to democratize its politics, and the business 
sector should defend their interest through democratic means. Some of his friends were also pro-
democratic while being pro-business, and the party was founded in early 1990s. While the founders 
were enthusiastic about party politics, other businessmen showed little interest in the affairs of the 
party. Some business friends expressed that the Chinese Communist Party should be the single 
political party in town, and the plan to build a pro-business party would only go in vain. In general, 
they preferred lobbying Beijing in their own interest, rather than fighting for it through electoral 
politics. The party, once ambitious, lost its enthusiasm for developing party political and became 
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satisified with the status quo, i.e. "guaranteed" seats in functional constituencies. The interviewee 
left the party out of disappointment. 
This piece of information suggested that the Beijing-Business alliance did not only disrupt 
the social network of the business sector, but it also made pro-business parties less vital. The 
alliance with Beijing provided a way out when the business faced difficulties in electoral politics. 
As we could see in the case of DAB, the first attempt of pro-establishment parties was unlikely to 
be satisfactory, possibly because of the popular support of the democrats. They could only enjoy the 
taste of success in late 1990s, half a decade after their party was formed. It was exactly the time 
when Liberal Party started to decrease their participation in direct elections. The existence of short-
cut reduced businessmen's incentive to wait for the long-term investment in electoral politics. In 
contrast, pro-Beijing politicians in Hong Kong had to rely on themselves, owing to Beijing's policy 
that there should be as little "leftists" in the ruling elite as possible (Deng 1997). They had no 
choice except earning public support through direct elections, and they succeeded. 
8.3.3. State-Business Relations after Political Reform 
As electoral politics would further develop in the following decade, there was a 
transformation in the political landscape. Only those who were well prepared could survive 
electoral competitions and gain access to political power. 
At the moment of writing, administrative officers under the lead of Donald Tsang are 
preparing for the transformation. It would be possible that a team of administrative officers, or their 
allies, could ultilize the chance created by the extension of political appointment system to establish 
a new political party. Although administrative officers were not trainned in electoral politics, they 
were widely appreciated for their role in promoting the governance of Hong Kong. Despite the 
necessity of a painful role transition, it was not a difficult task for former administrative officers to 
win voters' support. This could be illustrated in the by-election of the Legislative Council, which 
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elected a councilor to a seat vacated by the death of Ma Lik, the chairman of DAB at that time; in 
2007. Eight candidates competed in the election, but two former administrative officers won more 
than 95% of the votes. Eventually Anson Chan, the former Cheif Secretary, defeated Regina Ip, the 
former Secretary for Security, at a margin of around 12%. The election was one of the most hotly 
contested in Hong Kong's history, and the polling rate was 52.1%, which was high in the context of 
Hong Kong (Ming Pao, 3/12/2007, AOl). 
The possibility of success of administrative officers, however, should not be over-estimated. 
While administrative officers were famed for their good performance, the case of Star Ferry 
illustrated that they lacked the skill to deal with the public which demanded more participation. 
Time would be needed for them to be accustomed to the electoral culture. As the social network of 
administrative officers started to break down, some extra efforts would be necessary in the process 
of party formation. The state power in the future would be affected by the success of this 
"administrative officer party". If the party was successful, they could maintain state autonomy 
through popular support. Otherwise it might have to share or alternate power with other political 
parties, particularly those pro-establisment parties like DAB. 
The political future of the business sector would be grim if the malaise of pro-business 
parties continued. As Beijing publicly announced that universal suffrage was allowed to be fulfilled 
in or after 2020, we could anticipate a count down of the current privileges enjoyed by the business 
sector. If the business sector wished to maintain its influence on politics, it would have to increase 
their participation in direct election. They might also choose to co-operate with existing pro-
establishment parties. The merger of Hong Kong Progressive Alliance with DAB in February 2005 
was an illustrative example (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 17/2/2005, A03). 
If the current trend continued, the state would have an upper hand in state-business relations. 
As pro-business parties lacked motivation at the moment, it would be unlikely that business power 
became strong after political reform. The business sector would then cease to be the major societal 
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opponent of the state. The significance of state-business relations would likely be reduced, and 
these relations might become a side-track of the power struggle between the state and a major pro-
establishment party. A state-business synarchy or business dominance would only be possible if 
pro-business parties could have a fundamental change in their survival strategy. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
9.1. Conclusion of the Findings 
After reviewing the changes in state-business relations from early 1980s to early 
Century, we would go back to the research question: how is the state related to the business? What 
is the relative power of these two parties? 
The state-business relations kept on transforming during the studied period. In the period 
between 1983 and 1988, the state and the business power enjoyed similar amount of political power. 
This was consistent with the guardian state model, and we could say that Hong Kong was a state-
business synarchy. Business power diminished after 1989, and the state power remained strong until 
1997. The situation fitted the description of partisan state model, and the state was autonomous 
from business influence. An atypical pattern emerged from 1997 to 2002, in which neither the state 
nor the business could sustain political power. After reviewing the historical events, we concluded 
that there was a disarticulation of politics, as there was a power struggle between the civil service, 
led by administrative officers, and the business sector which was blessed by Beijing but structurally 
disorganized. Eventually, the pattern of partisan state models reappeared from 2003 onwards. 
The causes of the changes in state-business relations could be traced back to late 1970s. The 
economic role of expatriate firms started to be replaced by local Chinese firms in that period, while 
network studies showed that the community of Chinese firms tended to be more fragmented. 
Nevertheless, the balance of power between the state and the business was more or less maintained 
until 1989, when business influence within the Executive Council diminished. This was likely the 
result of the shift of business loyalty to the future sovereign in Beijing, which was further facilitated 
by Beijing's united-front work responding to the colonial government's proposal of political reform 
in mid-1980s. The business community, however, remained consolidated until the 1990s. 
Business power remained low throughout the late transitional period. The change of Britain's 
Hong Kong policy after 1989 eventually led to Patten's political reform. Under the unprecedented 
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support and intervention from London, business influence was excluded from the Executive 
Council. Enraged by Patten's challenge, Beijing increased the extent of its united front work. The 
hope for a "through-train" arrangement was abandoned, and the business sector was assigned as the 
ruling elite in post-colonial Hong Kong. Disputes among businessmen, however, were triggered 
while they competed for the patronage through these united front works. The business community 
became fragmented while Britain returned the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 1997. 
This fragmentation was proved to have grave consequences. The state-business relations in 
the first term of Tung were paradoxical. Apparently, businessmen became the ruling elites of the 
post-handover government. Many important positions were occupied by those having business 
background. A former businessman became the Chief Executive, and there was a business majority 
in the Executive Council. This business-dominated government also challenged the political role of 
administrative officers by introducing a range of policies, which successfully diminished 
bureaucratic power. However, our findings showed that business power remained low despite their 
apparent advantages, and the disunity within the business community prevented the business-led 
regime to exert effective political control. Businessmen outside the government became vocal 
opposition, while it was reported that business representatives within the government attacked one 
another for the sake of their own interest. As the business community failed to form a united ruling 
coalition, administrative officers resumed their political influence after the introduction of POAS. 
These illustrated that there were several dynamics affecting the state-business relations in 
Hong Kong. Our findings showed that business power in the Executive Council, as well as the 
number of HSIC or prominent business representatives in the council, was correlated with the 
cohesiveness of the business community. The change of economic environment, the policy of 
colonial government, Sino-British relations and the policy of Beijing and London also contributed 
to the changes in state-business relations. The influence of the united-front policy of Beijing, which 
influenced state-business relations through the reduction of business cohesiveness, deserved special 
129 
attention of its effect on post-colonial politics. 
9.2. Significance of the Study 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, we reviewed the debate over the study of power, particularly the 
debate about the three faces of power. In summary, this is the debate about whether social scientists 
should study the hidden aspect of power. Pluralists denied the possibility that the manifestation of 
power could be hidden, and they insisted that power should be defined as the possibility in which an 
actor's preference would prevail in the visible decision-making process. While power studies using 
this approach could be verified empirically, the validity of their findings was questioned so often 
that even some of the pluralists shifted their position. On the other hand, the empirical basis of elite 
theorists is also questionable. Earlier elite theorists, including Mills (1956) and Hunter (1953), 
oversimplified the issue by measuring power through official position and reputation. While the 
conception of second and third faces of power proposed by other elite theorists were closer to the 
reality, their claims were difficult to verify. Studies related to the distribution of political power 
would therefore face a dilemma: social scientists had to choose between sacrificing the validity of 
their studies and facing the risk that their studies would become conspiracy theories. 
The political environment of Hong Kong created another problem. As Hong Kong did not 
complete its democratization process, the political system lacked transparency. Decision-making 
process within advisory bodies, the Executive Council and the civil service were not open to the 
public. Minutes and documents were classified as confidential documents, and they would be out of 
the reach of the public for decades. We lacked information to assess all three faces of power in 
Hong Kong. Information could be obtained from the institutional arrangement in the government, 
but as mentioned, official positions are poor indicator of the actual distribution of power. Some 
studies obtained data from insider informants, but these sources would not be available to most 
researchers. 
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The significance of our research is that we tried to solve both problems by using social 
network analysis. Although social network analysis studied the network positions of actors rather 
than measuring the three faces of power directly, it did not have the same problem as studying 
power through official positions. As mentioned in chapter 2, power is a relational concept. The 
processes of decision making, agenda setting and ideological control have to be achieved through 
social relations. Previous empirical studies also suggested that social network analysis could 
estimate the power distribution in political networks in a relatively accurate manner. 
Social network analysis enabled social scientists to study the hidden aspect of power. 
Although the processes of agenda setting and ideological control remained undisclosed, information 
about these two faces of power could be estimated by studying the network positions of social 
actors. Such estimations could be possible even in political systems lacking transparency, as social 
network analysis could be performed using readily available data like company annual reports and 
directories of celebrities. In this manner, our study paved the way for power studies in Hong Kong 
in the future. By modifying our methodology, we could study all three faces of power without 
resorting to conspiracy theories. 
9.3. Limitations of the Study 
It should be noticed that we have made several assumptions in our studies. Although these 
assumptions were justified, in some occasions they could be violated owing to the constraints 
imposed by the political reality. The validity of our findings could be affected as a result. 
At first, we assumed the Executive Council was the venue of decision making throughout 
the studied period. This decision was justified by previous studies which pointed out that the 
council was the de facto cabinet in Hong Kong (Miners 1998). The council experienced little 
change during the studied period in spite of the political transformations. Many advisory bodies 
were set up in an ad hoc manner, while elected components had been introduced into the Legislative 
131 
Council, District Councils, Urban Council and Regional Council since the 1980s. The Executive 
Council was the only institution which retained its early colonial design at the end of the studied 
period. 
However, while the Executive Council was institutionally stable, its role in the policy 
making process might have changed throughout the period. If it had been the case, our findings 
would have indicated the change in the council's role rather than the change in state and business 
power. A possible change might have taken place in 1993, when representatives of core business 
firms were expelled from the council. Although the Executive Council remained a key institution in 
the policy making process, the possibility that some decision making process might have taken 
place outside the Executive Council should never be neglected. As mentioned in chapter 8, it was 
reported that principal officials made decisions without attending meetings of the council after 
2005. This example illustrated that it was not impossible for government to bypass the Executive 
Council when making decisions. Unfortunately, our study could not tackle this question due to the 
lack of relevant information. 
Our study also assumed that social relations could be measured by interlocks through 
participation in boards of directors or employment. This could be justified by the common practice 
in previous network studies, which used interlocking directorship as an indicator of social relations. 
The relations between directors or senior employees were also expected to be close, as they often 
shared similar interests or institutional culture. Information about this kind of relations is also easily 
available. However, we should not forget that social relations developed through other means could 
also be influential, although many of these relations are often too private to be detected. It could be 
argued that information other than directorship and employment, such as membership in 
recreational clubs, could provide some information about social relations in the councillors' private 
life. Such information could easily be found in directories of celebrities (Sinclair 1984, 1988, Lo 
and Ho 1995, Ho 2001, Sing Tao Publishing 2004). Our study abandoned this approach as 
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recreational clubs in Hong Kong often have hundreds to thousands of members, making common 
membership a poor indicator of close relations. 
Two types of bias may be found in our measurement of close social relations. Regulations of 
the government banned civil servants from participating in the boards of directors. As a result, our 
methodology might not accurately assess the relations between businessmen and bureaucrats. 
Another problem is that administrative officers were more or less treated as a consolidated group, 
simply because they were all employed by the same employer. Cleavages might exist within the 
community of bureaucrats, but these could not be measured in our research. Therefore, findings of 
bureaucratic power would simply reflect the number of administrative officers in the Executive 
Council. Although the change in the number of administrative officers in the council could indicate 
the change in bureaucratic power, our findings would underestimate these changes as we failed to 
measure the quality of the network among bureaucrats. 
Despite beneficial network positions and the chance to fulfill one's will are correlated, most 
of the available empirical studies were conducted in Western societies. The correlation between 
network and power remain untested in the context of Hong Kong. Besides, we have just illustrated 
that some of the basic assumptions of our research are questionable. Data interpretation would 
therefore be difficult without triangulating with other sources of information, including the writing 
of retired Executive Councillors (Lee 2004, Dunn 1989) and in-depth interviews with insiders. As 
illustrated in chapter 4, the power index scores were positively correlated with the sense of 
significance felt by several retired Executive Councillors. Our efforts in triangulation, however, 
were constrained by the fact that we could only obtain the opinions of several councillors retiring 
before 1993. This was caused by the regulation of the government which required Executive 
Councillors to keep the events within the council confidential. Councillors who were in active 
service, as well as the newly retired, are more reluctant to disclose insider information as they are 
afraid of the possible political consequences. None of the councillors serving after 1993 responded 
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to our invitation for in-depth interviews. Besides, our informants were reluctant to provide details 
during the interview. As they had retired for more than a decade, they might not be able to 
remember all the events they participated in. We should keep in mind that not all of the limitations 
in our research could be overcome despite our effort, and precautions should be taken while 
interpreting our findings. 
9.4. Prospects of Political Network Studies 
Although limitations were encountered in our study, we have nevertheless created a rough 
portrait of the changes in state-business relations in the studied period. The methodology of our 
study allowed the power distribution in Hong Kong to be estimated, with the fairly limited 
information that could be obtained in the current political environment. We have to admit that the 
research was far from perfect, but nevertheless we moved a step forward from previous studies. Our 
research could be treated as the foundation of further studies, which would eventually give us a 
clearer picture about the politics of Hong Kong. We could expand our scope of study to political 
institutions other than the Executive Council, including various advisory bodies and apparatuses of 
electoral politics. Our research findings could be reinterpreted when documents about policy 
making are declassified, or when time allows today's insiders to reveal their observations with less 
reservation. 
The potential of social network analysis should not be limited to the study of state-business 
relations. While business is one of the most important societal forces which interact with the state, 
the influence of civic organizations and pressure groups in the civil society is also important. The 
introduction of social network analysis may help us to study the interaction between the social 
networks of the state, the business and the civil society. Our research, in this sense, could be seen as 
pioneering in the study of the politics of Hong Kong. 
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Appendix 1. Sociograms of Executive Councilors, 1982-2005 
Figure 1. Social network in Executive council, 1982 
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Figure 2. Social network in Executive council, 1983 
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Figure 11. Social network in Executive council, 1994-1995 
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Figure 4. Social network in Executive council, 1985 
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Figure 11. Social network in Executive council, 1994-1995 
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Figure 6. Social network in Executive council, 1987 
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Figure 11. Social network in Executive council, 1994-1995 
Ford Lee Peng Fei Purves 
八 V 
/ \ Lee Quo Wei 
O O o o 
Liao Poon Huai Jacobs Chung Sze Yuen Lydia Dunn 
Figure 8. Social network in Executive council, 1989 
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Figure 11. Social network in Executive council, 1994-1995 
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Figure 10. Social network in Executive council, 1993 
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Figure 11. Social network in Executive council, 1994-1995 
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Figure 12. Social network in Executive council, 1996 
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Figure 13. Social network in Executive council, 1997-2001 
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Figure 11. Social network in Executive council, 1994-1995 
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Figure 15. Social network in Executive council, 2004-2005 
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Appendix 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage, Closure and Power Index Score of 
Executive Councilors, 1982-2005 
Table 1. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1982 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Aker-Jones 1 3 2 5 
Lo Tak Shing 1 3 2 5 
Chung Sze Yuen 1 3 2 5 
Bray 1 3 2 5 
Haddon-Cave 1 3 2 5 
Lobo 2 2 4 
Griffiths 0 0 0 0 
Newbigging 0 0 1 1 
Sandberg 0 0 1 1 
Chappie 0 0 0 0 
Cheung Oswald Victor 0 0 0 0 
Fan Sin Yang 0 0 0 0 
McGovem 0 0 0 0 
Li Fook Wo 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean-2.418, S.D=3.804 
Table 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1983 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Lobo 2 3 5 
Sandberg ^ 2 3 5 
Newbigging 4.3 2 3 5 
Bremridge 20.77 3 3 6 
Fan Sin Yang 0 0 0 0 
Chung Sze yuen ^ 2 3 5 
Cheung Oswald Victor 0 0 0 0 
Li Fook Wo 0 0 0 0 
Lo Tak Shing ^ 2 3 5 
Dunn Lydia ^ 2 3 5 
Haddon-Cave 1 1 2 3 
Griffiths 0 0 0 0 
Bray 1 1 2 3 
Aker-Jones 1 1 2 3 
Boorman 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=3.582, S.D.=5.134 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Bremridge ^ 3 3 6 
Newbigging ^ 2 3 5 
Sandberg 2 3 5 
Chung Sze yuen 3 1 3 4 
Lo Tak Shing 3 1 3 4 
Bray 1 1 2 3 
Dunn Lydia 3 1 3 4 
Lobo 3 1 3 4 
Lee Quo Wei ^ 2 0 2 
Thomas 0 0 0 0 
Aker-Jones 1 1 2 3 
Chen Shou Lum 0 0 0 0 
Boorman 0 0 0 0 
Li Fook Wo 0 0 0 0 
Cheung Oswald Victor 0 0 0 0 
Haddon-Cave 1 1 2 3 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=5.460, S.D=9.838 
Table 4. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1985 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Bremridge 20.77 3 3 6 
Sandberg 5 2 3 5 
Chung Sze Yuen ^ 2 3 5 
Lo Tak Shing ^ 2 3 5 
Dunn Lydia 3 2 3 5 
Lee Quo Wei 2 5 1 3 4 
Lobo 22 1 3 4 
Haddon-Cave 1 1 2 3 
Aker-Jones 1 1 2 3 
Ho Eric Peter 1 1 2 3 
Chen Shou Lum 0 0 3 3 
Boorman 0 0 0 0 
Li Fook Wo 0 0 0 0 
Cheung Oswald Victor 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
Thomas 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean二2.713, S.D.=4.910 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Bremridge \5 3 3 6 
Dunn Lydia 4 2 3 5 
Sandberg 2 1 3 4 
Chung Sze yuen 4 2 3 5 
Lee Peng Fei 2 1 3 4 
Lee Quo Wei 2 1 3 4 
Liao Poon Huai 1 1 2 3 
Ho Eric Peter 1 1 2 3 
Aker-Jones 1 1 2 3 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 _ 0 
Boam 0 0 0 0 
Cheung Oswald Victor 0 0 0 0 
Thomas 0 0 0 0 
Chen Shou Lum 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=2.880, S.D=5.224 
Table 6. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1987 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Jacobs 2 3 2 5 
Ford 2 3 2 5 
Ho Eric Peter 2 3 2 5 
Liao Poon Huai 2 3 2 5 
Lee Peng Fei 1 2 2 4 
Lee Quo Wei 1 2 2 4 
Purves 1 2 2 4 
Boam 0 0 0 0 
Wong Peter C 0 0 0 0 
Chiu Hin Kwong 0 0 0 0 
Chen Shou Lum 0 0 0 0 
Thomas 0 0 0 C 
Tse Chi Wai 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 1 1 
Chung Sze Yuen 0 0 | 1 | 1 
‘Mean=0.667, S.D=0.842 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Ford 1 3 2 5 
Jacobs 1 3 2 5 
Liao Poon Huai 1 3 2 5 
Purves 1 3 2 5 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
Chiu Hin Kwong 0 0 0 0 
Lee Quo Wei 1 3 2 5 
Johnson G D 0 0 0 0 
Wong Peter C 0 0 0 0 
Lee Peng Fei 1 3 2 5 
Chung Sze Yuen 0 0 1 1 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 1 1 
Tse Chi Wai 0 0 0 0 
Thomas 0 0 0 0 
iMean-0 .231 ,S .D =0.175 
Table 8. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1989 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Ford 1 3 2 5 
Liao Poon Huai 1 3 2 5 
Jacobs 1 3 2 5 
Purves 0 0 1 1 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Hon Kwan 0 0 0 0 
Lee Peng Fei 0 0 1 1 
Johnson 0 0 0 0 
Swaine 0 0 0 0 
Tse Chi Wai 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Fan Rita 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean-0.231, S.D =0.421 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Ford 1 3 2 5 
Wiggham 1 3 2 5 
Jacobs 1 3 2 5 
Purves 0 0 1 1 
Swaine 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Hon Kwan 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
Duffel 0 0 0 0 
Wang Gung Wu 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Fan Rita 0 0 0 0 
Lee Peng Fei 0 0 1 1 
Tse Chi Wai 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=0.214, S.D=0.410 
Table 10. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1991 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Ford 1 3 2 5 
Wiggham 1 3 2 5 
Jacobs 1 3 2 5 
Purves 0 0 1 1 
Swaine 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Hon Kwan 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Maria 0 0 0 0 
Duffel 0 0 0 0 
Wang Gung Wu 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Fan Rita 0 0 0 0 
Lee Peng Fei 0 0 1 1 
Tse Chi Wai 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 丨 0 | 0 
‘Mean=0.214, S.D=0.410 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness • Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Ford 1 3 2 5 
Macleod 1 3 2 5 
Wiggham 1 3 2 5 
Purves 0 0 1 1 
Chow Liang Selina 0 0 0 0 
Wang Gung Wu 0 0 0 0 
Duffel 0 0 0 0 
Ho Sing Tin 0 0 0 0 
Lee Peng Fei 0 0 1 1 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Hui Yin Fat 0 0 0 0 
Fan Rita 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Wong Wang Fat 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=0.231, S.D =0.421 
Table 12. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1993 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Chan Cho Chak 3 3 2 5 
Sze Cho Cheung 3 3 2 5 
Ford 3 3 2 5 
Macleod 3 3 2 5 
Chan Anson 3 3 2 5 
Purves 0 0 0 0 
Foley 0 0 0 0 
Tung Chee Hwa 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Chan Kwan Yiu 0 0 0 0 
Li Kwok Nang 0 0 0 0 
Chang Khen Lee Denis 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
U ^ Mak Felice 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 _ 
1 Mean=0.571, S.D.=0.904 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Chan Anson 1 3 2 5 
Macleod 1 3 2 5 
Sze Cho Cheung 1 3 2 5 
Gray 0 0 0 0 
Tung Chee Hwa 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Chan Kwan Yiu 0 0 0 0 
Li Kwok Nang 0 0 0 0 
Chang Khen Lee Denis 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Lieh Mak Felice 0 0 0 0 
iMean=0.231,S.D =0.421 
Table 14. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1995 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Chan Anson 1 3 2 5 
Macleod 1 3 2 5 
Sze Cho Cheung 1 3 2 5 
Gray 0 0 0 0 
Tung Chee Hwa 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Chan Kwan Yiu 0 0 0 0 
Li Kwok Nang 0 0 0 0 
Chang Khen Lee Denis 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Lieh Mak Felice 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 
'Mean=0.231,S.D =0.421 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Chan Anson 1 3 2 5 
Tsang Donald 1 3 2 5 
Sze Cho Cheung 1 3 2 5 
Cheng Hoi Chuen 0 0 0 0 
McGregor 0 0 0 0 
Tung Chee Hwa 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Chan Kwan Yiu 0 0 0 0 
Li Kwok Nang 0 0 0 0 
Chang Khen Lee Denis 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Dunn Lydia 0 0 0 0 
Lieh Mak Felice 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=0.250, S.D=0.452 
Table 16. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1997 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Chan Anson 0 0 1 1 
Tsang Donald 0 0 1 1 
McGregor 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Chan Kwan Yiu 0 0 0 0 
Li Kwok Nang 0 0 0 0 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Matthews 0 0 0 0 
Chang Khee Lee Denis 0 0 0 0 
Lieh Mak Felice 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Hoi Chuen 0 0 | 0 | 0 
1 Mean=0.000, S.D.二0.000 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Tsang Donald 0 0 1 1 
Chan Anson 0 0 1 1 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Leung Oi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Yang Ti Liang 0 0 0 0 
Chung Shui Ming 0 0 0 0 
Tang Yiiig Yen 0 0 0 0 
Lee Yeh Kwong 0 0 0 0 
Fong Wong Kut Man 0 0 0 C 
Chung Sze yuen 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Yiu Chung 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Leung Kam Chung 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean-0.000, S.D=0.000 
Table 18. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1999 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Tsang Donald 0 0 1 1 
Chan Anson 0 0 1 1 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Leung Oi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Yang Ti Liang 0 0 0 0 
Chung Shui Ming 0 0 0 _ 0 
Tang Ying Yen 0 0 0 0 
Lee Yeh Kwong 0 0 0 0 
Fong Wong Kut Man 0 0 0 0 
Chung Sze yuen 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Yiu Chung 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Leung Kam Chung 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=0.000, S.D=0.000 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Tsang Donald 0 0 1 1 
Chan Anson 0 0 1 1 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Leung Oi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Yang Ti Liang 0 0 0 0 
Chung Shui Ming 0 0 0 0 
Tang Ying Yen 0 0 0 0 
Lee Yeh Kwong 0 0 0 0 
Fong Wong Kut Man 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Yiu Chung 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Leung Kam Chung 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=0.000, S.D=0.000 
Table 20. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 2001 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Tsang Donald 0 0 1 1 
Chan Anson 0 0 1 1 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Leung Oi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Yang Ti Liang 0 0 0 0 
Chung Shui Ming 0 0 0 0 
Tang Ying Yen 0 0 0 0 
Lee Yeh Kwong 0 0 0 C 
Fong Wong Kut Man 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Yiu Chung 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Leung Kam Chung 0 0 | 0 | 0 
1 Mean=0.000, S.D=0.000 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Tsang Donald 0 0 0 C 
Wong Rosanna 0 0 0 0 
Leung Qi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Yang Ti Liang 0 0 0 0 
Chung Shui Ming 0 0 0 0 
Tang Ying Yen 0 0 0 0 
Lee Yeh Kwong 0 0 0 0 
Fong Wong Kut Man 0 0 0 0 
Tarn Yiu Chung 0 0 0 0 
Chien Kuo Fung 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Leung Kam Chung 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=0.000, S.D=0.000 
Table 22. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 2003 
Flow Betweenness i Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Ip Lau Regina 4 3 2 5 
Wong Wing Ping 4 3 2 5 
Suen Ming Yeung 4 3 2 5 
Tsang Donald 4 3 2 5 
Lam Sui Lung 4 3 2 5 
Ip Shu Kwan 4 3 2 5 
Leung Qi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Liao Cheung Shing 0 0 0 0 
Li Arthur 0 0 1 1 
Ma Si Hang 0 0 0 0 
Leung Kam Chung 0 0 1 1 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Ho Chi Ping 0 0 0 0 
Tsang Yok Sing 0 0 0 0 
Tang Ting Yen 0 0 0 0 
Tien Pei Chun 0 0 0 0 
Yeoh Eng Kiong 0 0 0 0 
Liao Sau Tung 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Yiu Tong 0 丨 0 丨 0 | 0 
'Mean=1.263, S.D =1.859 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Tsang Donald 5 3 3 6 
Lam Sui Lung 5 3 3 6 
Ip Shu Kwan 5 3 3 6 
Lee Siu Kwong 5 3 3 6 
Wong Wing Ping 5 3 3 6 
Tsang Chun Wah 5 3 3 6 
Suen Ming Yeung 5 3 3 6 
Ho Chi Ping 0 0 0 0 
Tang Ting Yen 0 0 0 0 
Tsang Yok Sing 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Yiu Tong 0 0 0 0 
Liao Sau Tung 0 0 0 0 
Yeoh Eng Kiong 0 0 0 0 
Li Arthur 0 0 0 0 
Liao Cheung Shing 0 0 0 0 
Leung Oi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Chow Liang Selina 0 0 0 0 
Ma Si Hang 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 
iMean=1.842, S.D=2.412 
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Table 11. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Power Index Score of Executive 
Councilors in 1992 
Flow Betweenness ‘ Brokerage Score Closure Score Power Index 
Suen Ming Yeung 5 3 3 6 
Wong Wing Ping 5 3 3 6 
Lee Sill Kwong 5 3 3 6 
Tsang Chun Wah 5 3 3 6 
Tsang Donald 5 3 3 6 
Ip Shu Kwan 5 3 3 6 
Lam Sui Lung 5 3 3 6 
Tsang Yok Sing 0 0 0 0 
Tang Ting Yen 0 0 0 0 
Cha Shih May Lung 0 0 0 0 
Chow Yat Ngok 0 0 0 0 
Chan Bernard 0 0 0 0 
Cheng Yiu Tong 0 0 0 0 
Leung Chun Ying 0 0 0 0 
Leung Qi Sie 0 0 0 0 
Chow Liang Selina 0 0 0 0 
Ho Chi Ping 0 0 0 0 
Liao Sail Tung 0 0 0 0 
Ma Si Hang 0 0 0 0 
Li Arthur 0 0 0 0 
Liao Cheung Shing 0 0 0 0 
1 Mean=1.667, S.D =2.357 
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Appendix 3. Sociograms of Firms with their stocks listed as Hang Seng Index 
Component 
Figure 1. Sociogram of HSIC firms in 1982 
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Figure 2. Sociogram of HSIC firms in 1986 
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Figure 3. Sociogram of HSIC firms in 1990 
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Figure 3. Sociogram of HSIC firms in 1990 
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Appendix 4. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage, Closure and Prominence of HSIC 
firms 
Table 1. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Prominent Index of Hang Seng 
Index Component Corporations in 1982* 
Flow Betweenness Brokerage Score Closure Score Prominence 
Hutchinson Whampoa 64.04 3 3 6 
HSBC 54.97 3 3 6 
KMB 46.29 3 3 6 
Green Island Cement 45.05 3 3 6 
Yaumatei Ferry 44.72 3 3 6 
HK Telephone 39.57 2 3 5 
Hang Seng Bank 37.36 2 3 5 
New World 37.28 2 — 3 5 
OOCL 36.59 2 0 2 
HK Electric 36.07 2 3 5 
Sun Hung Kai 32.62 2 3 5 
Wharf 30.39 2 — 3 5 
HK Aircraft Engineering 30.12 2 3 5 
Jardine 29.6 2 — 3 5 
Cross Harbor Tunnel 29.43 2 3 5 
Miramar Hotel 29.23 2 3 5 
HK and Shanghai Hotel 28.8 2 3 5 
Wheelock Marden 27.67 1 3 4 
Wheelock Maritime 24.01 1 3 4 
Wah Kwong 22.03 一 1 3 4 
HK Realty and Trust 19.44 1 3 4 
Cheung Kong Holdings 18.84 1 3 4 
CLP 17.87 1 3 4 
Swire Pacific — 17.09 1 3 4 
Harbor Center Development 17.04 1 3 4 
Jardine Security 15.61 1 3 4 
World International — 13.58 0 3 3 
HK and China Gas 11.68 0 3 3 
Winsor International 10.03 0 0 0 
Stelux 0 0 0 0 
Tai Cheong ~ 0 0 0 0 
HK Land 29.53 2 | 3 | 5 
*Data of Wing On Limited is missing. 
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Table 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Prominent Index of Hang Seng 
Index Component Corporations in 1986* 
Flow Betweenness Brokerage Score Closure Score Prominence 
Hutchinson Whampoa 74.87 3 3 6 
HK Land 65.67 3 2 ~ 5 ~ 
HSBC 57.36 3 一 2 5 
HK and China Gas 48.63 3 3 6 
Wharf 44.57 ~ 2 ~ 3 5 
Hang Seng Bank 43.85 2 一 3 一 5 一 
HK and Shanghai Hotel 41.32 2 3 5 
Swire Pacific 40.82 2 一 2 一 4 一 
Jardine Security ^ 2 2 4 
Yaumatei Ferry 33.75 2 3 5 
KMB 31.41 2 3 5 
New World 31.28 ~ 2 “ 3 — 5 
Green Island Cement 31.24 2 3 5 
Bank of East Asia 30,69 2 3 5 
World International 28.77 2 3 5 
Eastern Asia Navigation 28.77 2 3 5 
Jardine 27.3 ~ 2 ~ 2 4 
Henderson Development 25.94 1 3 4 
Sun Hung Kai 25.46 1 — 3 4 
Hysan 22.6 — 1 — 3 4 
HK Aircraft Engineering 21.48 1 2 3 
TVB 18.94 1 0 1 
CLP 14.63 一 1 3 4 
Winsor 13.62 1 3 4 
Miramar 13.11 1 3 4 
HK Telephone 10.07 1 0 1 
Cheung Kong Holdings 1 3 4 
HK Realty and Trust 1.46 0 3 3 
Hang Lung 0 0 0 0 
Stelux 0 0 0 0 
Wing On 0 0 0 0 
Tai Cheong 0 0 | 0 | 0 
*Data of Hong Kong Electric is missing. 
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Table 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Prominent Index of Hang Seng 
Index Component Corporations in 1986* 
Flow Betweenness Brokerage Score Closure Score Prominence 
HSBC 99.42 3 3 6 
World International 96.24 3 3 6 
HK Land 93.15 3 _ 3 6 
Wharf 69.69 3 ~ 3 " 6 ~ 
Hang Seng Bank 63.14 2 3 5 
HK Electric 62.9 2 3 " 5 ~ 
Hutchinson Whampoa 60.38 2 3 5 
New World 58.75 2 — 3 5 
Harbor Center 57.75 2 3 5 
Bank of East Asia 57.41 ‘ 2 3 5 
Swire Pacific 47.56 2 3 5 
CLP — 47.33 — 2 1 — 3 — 
Cathay Pacific 43.24 一 2 — 3 5 
HK and China Gas 41.95 2 3 — 5 
Mandarin Oriental 37.1 1 3 4 
Sun Hung Kai ^ 1 3 4 
HK and Shanghai Hotel 34.61 一 1 一 1 2 
Henderson Development 32.29 1 3 4 
KMB 27.19 1 — 3 4 
Jardine 26.71 一 1 一 3 4 
Cavendish 25.44 1 3 4 
Harbor Tunnel 25.22 1 3 4 
Hysan ^ 1 3 4 
Miramar 21.71 1 3 4 
HK Aircraft Engineering 19.68 1 3 4 
Dairy Farm International 15.23 1 3 4 
HK Ferry 14.64 1 3 4 
Jardine Strategy 14.14 1 3 4 
HK Telecom 14.03 1 0 1 
TVB 11.96 0 0 0 
HK Realty and Trust 8.03 0 3 3 
Cheung Kong Holding 3.63 0 3 3 
Winsor 2.19 0 0 0 
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Table 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Prominent Index of Hang Seng 
Index Component Corporations in 1986* 
Flow Betweenness Brokerage Score Closure Score Prominence 
Hang Seng Bank 144.52 3 3 一 6 一 
SCMP 131.8 3 一 0 3 
Wheelock 116.89 3 一 i 一 4 一 
HK Telecom 111.96 3 2 5 
New World 80.87 3 ~ 3 ~ 6 ~ 
CLP 76.65 2 — 1 3 
Shangria 61.16 “ 2 2 4 
Wharf 58 2 一 1 3 
Swire Pacific 46.75 2 ~ 2 4 ~ 
HK and Shanghai Hotel 43.64 2 1 3 
HK Electric 42.86 “ 2 3 5 
Hutchinson Whampoa 41.63 2 3 5 
CITIC Pacific 35.16 1 — 2 3 
Amoy 34.38 1 1 2 
Hang Lung 34.38 _ 1 1 2 
Henderson Development 29.62 1 3 4 
TVB 28.19 - 1 0 1 
Sino Land 27.28 “ 1 0 1 
Hysan 21.24 1 0 1 
HSBC 20.34 - 1 2 3 
Cathay Pacific 20.34 1 2 3 
Cheung Kong Holding — 19.59 1 3 4 
HK and China Gas — 17.67 1 3 4 
Henderson Investment 14.26 1 3 4 
Sun Hung Kai 14.05 1 3 4 
Bank of East Asia 1 3 4 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 12.24 1 3 4 
Hopewell 1.23 1 0 1 
Guangdong Investment 0 0 0 0 
China Resources 0 0 0 0 
Great Eagle “ 0 0 0 0 
First Pacific 0 0 0 0 
Shun Tak | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 
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Table 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Prominent Index of Hang Seng 
Index Component Corporations in 1986* 
Flow Betweenness Brokerage Score Closure Score Prominence 
HK Electric 127.16 3 2 5 
HK Telecom 一 112.72 3 0 — 3 
Bank of East Asia 109.08 3 2 " 5 ~ 
CLP 92.99 “ 3 2 5 
Sino Land 75.04 “ 3 0 3 
Amoy 68.67 2 1 3 
Wheelock 66.94 “ 2 1 3 
TVB 61.68 2 0 2 
Hutchinson Whampoa 61.36 2 2 4 
Swire Pacific 546 2 2 4 
Cathay pacific 49.69 2 2 4 
Hysan 49.33 2 2 ~ 4 
Sun Hung Kai 48.67 2 — 2 4 
Hang Seng Bank 2 2 4 
HK and China Gas 27.08 1 2 3 
New World 21.17 “ 1 2 3 
Henderson Development 20.27 1 2 3 
Smartone 16.71 1 0 1 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 11.85 1 2 3 
Henderson Investment 10.97 1 2 3 
Shanghai Industrial 7.68 1 0 1 
CITIC Pacific M 1 2 3 
HSBC 4.94 1 2 3 
Johnson Electric ^ 1 0 1 
Cheung Kong Holding 0.88 1 2 3 
First Pacific ~ 0 0 0 0 
Pao heng bank 0 0 0 0 
China Mobile 一 0 0 0 0 
Legend — 0 0 0 0 
China Resources 0 0 0 0 
Hang Lung 0 0 1 1 
Wharf — 0 0 1 1 
Li and Fung 0 0 | 0 | 0 
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Table 2. Flow Betweenness, Brokerage Score, Closure Score and Prominent Index of Hang Seng 
Index Component Corporations in 1986* 
Flow Betweenness Brokerage Score Closure Score Prominence 
Cathay Pacific 146.35 3 一 2 ' 5 
Bank of China (HK) 122.8 3 0 ' 3 一 
Hutchinson Whampoa 111.15 3 2 5 
Hang Seng Bank 74.11 3 — 2 5 
HSBC 71.8 3 一 2 5 
HK Electric 62.7 2 2 _ 4 一 
Wharf 50.76 2 1 3 
Sun Hung Kai 44.11 2 2 4 
Swire Pacific 40.55 2 — 2 4 
PCCW 35.71 ‘ 2 2 4 
COSCO Pacific 35.34 2 2 4 
Wheelock 30.76 1 1 2 
Bank of East Asia 30.05 1 2 3 
CLP 28.1 ‘ 1 2 3 
CITIC Pacific 26.4 1 2 3 
ESPRIT — 23.67 1 0 1 
MTR 23.11 1 0 1 
Lenovo ^ 1 0 1 
China Unicom ^ 1 0 1 
Henderson Development 14.66 1 2 3 
Li and Fung 13.46 1 一 0 1 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure 12.39 1 2 3 
HK and China Gas 一 10.41 1 2 3 
Henderson Investment 4.84 1 2 3 
Cheung Kong Holding 一 1.81 1 2 3 
China Merchants 0 0 0 0 
China Resources 0 0 0 0 
Johnson Electric — 0 0 0 0 
Denway Motors 0 0 0 0 
Yue Yuen — 0 0 0 0 
Hang Lung “ 0 0 0 0 
CNOOC 一 0 0 0 Q 
China Mobile 0 0 | 0 | 0 
Table 7. Mean flow betweenness and standard deviation of Hang Seng index component 
corporations in 1982, 1984, 1990, 1997, 2000 and 2004 
i m r ^ I W ~ 
Mean 28.02 27.26 39.12 39.38 35.11 3 2 . 1 5 ^ 
Standard Deviation 14.24 18.65 28.86 38.60 37.33 36.59 
ANOVA: df尸5, df2=190, F=0.966, p=0.440 
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Appendix 5. Representatives of HSIC firms in Executive Council 
Table 1. Representatives of HSIC firms* in Executive Council, 1982-1985 
Company Brokerage Closure Prominence Representative in Executive Brokerage / Closure / Power Indsx 
Council 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
^ i 3 4 Chung Sze Yuen — 2 / 3 / 5 — 2 / 3 / 5 “ 1 / 3 / 4 “ 2 / 3 / 5 
Lo Tak Shing 2 / 3 / 5 “ 2 / 3 / 5 — 1 / 3 / 4 ~ / 3 / 5 
Green Island 3 3 6 Li Fook Wo 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Cement 
Hang Seng Bank 2 3 1 Lee Quo Wei — - ~ - 2 / 0 / 2 “ 1 / 3 / 4 
Lee Peng Fei - - - -
Hutchinson 3 3 6 Li Fook Wo 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Whampoa 
HSBC 3 3 6 Dunn Lydia — - — 2 / 3 / 5 1 / 3 / 4 2 / 3 / 5 
Lee Quo Wei 0 / 0 / 0 “ 0 / 0 / 0 — 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Newbigging — 2 / 3 / 5 — 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 — -
Sandberg 2 / 3 / 5 “ 2 / 3 / 5 — 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 
Bremridge (retired director) 3 / 3 T V 3 / 3 3 / 3 / 6 3 / 3 / 6一 
Hong Kong 2 3 5 Newbigging 2 / 3 / 5 “ 2 / 3 / 5 — 2 / 3 / 5 — -
Electric Chen Shou Lum - - 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
i ^ g Kong Land “ 2 3 5 "Newbigging 一 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 — 2 / 3 / 5 -
Hong Kong 2 3 5 , . . ^ , , , ^ - , ^ , , « , , , . 
Telephone Newbigging 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 -
Jardine 2 . 3 . 5 "Newbigging 2 / 3 / ~ 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 -
Jardine Security 1 3 4 Newbigging 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 -
Miramar Hotel 2 _ 3 一 5 Lee Quo Wei 0 / 0 / 0 “ 0 / 0 / 0 — 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
New World — 2 — 3 一 5 Lee Quo Wei 0 / 0 / 0 “ 0 / 0 / 0 — 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
OOCL “ 1 — 0 — 2 Newbigging — 2 / 3 / 5 ~ 2 / 3 / 5 ~ T / 3 / 5 -
Swire Pacific i 3 4 Dunn Lydia - " 2 / 3 / 5 — 1 / 3 / 4 2 / 3 / 5 
Lo Tak Shing 2 / 3 / 5 2 / 3 / 5 “ 1 / 3 / 4 一 2 / 3 / 5 
Bremridge (retired director) 3 / 3 / 6 _ 3 / 3 / 6 3 / 3 / 6 3 / 3 / 6 
Wah Kwong — 1 — 3 — 4 Newbigging 2 / 3 / 5 " 2 / 3 / 5 — 2 / 3 / 5 -
HK Aircraft 2 3 5 Bremridge (retired director) 3 / 3 / 6 3 / 3 / 6 3 / 3 / 6 3 / 3 / 6 
Engnieering 
Mean Prominence 4.69 Mean Power 4.33 4.43 3.33 3.75 
Total number of 16 Total number of 6 7 9 8 
Representated Corp. Representatives 
% in HSIC firms 50% % in Execo 42.8% 50.00% 52.94% 50.00% 
*Data of Wing On Limited is missing. 
Table 2. Representatives of HSIC firms* in Executive Council, 1986-1989 
Company Brokerage Closure Prominence Representative in Executive Brokerage / Closure / Power Index 
Council 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
^ P " 1 3 ~ 4 Chung Sze Yuen 2 / 3 / 5 0 / 1 / 1 0 / 1 / 1 
Eastern Asia 2 3 5 Chung Sze Yuen ~ 2 / 3 / 5 0 / 1 / 1 0 / 1 / 1 -
Navigation 
Hang Seng Bank 2 3 5 Lee Quo Wei 一 1 / 3 / 4 一 2 / 2 / 4 3 / 2 / 5 — -
Lee Peng Fei 1 / 3 / 4 2 / 2 / 4 3 / 2 / 5 0 / 1 / 1 
HSBC 3 2 5 Dunn Lydia 2 / 3 / 5 “ 0 / 1 / 1 0 / 1 / 1 “ 0 / 0 / 0 
Sandberg 1 / 3 / 4 - - -
Purves - “ 2 / 2 / 4 ‘ 3 / 2 / 5 0 / 1 / 1 
H^ian 1 ~ 3 4 L i ^ Q u o Wei 1 / 3 / 4 “ 2 / 2 / 4 “ 3 / 2 / 5 - “ 
Miramar Hotel ' 1 3 4 u T Q u o Wei 1 / 3 / 4 “ 2 / 2 / 4 3 / 2 / 5 - “ 
疋 w World 2 . 3 — 5 Lee Quo Wei 1 / 3 / 4 ~ l l 2 / 4 3 / 2 / 5 — -
Swire Pacific 2 _ 2 4 —Dunn Lydia 2 / 3 / 5 0 / 1 / 1 — 0 / 1 / 1 0 / 0 / 0 
World 2 3 5 Chung Sze Yuen 2 / 3 / 5 0 / 1 / 1 0 / 1 / 1 -
International 
Mean Prominence 4.56 Mean Power 4.40 2.80 3.40 0.67 
Total number of 9 Total number of 5 5 5 3 
Representated Corp. Representatives 
% in HSIC firms 2 8 . 1 3 % ^ % in Execo 3 5 . 7 1 % 3 1 . 2 5 % 3 5 . 7 1 % 2 1 . 4 3 % 
*Data of Hong Kong Electric is missing. 
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Table 3. Representatives of Hang Seng Index Component Corporations in Executive Council, 
1990-1996 
Company Brok. Closure Prom. Representative in Brokerage / Closure / Power Index 
Executive Council 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Cathay 2 3 5 Dunn Lydia 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 - -
Pacific 
Hang Seng 2 3 5 Lee Peng Fei . 0 / 1 / 1 ! \ ! \ ~ o 7 l / 1 - — - - -
Bank G r ^ - — - - - 0 / 0 / 0 ~ 0 / 0 / 0 " -
Cheng Hoi Chuen “ - - - - — - - 0 / 0 / 0 
HSBC 3 3 6 Dunn Lydia 0 / 0 / 0 ~ 0 / 0 / 0 ~ ^ 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 ~ - -
Purves — ~ 0 / 1 / 1 ~0"/1 / 1 0 / 1 / 1 0 / 0 / " o ~ - — - -
Gray “ - “ - — - 0 / 0 / 0 - -
Swire P a c i f i c 2 3 5 Dunn Lydia 0 / 0 / 0 — 0 / 0 / 0 ~ 0 / 0 0 / 0 7 F " 0 / 0 / 0 ~ 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
1 Gray - “ - “ - _ - _ 0 / 0 / 0 _ - -
Mean Prominence 5 .25~Mean Power 0.67 0.67 0.67 0 0 0 — 0 
Total number of 4 Total number of 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Representated Corp. Representatives 
% in HSIC firms 12.12% |% in Execo 20.00% 120.00% 120.00% 112.50% 15.38% 15.38% 14.28% 
Table 4. Representatives of Hang Seng Index Component Corporations in Executive Council, 
1997-1999 
Company Brokerage Closure Prominence Representative in Brokerage / Closure / Power Index 
Executive Council 19^ 
Cheung Kong i 3 4 Lee Yeh Kwong - 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Holding 
CLP 2 1 3 Chung Sze Yuen - “ 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
First Pacific 0 ~ 0 " 0 Chan Kwan Yiu 0 / 0 / 0 - — -
^ n g Seng Bank" 3 3 一 6 ^ e n g Hoi Chuen 0 / 0 / 0 - -
二 ： t ^ Yeh Kwong - ^ 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
？ = o n g 3 2 5 Chung Sze Yuen - 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Wheelock | 3 | 1 | 4 Chung Sze Yuen “ - 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Mean Prominence 3.71 Mean Power 0 0 0 
Total number of 7 Total number of 2 2 2 
Representated Corp. Representatives 
% in HSIC firms ~ 2 1 . 2 1 % ~ % in Execo 18.18% 14.29% 14.29% 
Table 5. Representatives of Hang Seng Index Component Corporations in Executive Council, 
2000-2003 
Company Brokerage Closure Prominence Representative in Brokerage / Closure / Power Index 
£xccutivc Council — ^ ^ ^ 
HSBC 1 “ 2 3 Chien Kuo Feng 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 — -
Bank of East Asia 3 — 2 5 " L i Arthur - — - — - 0 / 1 / 1 
China Mobile 0 0 0 Li Arthur - — - - 0 / 1 / 1 
Leung Kam Chung 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 ~ 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 1 / 1 
Mean Prominence 2.67 Mean Power 0 0 0 1 
Total number of 3 Total number of 2 2 2 2 
Representated Corp. Representatives 
^ ^ HSIC firms 9.09% |% in Execo 15.38o/o 15.38% 16.67% 10.53°厂 
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Table 6. Representatives of Hang Seng Index Component Corporations in Executive Council, 
2004-2005 
Company Brokerage Closure Prominence Representative in Brokerage / Closure / Power Index 
Executive Council — ^ 
Bank of East Asia" 1 2 3 Li Arthur 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 — 
^ i n a Mobile 0 I 0 I 0 Li Arthur “ 0 / 0 / 0 0 / 0 / 0 
Mean Prominence 1.5 Mean Power 0 0 
Total number of 2 Total number of 1 1 
Representated Corp. Representatives 
% in HSI component 6.06% % in Execo 5.26% 4.76% 
corporations 
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Appendix 6. Prominent HSIC firms and their Representatives in Executive Council 
Table 1. Power of Business Sector in Executive Council, 1982-1986 
HSIC Firms with Prominence >5 in 1982 Their Representatives Their Representatives with 
Power Index Scored >5 from 
1982-1986 
HSBC Dunn Lydia Dunn Lydia 




Hong Kong Electric Newbigging Newbigging 
Chen Shou Lum 
Hong Kong Land Newbigging Newbigging 
Hong Kong Telephone Newbigging Newbigging 
Jardine Newbigging Newbigging 
Green Island Cement Li Fook Wo 
Hang Seng Bank Lee Quo Wei 
Lee Peng Fei 
Hutchinson Whampoa Li Fook Wo 
Miramar Hotel Lee Quo Wei 
New World Development Lee Quo Wei 
Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Bremridge 
KMB 
Yaumatei Ferry 
Sun Hung Kai 
Wharf 
Cross Harbour Tunnel 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel � 
Total: 17 Total: 8 Total: 4 
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Table 2. Power of Business Sector in Executive Council, 1986-1990 
HSIC Firms with Prominence >5 in 1986 Their Representatives in Their Representatives with 
Executive Council Power Index Scored >5 from 
1986-1990 
Eastern Asia Navigation Chung Sze Yuen Chung Sze Yuen 
Hang Seng Bank Lee Quo Wei Lee Quo Wei 
Lee Peng Fei Lee Peng Fei 




New World Lee Quo Wei Lee Quo Wei 
World International Chung Sze Yuen Chung Sze Yuen 
Hutchinson Whampoa 
Hong Kong Land 
Hong Kong and China Gas 
Wharf 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotel 
Yaumatei Ferry 
KMB 
Green Island Cement 
Bank of East Asia 
Total: 14 Total: 7 Total: 6 
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Table 3. Power of Business Sector in Executive Council, 1990-1994 
HSIC Firms with Prominence >5 in 1990 Their Representatives in Their Representatives with 
Executive Council Power Index Scored >5 from 
1990-1994 
Cathay Pacific Dunn Lydia 
Hang Seng Bank Cheng Hoi Chuen 
Lee Peng Fei 
Gray 
HSBC Dunn Lydia 
Purves 
Gray 
Swire Pacific Dunn Lydia 
Gray 
World International 
Hong Kong Land 
Wharf 
Hong Kong Electric 
Hutchinson Whampoa 
New World Development 
Harbor Center 
Bank of East Asia 
Hong Kong and China Gas 
Total: 13 Total: 5 Total: 0 
Table 4. Power of Business Sector in Executive Council, 1997-2001 
HSIC Firms with Prominence >5 in 1997 Their Representatives in Their Representatives with 
Executive Council Power Index Scored >5 from 
1997-2001 
Hang Seng Bank Cheng Hoi Chuen 
Hong Kong Telecom Chung Sze Yuen 
New World Development 
Hong Kong Electric 
Hutchinson Whampoa 
Total: 5 Total: 2 Total: 0 
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Table 5. Power of Business Sector in Executive Council, 2000-2004 
HSIC Firms with Prominence >5 in 2000 Their Representatives in Their Representatives with 
Executive Council Power Index Scored >5 from 
2000-2004 
Bank of East Asia Arthur Li 
Hong Kong Electric 
CLP 
Total: 3 Total: 1 Total: 0 
Table 6. Power of Business Sector in Executive Council, 2004-2005 
HSIC Firms with Prominence >5 in 2004 Their Representatives in Their Representatives with 
Executive Council Power Index Scored >5 from 
2004-2005 
HSBC 
Hang Seng Bank 
Hutchinson Whampoa 
Cathay Pacific 
Total: 4 Total: 0 Total: 0 
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Appendix 7. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1982-2005 
1. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1982 
Government Administrative Services Aker-Jones 
Bray 
Haddon Cave 
China Light and Power Chung Sze Yuen 




Mercantile Bank Bremridge 
Newbigging 
Sandberg 
Swire Pacific Limited Bremridge 
Lo Tak Shing 
Swire Properties Limited Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Swire Group Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lo Tak Shing 
Lobo 
2. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1983 
Government Administrative Services Aker-Jones 
Bray 
Haddon-Cave 
China Light and Power Chung Sze Yuen 




Mercantile Bank Bremridge 
Newbigging 
Sandberg 
John Swire and Sons Bremridge 
Lydia Dunn 
Swire Pacific Limited Bremridge 
Lo Tak Shing 
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Swire Properties Limited Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Swire Group Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lo Tak Shing 
Lobo 
Lydia Dunn 
3. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1984 
Government Administrative Services Aker-Jones 
Bray 
Haddon-Cave 
China Light and Power Chung Sze Yuen 
Lo Tak Shing 
Hong Kong Electric Newbigging 




HSBC Group Bremridge 
Lee Quo Wei 
Newbigging 
Sandberg 
Mercantile Bank Bremridge 
Newbigging 
Sandberg 
John Swire and Sons Bremridge 
Lydia Dunn 
Swire Pacific Limited Bremridge 
Lo Tak Shing 
Swire Properties Limited Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Swire Group Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 




4. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1985 
Government Administrative Services Aker-Jones 
Haddon-Cave 
Ho Eric Peter 
China Light and Power Chung Sze Yuen 
Lo Tak Shing 
HSBC Bremridge 
Sandberg 
HSBC Group Bremridge 
Lee Quo Wei 
Sandberg 
Mercantile Bank Bremridge 
Sandberg 
John Swire and Sons Bremridge 
Lydia Dunn 
Swire Properties Limited Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Swire Group Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lo Tak Shing 
Lobo 
Lydia Dunn 
5. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1986 
Government Administrative Services Aker-Jones 
Ho Eric Peter 
Liao Poon Hua 
HSBC Bremridge 
Sandberg 
Hang Seng Bank Lee Peng Fei 
Lee Quo Wei 
HSBC Group Bremridge 
Lee Peng Fei 
Lee Quo Wei 
Sandberg 
Mercantile Bank Bremridge 
Sandberg 
John Swire and Sons Bremridge 
Lydia Dunn 
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Swire Properties Limited Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Swire Group Bremridge 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lydia Dunn 
6. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1987 
Government Administrative Services Aker-Jones 
Ford 
Ho Eric Peter 
Liao Poon Huai 
Hang Seng Bank Lee Peng Fei 
Lee Quo Wei 
HSBC Group Lee Peng Fei 
Lee Quo Wei 
Purves 
Swire Group Chung Sze Yuen 
Lydia Dunn 
7. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1988 
Government Administrative Services Ford 
Jacobs 
Liao Poon Huai 
Hang Seng Bank Lee Peng Fei 
Lee Quo Wei 
HSBC Group Lee Peng Fei 
Lee Quo Wei 
Purves 
Swire Group Chung Sze Yuen 
Lydia Dunn 
8. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1989 
Government Administrative Services Ford 
Jacobs 
Liao Poon Huai 
HSBC Group Lee Peng Fei 
Purves 
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9. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1990-1992 
Government Administrative Services Ford 
Jacobs 
Wiggham 
HSBC Group Lee Peng Fei 
Purves 
10. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1993 
Government Administrative Services Anson Chan 
Chan Cho Chak 
Ford 
Macleod 
Sze Cho Cheung 
11. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1994-1995 
Government Administrative Services Anson Chan 
Macleod 
Sze Cho Cheung 
12. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1996 
Government Administrative Services Anson Chan 
Donald Tsang 
Sze Cho Cheung 
13. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 1997-2001 
Government Administrative Services Anson Chan 
Donald Tsang 
14. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 2003 
Government Administrative Services Donald Tsang 
Ip Shu Kwan 
Lam Sui Lung 
Regina Ip 
Suen Ming Yeung 
Wong Wing Ping 
China Mobile Anthony Leung 
Arthur Li 
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15. Social Linkages between Executive Councilors, 2004-2005 
Government Administrative Services Donald Tsang 
Ip Shu Kwan 
Lam Sui Lung 
Lee Siu Kwong 
Suen Ming Yeung 
Tsang Chun Wah 
Wong Wing Ping 
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Appendix 8. List of directors in the borads of HSIC firms 
1. List of directors in 1982 
Cheung Kong Holdings Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Zang Chon Sheng 
Li Ka Shing 
Magnus George C 
Chow Chin Wo 
Li Chong Yuet Ming 
China Light and Power Lo Man Wai 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lo Tak Shing 
Wang Yun Cheng 
Dickson Leach James S 
Miller Kenneth A 
Stones W F 
Kadoorie Michael 
Gordon Sidney S 
Kadoorie Horace 
Strachan I C 
Ross George R 
McAulay Ronald J 
Birkhead W J 
Barret Dean 
Wood C F 
Norton A S H 
Kadoorie Lord 
Cross Harbour Tunnel Blye Douglas W A 
Lee Jung Sen 
Vine Peter A L 
Marden John L 
Kadoorie Lord 
Leeds Peter F 
Leung Hon Wah 
Richardson John A 
Orgill Richard M J 
Green Island Cement Magnus George C 
Li Ka Shing 
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Zang Chon Sheng 
Dickson Leach James S 
Fok Canning K N 
Ross George R 
Nash Peter E 
Lam Chik Ho 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Li Fook Wo 
Hobson Howard F G 
Wu Shu Chih Alex 
Michael Don A H 
Grimsdale Willian T 
Brooker Joseph S 
Hang Seng Bank Man Kwok Lau 
Lee Quo Wei 
Lau Chan Kwok 
Leung Kau Kui 
Tang Shiu Kin 
Yuen Tat Cho 
Ho Sin Hang 
Ho Tim 
Gray John M 
Hui Sai Fun 
Munden Roy V 
Ho Tzu Cho David 
Hammond Peter E 
Pao Yue Kong 
Wrangham Peter J 
Harbour Centre Development Gordon Sidney S 
Sohmen Helmut 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Kadoorie Michael 
Hui Sai Fun 
Pao Yue Kong 
Forsgate Hugh M G 
Li Wen Jen Gonzaga 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
Hutchison Whampoa Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
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Hutchinson Allan G 
Wight Peter W 
Hubbard-Ford Jonathan L 
Wrangham Peter J 
Moller Eric B 
Li Fook Wo 
Li Ka Shing 
Ann Tse Kai 
Vine Peter A L 
Richardson John A 
Kadoorie Horace 
Magnus George C 
Hong Kong and China Gas Lee Shau Kee 
Lee Richard C 
Lawrence Edward J 
Leung Hay Man 
Li Fook Shu 
Liu Lit Man 
MacCallum Ian R A 
Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf Kan Yuet Keung 
Kadoorie Horace 
Sohmen Helmut 
Marden John L 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
Li Wen Jen Gonzaga 
Li Fook Shu 
Pao Yue Kong 
HSBC Li Ka Shing 
Sandberg Michael G R 
Marden John L 
MacDonald I H 
Purves W 
Petty J R 
Pao Yue Kong 
Duffy E W 
Newbigging David K 
Lee Quo Wei 
Hutson P E 
Hubner R W 
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Archer John 
Munden Roy V 
Dunn Lydia 
Bluck Duncan R Y 
Holmes John F 
Thompson N S 
Bedford Trevor J 
Hui Sai Fun 
Hammond Peter E 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels Mardulyn Raymond P 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Gordon Sidney S 
Marden John L 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Rodrigues Albert 
Kadoorie Michael 
Liang Chong Hou David 
McAulay Ronald J 
Kadoorie Horace 
Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Lau Chan Kwok 
Lee Pak Yiu 
Suen Michael M Y 
Fung Ping Fan Kenneth 
Young Grace T K 
Wu Shu Chih Alex 
Leung Hay Man 
Lau Ting Chung 
Liu Yan Tak 
Leeds Peter F 
Lee Shau Kee 
Kwok Lambert 
Tang Shiu Kin 
Kan Michael Y L 
Shum Wai Yau 
Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering McLeod David D B 
Gledhill David A 
Collins John M 
Miles Henry M P 
King Sing Yui 
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Jones Colin F J 
Booton Joseph S 
Marden John L 
Bluck Duncan R Y 
Spink John D 
Hong Kong Electric Pao Yue Kong 
Tonroe John G 
Li Ka Shing 
Marden John L 
Rigg Nigel A 
Chen Shou Lum 
Hui Sai Fun 
Yee Lup Yuen Ewan 
Bedford Trevor J 
Peacock John 
Newbigging David K 
Hong Kong Land Newbigging David K 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Bedford Trevor J 
Lo Man Wai 
Hui Sai Fun 
McLeod David D B 
Kwok Chin Kung Robert 
Ho George 
Wu Shun Tak 
Hong Kong Realty Lees William J 
Cheung John 
Ying Ming The Michael 
Leung Hon Wah 
Cheung Yok Luen Irene 
Poon Patrick 
Marden John L 
Hsu William H 
Tipper Raymond P 
Hong Kong Telephone Wong F H B 
Bedford Trevor J 
Li Fook Shu 
Blye Douglas W A 
Newbigging David K 
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Ross George R 
Gordon Sidney S 
Wong Bing Lai 
Walker Frederick L 
Kan Michael Y L 
Jardine Matheson Friend Robert V 
McLeod David D B 
Kwok Chin Kung Robert 
Hutt Eric J V 
MacDougall Patrick L 
Moore R E 
Keswick Simon L 
Smith M M 
Downey W J 
Newbigging David K 
Ho George 
Bedford Trevor J 
Jardine Securities Leong Siu Wing Sydney 
Newbigging David K 
Lo Kenneth 
Rodrigues Albert 
MacDougall Patrick L 
Forsgate Hugh M G 
Sibley Nicholas T 
Hutt Eric J V 
Kowloon Motor Bus Yu Shu Chuen 
Woo Pak Chuen 
Louey Lawrence E 
Ng Chiu Kwon 
Lui Fook Hong 
Suen Michael M Y 
Ann Tse Kai 
Lo Yuk Sui 
Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Tang Shiu Kin 
Leeds Peter F 
Miramar Hotel and Investment Yue King Cheong Robert 
Sin Wai Kin David 
Ho Sin Hang 
193 
Cheung W K 
Young Bing Ching Albert 
Young Chi Wan 
Ho Tim 
F u n g Y K 
Lee Quo Wei 
Ho Chew 
Lui Hac Minh 
Tsui M G 
Leung Kau Kui 
Woo Kim Phoe 
Tang Shiu Kin 
New World Development Wu Fung Chi 
Lee Quo Wei 
Young Bing Ching Albert 
Liang Chong Hou David 
Tang Shiu Kin 
Sin Wai Kin David 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Ho Tim 
Cheng Yue Pui 
Kwok Tak Seng 
Young Chi Wan 
Ho Sin Hang 
Cheng Kar Shun Henry 
OOCL Newbigging David K 
Hobson Howard F G 
Tung Chee Hwa 
Ann Tse Kai 
Loh Chia Nien 
Stelux Holdings Ng Chue Meng 
Ng Hung Kiang 
Wong Chong Po 
Chuang Yuan Hsien Madam 
Gazeley Albert E 
Gazeley Supanee 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Law King Wan 
Ho Wing Sun 
Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
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Lee Shau Kee 
Kwok Ping Kwong Thomas 
Young Chi Wan 
Kwok Ping Sheung Walter 
Ho Tim 
Chan Kai Ming 
Woo Po Shing 
Kwan Man Wai 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Fung King Hey 
Kwok Tak Seng 
Woo Seaward 
Lo Chiu Chun Clement 
Swire Pacific Lee Jung Sen 
Yao Kang 
Dunn Lydia 
Lo Tak Shing 
Hammond Peter E 
Gledhill David A 
Miles Henry M P 
Booton Joseph S 
Woo Pak Chuen 
Allmand-Smith T P 
Bluck Duncan R Y 
McElney Brian S 
Tai Cheung Properties Chan Pun David 
Tong Tin Sun 
Woo Chan Sum 
Kwok Lamson 
Chan Sau Ching Ivy 
Wah Kwong Shipping and Investment Chao Sze Bang 
Chu Kang Tsu Samuel 
McLeod David D B 
Ho Sin Hang 
Chen Yu Tsai 
Chao Sze Kwong 
Chao Sze Tsung 
Newbigging David K 
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Lee Quo Wei 
Chao Tsong Yea 
Wheelock Marden Griffiths Peter J 
Brothers Robert J F 
Marden John L 
Leung Hon Wah 
Hewett P W 
Lees William J 
Lee Pei Chung 
Poon Patrick 
Hsu William H 
Ortiz-Patino J 
Wheelock Maritime Lee Pei Chung 
Poon Patrick 
Hussey David A 
Lees William J 
Brothers Robert J F 
Lloyd C B M 
Marden John L 
Leung Hon Wah 
Windsor Industrial Chou Wen Hsien Vincent 
Yen Gee Samuel 
Chang Su Chen 
Hsin Teng Fong 
Ishikawa Kazuo 
Brockman Peter W S C 
Chow Ming Shan 
Tang Hsiang Chien 
On Shu 
Chen Ke Kung 
Ann Tse Kai 
Tang Hung Yuan 
Yu King On 
Chow Chung Kai 
World International Sohmen Helmut 
Marden John L 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
CheukS B 
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Pao Yue Kong 
P a n C L 
Lee Pei Chung 
Li Wen Jen Gonzaga 
Brindle Clive 
2. List of directors in 1986 
Bank of East Asia Li Fook Wo 
Li Fook Shiu 
Li Alan F S 
L o K S 
Wong Chung Hin 
Li Kwok Po David 
LiFook Kuen 
Kan Yuet Fai 
Fung Ping Fan 
Wong Chung Man 
Ho George 
Kan Yuet Hing 
Fung Man Yet 
Cheung Kong Holdings Magnus George 
Chow C W 
Hung Siu Lin Katherine 
Li Ka Shing 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Chow Chin Wo 
Li Chong Yuet Ming 
Leung Siu Hong 
Chow Nin Mow Albert 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
China Light & Power Lo Tak Shing 
Wood Cyril Frederick 
Eagan Jr Robert William 
Wang Yun Cheng 
Kadoorie Michael David 





McAulay Ronald James 
Clancy Michael Joseph 
Dickson Leach 
Kadoorie Lawrence 
Miller Kenneth Andrew 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Ross George Ronald 
Stones William Frederick 
Barrett Dean 
Eastern Asia Navigation Chung Sze Yuen 
Li Wei Jen Gonzaga 
Sohman Helmut 
Marden John Louis 
Chang Bei Ming 
Pao Yue Kong 
Brindle Clive 
Lee Wei Yung William 
Pao Yue Kuo Stephen 
Lee Pei Chung 
Cheuk Siu Bun 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
Green Island Cement Hobson Howard Frederick Gordon 
Wu Shu Chih Alex 
Lau Chin Sung John 
Zang Chon Sheng George 
Li Ka Shing 
Nash Peter Elliott 
Li Fook Wo 
Ross George Ronald 
Magnus George Colin 
Lam Chik Ho 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Grimsdale William Thomas 
Cook Barrie 
Hang Lung Development Chan Tseng His 
Chen Tsang Tao Thomas 
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Chan Chi Chung Ronnie 
Shen His Jui 
Yin Shang Shing 
Hang Seng Bank Ho Tim 
Ho Tak Ching 
Leung Kau Kui 
Ho Tzu Cho David 
Hui Sai Fun 
Wrangham Peter John 
Lee Quo Wei 
Chen Shou Lum 
Munden Roy Victor 
Pao Yue Kong 
Tang Shiu Kin 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Whitson Keith Roderick 
Au Siu Kee Alexander 
Ho Sin Hang 
Lau Chan Kwok 
Gray John Malcolm 
Henderson Land Development Lo Tak Shing 
Lee Tat Man 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Lee Shau Kee 
Leung Sing 
Wan Man Yee 
Lee King Yue 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Lee Ka Kit 
Fung Lee Woon King 
Woo Po Shing 
Leung Hay Man 
Television Broadcast Ann Tse Kai 
Fung Wing Cheung Tony 
Richardson John Alan 
Lee Look Ngan Kwan 
Shawcross Lord 
Shaw Run Run 
Pain John Hugh 
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Lee Jung Sen 
Lo Chung Ping Kevin 
Stirling David Archibald 
Hong Kong Aircraft Enginerring Howat Graham 
Gledhill David Anthony 
Sutch Peter Dennis Anthony 
Bluck Duncan Robert Yorke 
WuShu Chih Alex 
Marden John Louis 
Miles Henry Micheal Pearson 
John Stewart Morris 
Morrison Allister George 
Johansen Peter Andre 
Swain Micheal Bernard 
Hong Kong and China Gas Liu Lit Man 
Li Kwok Po David 
Li Fook Shiu 
Lee Hon Chiu 
MacCallum Ian R A 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Matthews Malcolm 
Lawrence Edward J 
Leung Hay Man 
Hong Kong Telephone Lam Alice 
Kan Yuet Loong Michael 
Chan Kam Chuen 
Wong Hok Bun Francis 
Yaxley John Francis 
Wong Bing Lai 
Olsen Rodney James 
Li Kwok Po David 
BlyeD W A 
Hong Kong & Kowloon Wharf Pao Yue Kong 
Watari Shinichiro B 
Sohman Helmut 
Kadoorie Horace 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
Li Wei Jen Gonzaga 
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McFadzean Ian Findley 
Li Fook Shiu 
Marden John Louis 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Fung Ping Fan Kenneth 
Lee Pak Yiu 
Kwok Lambert 
WuShu Chih Alex 
Young Tsin Kiu Grace 
Leung Hay Man 
Liu Yan Tak 
Lee Shau Kee 
Kan Yuet Loong Michael 
Lau Ting Chung Edmond 
Lau Chan Kwok 
Tang Shiu Kin 
HSBC Sohman Helmut 
Miles Henry Micheal Pearson 
Frame Frank Riddell 
Petrie Alfred R 
Munden Roy Victor 
Archer John 
Dunn Lydia Selina 
Bedford Trevor J 
Norman Sinclair 
Tang Chi Chien Jack 
Duffy Edward W 
Petty John R 
Keswick Simon Lindley 
Purves William 
Sandberg Michael Gradham Ruddock 
Deveson Patrick Charles 
Li Ka Shing 
Farrell Robert C 
Mckee Jr James W 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels Marden John Louis 




McAulay Ronald James 
Mocatta William Elkin 
Kadoorie Michael David 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Rodrigues Albert 
Liang Chou Hou 
Hong Kong Land Ho George 
Howell Price Owen Nigel 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Kwok Chin Kung Robert 
Keswick Simon Lindley 
Davies David John 
Leach Charles Guy Rodney 
Wu Shun Tak 
Hui Sai Fun 
Hong Kong Realty Pan Chia Lu 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
Tipper Raymond P 
Pao Yue Kong 
Lee Pei Chung 
Leung Hon Wah 
Lees William J 
Hutchison Whampoa Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Magnus George Colin 
Shumiak W 
Kadoorie Horace 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Wrangham Peter John 
Ann Tse Kai 
Chow Nin Mow Albert 
Li Fook Wo 
Moller Eric Blechynden 
Murray Simon 
Li Ka Shing 
Vine Peter Alan Lee 
Wong Chung Hin 
Hysan Development MacCallum Ian R A 
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Lee Hon Chiu 
Lee Quo Wei 
Kwok Tak Seng 
Hu Fa Kuang 
Jorgensen Per 
Yeh Meou Tsen Geoffrey 
Kan Fook Yee 
Jebsen Micheal 
Lee Jung Sen 
Lee Wing Kit 
Lee Jung Kong 
Jardine Matheson Sutton Robert Clive 
Michell Rodney Drake 
Keswick Henry 
Collins Peter John 
Brown Jeremy John Galbraith 
Macdougall Patrick Lorn 
Hemes Michael 
Nigel Mervyn S 
Kwok Chin Kung Robert 
Keswick Simon Lindley 
Leach Charles Guy Rodney 
Moore Raymond Edward Rich 
Barrow Martin Gilbert 
Jardine Securities Keswick Simon Lindley 
Leong Siu Wing Sydney 
Forsgate Hugh M G 
Smith Alan H 
Lo Kenneth 
Collins Peter John 
Kwok Chin Kung Robert 
Rodrigues Albert 
Kowloon Motor Bus Tang Shiu Kin 
Kwok Tak Seng 
Ng Siu Chan 
Yu Shu Chuen 
Ann Tse Kai 
Wong Kim Kam Christopher 
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Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Ng Chiu Kwon 
Woo Pak Chuen 
Louey Lawrence E 
Leeds Peter Frederick 
Miramar Hotel and Investment Ho Chew 
Leung Kau Kui 
ChengK O 
Sin Wai Kin David 
Lee Quo Wei 
Tsui Mae Gock 
Tang Shiu Kin 
Yeung P L 
Ho Sin Hang 
Ho Tim 
Yue Robert K C 
Young Bing Ching Albert 
Woo Kim Phoe 
Fung Y B 
Lui Hac Minh 
New World Development Tang Shiu Kin 
Sin Wai Kin David 
Yin Yan 
Cheng Kar Shun Henry 
Yeung P L 
Ho Sin Hang 
Wu Fung Chi 
Ho Tim 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Young Bing Ching Albert 
Liang Chou Hou 
Kwok Tak Seng 
Cheng Yue Pui 
Lee Quo Wei 
Stelux Holdings Mahaguna Supasit 
Wong Chong Po 
Ng Hung Kiang 
Ng Chue Meng 
Chuang Yuan Hsien 
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Gazeley Albert E 
Sophonpanich Chote 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Lo Chiu Chun Clement 
Ho Tim 
Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Kwok Ping Sheung Walter 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Ho Wing Sun 
Chan Kai Ming 
Lee Shau Kee 
Woo Po Shing 
Kwan Man Wai 
Law King Wan 
Kwok Ping Kwong Thomas 
Kwok Tak Seng 
Swire Pacific Swire Adrian 
Gledhill David Anthony 
Allmand Smith 
Timothy Paul 
Lo Tak Shing 
Purves William 
Bluck Duncan Robert Yorke 
Dunn Lydia Selina 
McEleny Brian Shane 
Johansen Peter Andre 
Woo Pak Chuen 
Lee Jung Sen 
Swire John Anthony 
Yao Kang 
Miles Henry Micheal Pearson 
Sutch Peter Dennis Anthony 
Tai Cheung Properties Chan Sau Ching Ivy 
Kwok Chi Leung Karl 
Woo Chan Sum 
Chan Pun David 
Kwan Ying Kit Alan 
Wing On Holdings Kwok Lester 
Kwok Russel 
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Kwok Chi Kuen Philip 
Kwok Chi Leung Karl 
Kwok Man Chung 
Kwok Man Cho 
Tan lock San 
Windsor Industrial Yu King On 
Chow Wai Wai John 
Tang Hsiang Chien 
Chang Su Chen 
Chow Chung Kai 
Tang Hung Yuan 
MacKenzie Kenneth C B 
Ting Hsiun Shih Patrick 
Odake A 
Ann Tse Kai 
Chow Ming Shan 
Chou Wn Hsien 
Wrangham Peter John 
World International Holdings Cheuk Siu Bun 
Lee Wei Yung William 
Sohman Helmut 
Brindle Clive 
Li Wei Jen Gonzaga 
Pao Yue Kuo Stephen 
Pao Yue Kong 
Woo Kwong Ching Peter 
Chang Bei Ming 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lee Pei Chung 
Marden John Louis 
3. List of directors in 1990 
Bank of East Asia Ho George 
Li K P David 
Li Fook WO 
Li Fook Shu 
Fung Ping Fan K 
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Lee Shau Kee 
Wong Chung Hin 
Cathay Pacific Airways Lee Hon Chiu 
Dunn Lydia 
Gledhill D A 
J o h n S M 
Sutch P D A 
Swire Adrian 
Yung C K Larry 
Yao Kang 
Miles H M P 
Selway-Swift Pa 
B l u c k D R Y 
Cavendish International Shumiak William 
Tso Kai Sum 
Shea Ralph Raymond 
Chow Nin Mow A 
Selway-Swift Pa 
Murray Simon 
Leong Siu Wing 
Wong Chung Hin 
Hotung Joseph E 
Yee Lup Yuen E 
Magnus George C 
Cheung Oswald V 
Rigg Nigel Anthony 
Lee Yeh Kwong C 
Fok Kin Ning C 
Cheung Kong Holdings Chow Nin Mow A 
Fok Kin Ning C 
Magnus George C 
Li Ka Shing 
Lee Yeh Kwong C 




Dickson Leach J 
McAulay R J 
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Gordon Sidney 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Cross Harbour Tunnel Woo K C Peter 
Siu Kwing Chue 
Vine P A L 
Lee Ting Chang 
Higginson G A 
Hu Ka Kuang 
Kadoorie Lawrence 
Dairy Farm International Keswick Henry 
Price Owen 
Leach C G R 
Moore R E 
Keswick Simon 
Terry Gregory J 
Rich Nigel M S 
Collins P J 
W u S T 
Kwok R C 
Hang Seng Bank Hui Sai Fun 
Lau Chan Kwok 
Bond J R H 
Selway-Swift Pa 
Ho Sin Hang 
Lee Quo Wei 
Lee Hon Chiu 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Leung Kau Kui 
Ho Tim 
Gray J M 
Harbour Centre Hui Sai Fun 
N g T H Stephen 
Li W J Gonzag 
Watari Shinichi 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Sohmen Helmut 
Henderson Land Lau Yum Chuen E 
Lee Yeh Kwong C 
Lo Tak Shing 
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Leung Hay Man 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lam Ko Yin Coli 
Woo Po Shing 
Lee Ka Kit 
Hong Kong and China Gas Leung Hay Man 
Lee Ka Kit 
Maccallum I R 
Li K P David 
Lam Ko Yin Coli 
Li Fook Shu 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lee Hon Chiu 
HSBC Rich Nigel M S 
Bond J R H 
Li Ka Shing 
Lee Quo Wei 
Lee Hon Chiu 
Dunn Lydia 
Gledhi l lDA 
Sohmen Helmut 
Gray J M 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels Marden J L 
Li K P David 




Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Johansen P A 
Miles H M P 
Marden J L 
Sutch P D A 
Allmand Smith T 
WuShu ChihAlex 
J o h n S M 
Dickson Leach J 
Hong Kong Electric Shea Ralph Raymond 
Rigg Nigel Anthony 
Tso Kai Sum 
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Lee Yeh Kwong C 
Wong Chung Hin 
Magnus George C 
Hotung Joseph E 
Selway-Swift Pa 
Fok Kin Ning C 
Shumiak William 
Leong Siu Wing 
Chow Nin Mow A 
Cheung Oswald V 
Murray Simon 
Sandberg Michael 
Yee Lup Yuen E 
Hong Kong Ferry Fung Ping Fan K 
Lau Chan Kwok 
Wu Shu Chih Alex 
Leung Hay Man 
Lam Ko Yin Coli 
Lau Yum Chuen E 
Lee Shau Kee 
Hong Kong Land Keswick Henry 
Leach C G R 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Price Owen 
Lo Kenneth 
W u S T 
Morrison A G 
Ho George 
Moore R E 
Hui Sai Fun 
Kwok R C 
Keswick Simon 
Rich Nigel M S 
Hong Kong Realty Li W J Gonzag 
Lee P C 
Hong Kong Telecommunication Yung C K Larry 
Li K P David 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Hutchison Whampoa Shumiak William 
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Vine P A L 
Magnus George C 
Lee Yeh Kwong C 
Fok Kin Ning C 
Murray Simon 
Ann Tse Kai 
Wong Chung Hin 
Li Fook Wo 
Selway-Swift Pa 
Chow Nin Mow A 
Kadoorie Horace 
Li Ka Shing 
Hysan Properties Gledhill D A 
Maccallum I R 
Lee Quo Wei 
Hu Ka Kuang 
Lee Ting Chang 
Jardine Matheson Leach C G R 
Rich Nigel M S 
Ho George 
Keswick Henry 
Collins P J 
Moore R E 
Keswick Simon 
Jardine Strategic Rich Nigel M S 
Collins P J 
Leach C G R 
Lee Richard 
Keswick Simon 
Kwok R C 
Keswick Henry 
Moore R E 
Kowloon Motor Bus Siu Kwing Chue 
Kwok Ping Luen 
Ann Tse Kai 
Kwok Ping Sheun 
Mandarin Oriential Keswick Simon 




Morrison A G 
Keswick Henry 
Terry Gregory J 
Kwok R C 
Rich Nigel M S 
Leach C G R 
Moore R E 
Miramar Hotel Sin Wai Kin 
Lee Quo Wei 
Young Bing Ching 
Yeung Ping Leung 
Ho Tim 
Leung Kau Kui 
Ho Sin Hang 
New World Development Yeung Ping Leung 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Sin Wai Kin 
Ho Sin Hang 
Lee Quo Wei 
Young Bing Ching 
Sandberg Michael 
Ho Tim 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Kwok Ping Luen 
Kwok Ping Sheun 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lee Yeh Kwong C 
Woo Po Shing 
Ho Tim 
Swire Pacific Gledhill D A 
Gray J M 
Yao Kang 
Dunn Lydia 
Allmand Smith T 
Miles H M P 
Swire Adrian 
Sutch P D A 
Lo Tak Shing 
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Lee Jung Sen 
Johansen P A 
B l u c k D R Y 
Television Broadcasts Ann Tse Kai 
Lee Jung Sen 
Wharf Li W J Gonzag 
Higginson G A 
Kan Yuet Keung 
Watari Shinichi 
Li Fook Shu 
Woo K C Peter 
Sohmen Helmut 
N g T H Stephen 
Windsor Industrial Ann Tse Kai 
Sandberg Michael 
World International Sohmen Helmut 
Li W J Gonzag 
N g T H Stephen 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Lee P C 
Woo K C Peter 
4. List of directors in 1997 
Amoy Properties Chan Chi Chung Ronnie 
Yin Shang Shing 
All Siu Kee Alexander 
Chen Lok Yee Laura 
Li Hung Kwan Alfred 
Cheng Hon Kwan 
Arculli Ronand Joseph 
Yuen Wai Leung Nelson 
Bank of East Asia Ho George 
Li Kwok Po David 
Li Kwok Sing Aubrey 
Chan Kay Cheung 
Lee Shau Kee 
Li Fook Shum Alan 
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Li Kwok Cheung Arthur 
Wong Chi Yun Allan 
Li Fook Wo 
Wong Chung Hin 
Lee Fook Sean Simon 
Mong Man Wai William 
Pang Yuk Wing Joseph 
Cathay Pacific Airways Heale Simon 
Chen Philip 



















Cheung Kong Holdings Ip Tak Chuen 
Kwok Tun Li 
Leung Siu Hon 
Chow Kun Chee 
Hung Siu Lin 
Li Tzar Kuoi 
Li Ka Shing 
Chung Sun Keung 
Kam Hing Lam 
Murray S 
Sixt Frank J 
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Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Chow Nin Mow Albert 
Yeh Yuen Chang 
Woo Chia Ching 
Pau Yee Wan 
Chow Chin Wo 
Fok Kin Ning 
Magnus George 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Kam Hing Lam 
Sixt Frank J 
Magnus George 
Cheong Ying Chew Henry 
Lee Pui Ling Angelina 
Ip Tak Chuen 
Li Tzar Kuoi 




McAulay R J 
Gordon Sidney 
Miller K A 
Lo Tak Shing 
Reed E L 
Mocatta W E 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Ross G R 
Leach Dickson J S 
Chuang S K 
Fung K William 
China Resources Enterprise Loo Wun Loong John 




Huang Tie Ying 
Ning Gao Ning Frank 
Lau Pak Shing 
Chan Po Fun Peter 
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CITIC Pacific Chang Willie 
Moore Vernon Francis 
Fan H L Henry 
Ho H H Hamilton 
Hamilton Alexander Reid 
Ho H C Norman 
Chau Cham Son 
Chung W S Patrick 
Adams Robert E 
Kuok Khoon Loong 
Loh C H Hansen 
Liu Tai Fung 
Lee C H Peter 
Yung C K Larry 
Fan Y H Philip 
First Pacific Pascua Ricardo S 




Pangilinan Manuel V 
Tang W C David 
Davies David S 
Meyer Robert L 
Risjad Ibrahim 
Salim Anthony 
Tortorici Edward A 
Chan Kwan Yiu Edward 
Sutanto Djuhar 
Great Eagle Holdings Lo Ka Shui 
Lo Ying Sui Archie 
Lo To Lee Kwan 
Lo Hong Sui Antony 
Lo Ying Shek 
Wong Yue Chim Richard 
Lo Hong Sui Vincent 
Kan Tak Kwong 
Law Wai Duen 
Cheng Hoi Chuen Vincent 
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McElney Brian Shane 
Lo Kai Shui 
Guangdong Investment Kwan Steven 
Hui Herbert 
Chen Dazhi 







Au Wai Ming 
Ou Zhushuo 
Woo King Wai 
Sing Xun 
Ho Lam Lai Ping Teresa 
Tang Zhen 
Deng Bei Sheng 
Hou Bojian 
Hang Lung Development Yin Shang Shing 
Li Hung Kwan Alfred 
Arculli Ronand Joseph 
Au Siu Kee Alexander 
Yuen Wai Leung Nelson 
Chan Lok Chung Gerald 
Chan Chi Chung Ronnie 
Chen Lok Yee Laura 
Cheng Hon Kwan 
Ho Sai Leung Wifred 
Hang Seng Bank Langley Chris 
Strickland J E 
Tang Y S Richard 
Cheng Hoi Chuen Vincent 
L o H K 
ChengYT 
Cheng W K Edgar 
Hui Jenkin 
217 
Sin W K David 
Luk K H Roger 
Chan C C John 
All Siu Kee Alexander 
Ho T C David 
Eldon D G 
Ho Tim 
H o S H 
Lee Quo Wei 
L e e H C 
Henderson Investment Woo Po Shing 
Lau Chi Keung 
Lee King Yue 
Wong Wing Lun William 
Lee Tat Man 
Lee Shau Kee 
Ho Wing Fun 
Li Ka Shing 
Li Ning 
Leung Hay Man 
Lee Ka Kit 
Yuen Pak Yiu Philip 
Lam Yum Chuen Eddie 
Yen Ping Sei Stephen 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Kwok Ping Ho Patrick 
Henderson Land Development Lee Shau Kee 
Lee Ka Kit 
Leung Hay Man 
Lee King Yue 
Liang Vincent 
Fung Lee Woon King 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Leung Sing 
Li Ka Shing 
Li Ning 
Wong Wing Lun William 
Woo Po Shing 
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Kwok Ping Ho Patrick 
Lee Tat Man 
Lau Yum Chuen Eddie 
Lee Yeh Kwong Charles 
Lo Tak Shing 
Hong Kong and China Gas Lee Shau Kee 
L i u L M 
Leung Hay Man 
Kwan Yuk Choi James 
Lam C k Y 
Chan R T H 
Chan Wing Kin Alfred 
L i D K P 
L e e K K 
L e e H C 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels Li K P David 
Kadoorie Michael 
Miller-Day James A 
Boppe Pierre R 




McAulay R J 
Leach Dickson J S 
Webster Douglas E 
Mocatta W E 
Hong Kong Electric Yee Lup Yuen Ewan 
Leung Chun Ying 
Li Tzar Kuoi 
Fok Kin Ning 
Li Tzar Kai Richard 
Tso Kai Sum 
Rigg Nigel 
Hotung Joseph 
Kam Hing Lam 
Magnus George 
Wool ley Brian 




Chow Nin Mow Albert 
Shumiak William 
Ko Chan Man 
Hong Kong Telecom Prince David N 
Fan H L Henry 
Cheung W L Linus 
Li K P David 
Grieve Alistair 
Moore Vernon Francis 
Fung K K Victor 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Olsen Rodney J 
Smith N Brian 
Yuen K T Norman 
Solomon Jonathan H M 
Hopwell Holdings Ho Ping Chang Eddie 
Li Tzar Kuoi 
Laing Douglas 
Wu Man Hon James 
Wu Kwok Sau Ping Ivy 
Lee Min Moh Henry 
Elliot Stewart 
Yeung Ka Yan Kevin 
Wu Ying Sheung Gordon 
Loke Lai Chuen Linda 
Nien Van Jin Robert 
Burger Joachim 
Wu Man Guy 
Miao Sai Kit Lawrence 
HSBC Asher B H 
Sohmen H 
Reichardt C E 
Bond J R H 
Connolly D E 
Hotung Joseph 
Mackay C D 
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Smith C Miller 
Dunn Lydia 





K n o x N R 
Newton Wilfrid 
Murofushi M 
Strickland J E 
Gray J G M 
Flint D J 
Hutchison Whampoa Li Tzar Kai Richard 
Kadoorie Michael 
Li Ka Shing 
Murray S 
Langley Chris 
Li Fook Wo 
Chow A N M 
LeeC Y K 
Shumiak William 
Sixt Frank J 
Chow M F Susan 
Vine P A L 
Wong C H 
Lam H L 
Li Tzar Kuoi 
Magnus George 
Fok Kin Ning 
Hysan Development Gledhill David A 
Jebsen Hans M 
Akers-Jones David 
Chan Yan Ming Michael 
Lee Hon Chiu 
Lee Chien 
Lee Quo Wei 
Yeh Meou Tsen Geoffrey 
Jorgensen Per 
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Wong Wah Ling Yu Pauline 
Lee Hsien Pin Anthony 
Lee Tze Hau Michael 
MacCallum Ian R A 
Rudgard Deanna R 丁 Y 
Hu Fa Kuang 
Lee Ting Chang Peter 
New World Development Yeung Ping Leung Howard 
Sin W K David 
Lee Quo Wei 
Sandberg Michael 
Chow Lwai Cheung 
Cheng Kar Shun Henry 
Cha Mou Sing Payson 
Ho Tim 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Cheng Yue Pui 
Liang Chong Hou David 
Cheng Kar Shing Peter 
Leung Chi Kin Stewart 
Chan Kam Ling 
Shangri-La Asia Ho Kian Guan 
Fok Ressel 
Lee Yong Sun 
McMillan Eoghan Murray 
Liu Tai Fung 
Zhu You Lan 
Kuok Chong Heng 
Kuok Khoon Loong 
Ongpin Roberto V 
Bush James Cromwell 
Shun Tak Holdings Lobo Roger 
Chan Anthony 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Ho Hung Sung Stanley 




Ho Chiu Fung Daisy 
Tse Andrew 
Ho Chiu King Pansy 
Hill David 
Kwan Chiu Yin Robert 
Sino Land Yeung Pak Hin Albert 
Cheng Chaun Kwan Michael 
Ng Chee Siong Robert 
Cheng Ming Fun Paul 
Lee Wing Kan Kent 
Yeung Kai Yin 
Arculli Ronand Joseph 
Ow Sing Kau 
South China Morning Post Khoo Kay Peng 
Doo Shek Hoi Daniel 
Li Kwok Po David 
McAulay R J 
Holloway Lindley 
Kuok Hock Nien Robert 
Kuok Khoon Ho 
Bush Paul 
Jonathan Owen 
Ongpin Roberto V 
Cradock Percy 
Kuok Khoon Ean 
Cheah Sin Bee 
Arculli Ronand Joseph 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Ho Wing Sun 
Wong Chik Wing Mike 
Chan Kai Ming 
Kwok Ping Kwong Thomas 
Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Wong Yick Kam Michael 
Law King Wan 
Chan Kui Yuen 
Ho Tim 
Lee Shall Kee 
Kwong Chun 
Kwok Ping Sheung Walter 
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Woo Po Shing 
Lo Chiu Chun Clement 
Swire Pacific Lee Chien 
Swire Adrian 
Kerr K G 
Conybeare H J 
Scott Edward 
Lo Tak Shing 
Miles H M P 
Bluck Duncan 
Eddington Rod 
Sutch Peter D A 
Wong Benjamin 
Hughes-Hallet J W J 
Johansen P A 
Dunn Lydia 
Gray J G M 
Television Broadcasts Kuok Khoon Ho 
Fong Mona 
Lo Chung Ping Kevin 
Li Dak Sum 
Page Louis 
Cater Jack 
Shaw Run Run 
Tse Kai Ann 
Fok Ressel 
Lee Look Ngan Kwan Christina 
Nazzaro Stewart 
Lee Jung Sen 
The Wharf Holdings Woo K C Peter 
Watari Shinichiro B 
Li W J Gonzaga 
Hung T John 
Ng T H Stephen 
Fang Vincent 
Bums Robert H 
Davies David S 
Barett Dean 
Wheelcok and Company Leung K H 
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N g T Y 
ChangB M 
Lee Pei Chung 
N g T H Stephen 
Law Y K Quinn 
Woo K C Peter 
Tse C O Raymond 
Hung T John 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Li W J Gonzaga 
L e e W Y 
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5. List of directors in 2000 
Cheung Kong Holdings Murray Simon 
Woo Chia Ching Grace 
Lwok Tin Li Stanley 
Leung Siu Hon 
Chow Kun Chee Ronald 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Chow Nin Mow Albert 
Pau Yee Wan Ezra 
Sixt Frank John 
Yeh Yuan Chang Anthony 
Ip Tak Chuen Edward 
CLP Holdings Moore V F 
Fung William K 
Harms W A 
Graves G L 
Yung C K Larry 
ChuangS K 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Fan H L Henry 
MuAulay A J K 
Leach J S Dickson 
MuAulay R J 
Lo Tak Shing 
Leigh J A H 
Sayers R E 
Jacob Piers 
Mocatta W E 
Kadoorie Michael 
BischofR 
The Hong Kong and China Gas Chan Tat Hung Ronald 
Leung Hay Man 
Li Kwok Po David 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Liu Kit Man 
Chan Wing Kin Alfred 
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Lee Hon Chiu 
Kwan Yuk Choi James 
The Wharf Holdings Hung T John 
Li W J Gonzaga 
Law Y K Quinn 
Fang Vincent 
Tsui Y C Paul 
Bums Robert H 
N g T Y 
Melrose Ian H 
LeungK H 
Ng T H Stephen 
HSBC Smith C Miller 
Bond J R H 
Sohmen H 
Dunn Lydia 
Connolly D E 
Dalton W R P 
Murofushi M 
Whitson K R 
Fung W K L 
Marshall Colin 
Flint D J 
Bulter Lord 
Reichardt C E 
Newton Wilfred 
Walters Peter 
Chien Kuo Feng 
Strickland J E 
Swire A drain 
Hong Kong Electric Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
Sixt Frank John 
Li Tzar Kai Richard 
Magnus George C 
Yee Lup Yuen Ewan 
Kam Hing Lam 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Wong Chung Hin 
Arculli Ronald J 
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Lee Lan Yee Francis 
Shea Ralph Raymond 
Sandberg Michael C R 
Langley Christopher Patrick 
Tsoi Kai Sum 
Chow M F Susan 
Hong Kong Telecom Olson Rodney 
Grieve Alistair R 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Cheung W L Linus 
Yuen K T Norman 
Seitz Raymond 
Brown Richard H 
Wilson R 
Prince David N 
Fung Kwok King Victor 
Ping Li 
Li Kwok Po David 
Smith Brian 
Lerwill Robert 
Hang Lung Development Chan K C Ronnie 
Ho S L Wilfred 
Yuen W L Nelson 
Au S K Alexander 
Chan L C Gerald 
Y i n S S 
Li H K Alfred 
ChengH K 
Hang Seng Bank Luk K H Roger 
Sin W K David 
Langley Christopher Patrick 
Hui Jenkin 
Ho T C David 
Ho Tim 
L o H K 
Stickland J E 
Cheng Y T 
Lee Hon Chiu 
Lee Quo Wei 
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Cheng H C Vincent 
Eldon D G 
Cheng W K Edgar 
Chan CC John 
Tang Y S Richard 
Henderson Land Development Lee Tat Man 
Lee King Yue 
Lam Yum Chuen Eddie 
Lee Shau Kee 
Kwok Ping Ho Patrick 
Leung Sing 
Lo Tak Shing 
Kan Fook Yee 
Leung Hay Man 
Liang Vincent 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Woo Po Shing 
Yip Ying Chee John 
Lee Ka Hit 
Lee Ka Shing 
Li Ning 
Fung Lee Woon King 
Lee Pui Ling Angelina 
Ho Wing Fun 
Hutchison Whampoa Li Fook Wo 
Li Tzar Kai Richard 
Kadoorie Michael 
Li Ka Shing 
Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Shumiak W 
Langley Christopher Patrick 
Sixt Frank John 
Magnus George C 
Chow M F Susan 
Kam Hing Lam 
Murray Simon 
Wong Chung Hin 
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Vine P A L 
Hysan Development Lee Hon Chiu 
Yu Wong Wah Ling Pauline 
Lee Ting Chang Peter 
Akers-Jones David 
Lee Quo Wei 
MacCallum Anderson 
Chan Yan Ming Michael 
Yeh Meou Tsen Geoffrey 
Lee Tze Hau Michael 
Robert Ian 
Lee Hsien Pin 
Gledhill David Anthony 
Jorgensen Per 
Jebsen Michael 
Lee Chien Anthony 
Hu Fa Kuang 
Rudgard Deanna Ruth Tak Yung 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Law King Wan Clement 
Chan Kui Yuen 
Chan Kai Ming 
Wong Yick Kam Michael 
Woo Po Shing 
Wong Chik Wing Mike 
Kwok Ping Sheung Walter 
Ho Tim 
Kwok Ping Kwong Thomas 
Lo Chiu Chun 
Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Ho Wing Sun 
Chun Kwong Thomas 
Lee Shau Kee 
New World Development Liang Chong Hou David 
Leung Chi Kin Stewart 
Chow Kwai Cheung 
Lee Quo Wei 
Cheng Kar Chun 
Yeung Ping Leung Howard 
Sin W K David 
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Chan Kam Ling 
Ho Tim 
Cheng Kar Shing Peter 
Sandberg Michael C R 
Cha Mou Sing Payson 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Cheng Yue Pui 
Swire Pacific Ho D 
Swire Adrain 
Tumbill D M 
Lo Tak Shing 
Bell M J 
Miles H M P 
Conybeare H J 
Kerr K G 
Lee Chien Anthony 
Scott E J R 
Eldon D G 
Dunn Lydia 
Hughes-Hallett J W J 
Cubbon M 
Wheelock and Company Lee W W Y 
Hung T John 
Chung Sze Yuen 
N g T Y 
Law Y K Quinn 
Li W J Gonzaga 
Lee P C 
N g T H Stephen 
Leung K H 
Chang B M 
Tse R C O 
Bank of East Asia George Ho 
Li Kwok Cheung Arthur 
Li Kwok Po David 
Li Kwok Sing Aurbrey 
Mong Man Wai William 
Li Fook Sum Alan 
Wong Chung Hin 
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Chan Kay Cheung 
Li Fook Wo 
Pang Yuk Wing Joseph 
Fung Ping Fan Kenneth 
Li Fook Sean Simon 
Wong Allan 
Lee Shau Kee 
Sino Land Lee Wing Kan Kent 
Tong Kwok Tung raymond 
Lee Chi Hong Robert 
Ow Sing Kan 
Ng Chee Siong Robert 
Yeung Pak Hin Albert 
Arculli Ronald J 
Cheng Ming Fun Paul 
Henderson Investment Lee Shau Kee 
Lee King Yue 
Kwok Ping Ho Patrick 
Yuen Pak Yiu Philip 
Lee Ka Shing 
Lee Ka Kit 
Ho Wing Fun 
Li Ning 
Leung Hay Man 
Lee Tat Man 
Lau Yum Chuen Eddie 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Woo Po Shing 
Wong Ho Ming Augustine 
Lau Chi Keung 
Cheung Ping Keung Donald 
Suen Kwok Lam 
Amoy Properties Au S K Alexander 
Yuen W L Nelson 
Cheng H K 
Chan K C Ronnie 
Arculli Ronald J 
Li H K Alfred 
Y i n S S 
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Johnson Electric Conn Ian L P 
Wrangham Peter John 
Wang Shui Chung Patrick 
Wang Kin Chung Peter 
Li Fook Wo 
Wang Li Chung Richard 
Gaims David Wylie 
Edwards Peter S A 
Wang Wing Yee Winnie 
Wang Koo Yik Chun 
CITIC Pacific Desmarais Andre 
Lee Chung Hing Peter 
Fan H L Henry 
Ho Hau Hay Hamilton 
Hamilton Alexander Reid 
Ho Hau Chong Norman 
Moore V F 
Adams Robert Ernest 
Mak Shair On Peter 
Yung C K Larry 
Chung W S Patrick 
Chang Willie 
Chau Cham Son 
Loh Chung Hon Hassen 
China Resources Enterprise Yan Biao 
Jiang Wei 
Ning Gao Ning 
Zhu Youlan 
Lau Pak Shing 
Keung Chi Wang 
Houang Tai Ninh 
Huang Tie Ying 
Loo Wun Loong 
Chan Po Fun 
Cathay Pacific Airways Tsai Patrick 
Yung Carl 
Moore V F 




Langley Christopher Patrick 
Zhu Youjun 
Lee Hon Chiu 
Swire Adrain 
Sutch Peter 










Tumbill D M 
Shanghai Industrial Holdings Woo Chia Wei 
Wen Song Quan 
Zhuo Fu Min 
Cao Fu Kang 
Chen Jin Bang 
Zhu Shi Xiong 
YuLi 
Leung Pak To Francis 
Ge Wen Yao 
Lee Quo Wei 
Lu Da Yong 
Cao Fu Kang 
Cai Lai Xing 
Chen Wei Chu 
Huang Yan Zheng 
Lo Ka Chui 
Li Wei Da 
Li and Fung Hayward Anthony 
Selway-Swift Paul Edward 
Chung Po Yang 
Chan Henry 
Fung Kwok Lun William 
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Lau Butt Fam 
Lau Sai Wing Danny 
Fung Kwok King Victor 
Small Steven Murray 
Television Broadcasts Page Louise 
Lee Look Ngan Kwan Christina 
Cater Jack 
Lo Chun Ping Kevin 
Chow Wei Ching 
Li Dak Sum 
Fong Mona 
Shaw Run Run 
Lee Chien Anthony 







Yu Chor Tsang Patrick 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Cheong Ying Chew Henry 
Kam Hing Lam 
Magnus George C 
Ip Tak Chuen Edward 
Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
Tsoi Kai Sum 
Lee Pui Ling Angelina 
Sixt Frank John 
Chow M F Susan 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Dao Heng Bank Wilkinson Harry Richard 
Kwek Leng San 
Cater Jack 
Tung His Hui Frank 
Khattar Sat Pal 
Al Masad Mishal A A 
Sullivan Randolph Gordon 
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Kuek Leng Chan 
Lwek Leng Hai 
Smartone Telecommunications Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Stanton John William 
Liu Guang Qian 
Chan Kai Lung Patrick 
Ng Ching Wah Hubert 
Li Ha Cheung Eric 
Nordstrom Bror B V 
Tsim Tak Po Paul 
Hamilton Mark Robert 
Horwitz Bradley Jay 
Ng Leung Sing 
Ho George 






Li Kwok Cheung Arthur 
Li Zhenqun 
Leung Kam Chung Antony 
Yuan Jianguo 
Ding Donghua 
First Pacific Risjad Ibrahim 
Eastlake David G 
Tang W C David 
Djuhar Tedy 
Tortotici Edward A 
Brown Ronald A 
Salim Anthoni 
Chen K Y Edward 
Pangilinan Manuel V 
Healy Michael J A 
Djuhar Sutanto 
Pascua Ricardo S 
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6. List of directors in 2004 
Cheung Kong Holdings Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
Li Ka Shing 
Ip Tak Chuen Edmond 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Hung Siu Lin Katherine 
Murray Simon 
Kwan Chill Yin Robert 
Cheong Ying Chew Henry 
Kam Hing Lam 
Leung Siu Hon 
Wong Yick Ming Rosanna 
Chiu Kwok Hung Justin 
Chow Fun Chee Roland 
Chow Nin Mow Albert 
Sixt Frank John 
Woo Chia Ching Grace 
Pau Yee Wan Ezra 
Magnus George Colin 
Kwok Tun Li Stanley 
Yeh Yuan Chang Anthony 
Chung Sun Keung Davy 
CLP Holdings Kan M I Paul 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Kadoorie Michael 
Tan P C 
Leigh J A H 
Loh C H Hansen 
MuAulay R J 
Tse P W Peter 
BischofR 
L e e Y B 
Brandler Andrew 
Moore V F 
Mocatta W E 
Fung K William 
Dickson Leach J S 
Greenwood Peter W 
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Boyce I D 
Hong Kong and China Gas Liu Kit Man 
Lee Ka Shing 
Kwan Yuk Choi James 
Lee Shau Kee 
Leung Hay Man 
Li Kwok Po David 
Lee Hon Chiu 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Lee Ka Kit 
Chan Wing Kin Alfred 
Chan Tat Hung Ronald 
Wharf Holdings N g T H Stephen 
Chen K Y Edward 
Christensen Erik B 
Jebsen Hans Michael 
Lee Y F Doreen 
Li W J Gonzaga 
Law Y K Quinn 
Chien K F Raymond 
Langley Christopher P 
Woo K C Peter 
Chan M P Paul 
N g T Y 
Thompson James E 
Fang K Vincent 
HSBC Bulter Lord 
Chien K F Raymond 
Dunn Lydia 
Fairhead R A 
Studzinski J J 
Gulliver S T 
Geoghegan M F 
Kemp-Welch John 
Green S K 
Hintze S 
Sohmen H 
Filippi C H 
Fung W K L 
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Hughes-Hallett J W J 
Williamson Brian 
Coombe J D 
Moffat Brian 
Eldon D G 
Bond John 
Newton S W 
N a s r Y A 
Taylor C S 
JebsonA W 
Moody-Stuart Mark 
Flint D J 
Aldinger W F 
Hong Kong Electric Wong Chung Hin 
Shea Ralph Raymond 
Sixt Frank John 
Arculli Ronald Joseph 
Kluge Holger 
Magnus George Colin 
Tso Kai Sum 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Lee Lan Yee Francis 
Hunter Andrew J 
Kam Hing Lam 
Yee Lup Yuen Ewan 
Chow M F Susan 
Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
PCCW Allen Peter Anthony 
Yuen Tin Fan Francis 
So Chak Kwong Jack 
Lobo Roger 
Metha Aman 
Li Kwok Po David 
Chang Hsin Kang 
Li Tzar Kai Richard 
Chung Cho Yee Mico 
Arena Alexander Anthony 
Lee Chi Hong Robert 
Seitz Raymond G H 
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Fung Kwok King Victor 
Ford David 
Hang Seng Bank Lee Ting Chang Peter 
Tang Yat Sun Richard 
Sin Wai Kin David 
Li Ka Cheung Eric 
Cheng Yu Tung 
Poon Chung Yin Joseph 
Mok Wai Kin 
Lo Hong Sui Vincent 
Or Ching Fai Raymond 
Hui Jenkin 
Cheung Kin Tung Marvin 
Chan Cho Chak John 
Cheng Hoi Chuen Vincent 
Glass Simon Jeremy 
Eldon D G 
Henderson Land Fung Lee Woon King 
Leung Sing 
Woo Po Shing 
Yip Ying Chee John 
Kwok Ping Ho Patrick 
Leung Hay Man 
Lee King Yue 
Lee Ka Shing 
Lee Ka Kit 
Lee Tat Man 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lee Pui Ling Angelina 
Ho Wing Fun 
Suen Kwok Lam 
Kwong Che Keung Gordon 
Liang Vincent 
Li Ning 
Lam Yum Chuen Eddie 
Kan Fook Yee 
Lo Tak Shing 
Woo Ka Bill Jackson 
240 
WuShu Chih Alex 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Hutchison Whampoa Lai Kai Ming Dominic 
Or Ching Fai Raymond 
Mocatta W E 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
Vine Peter Alan Lee 
Chow M F Susan 
Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
Wong Chung Hin 
Kadoorie Michael 
Shumiak William 
Magnus George Colin 
Li Ka Shing 
Sixt Frank John 
Kluge Holger 
Murray Simon 
Kam Hing Lam 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Woo Ka Biu Jackson 
Lo Chiu Chun Clement 
Wong Yick Kam Michael 
Wong Chik Wing Mike 
Kwok Ping Kwong Thomas 
Woo Po Shing 
Kwok Ping Luen Raymond 
Kwok Ping Sheung Walter 
Kwong Chun 
Kwan Cheuk Yin William 
Chan Kai Ming 
Law King Wan 
Chung Sze Yuen 
Fung Kwok King Victor 
Lee Shau Kee 
Yip Dicky Peter 
Chan Kui Yuen Thomas 
Swire Pacific Ho Cho Ying Davy 
Lee Chien 
Kerr Keith Graham 
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Johansen Peter Andre 
Yang Mun Tak Majorie 
Tumbull David Muir 
Kwok King Man Clement 
Dunn Lydia 
Swire Adrian 
Sze Cho Cheung Michael 
Eldon D G 
Hughes-Hallett J W J 
Cubbon Martin 
Wheelock and Company Woo K C Peter 
Chang B M 
Tsui Y C Paul 
Ng T H Stephen 
Tumbull David Muir 
Au S K Alexander 
Li W J Gonzaga 
Lawrence David J 
MTR Lo Chung Hing 
Stevenson T Brian 
Turk Leonard Bryan 
Ho Hang Kwong Thomas 
Chow Chung Kong 
Leong Kwok Kuen Lincoln 
Chien K F Raymond 
Chan Fu Keung William 
Fang Meng Seng Christine 
Black Russell John 
Cheung Yau Kai 
Gaffney Philip 
Ho Sing Tin Edward 
Bank of East Asia Li Tzar Kai Richard 
Mong Man Wai William 
Pang Yuk Wing Joseph 
Li Kwok Sing Aubrey 
Khoo Kay Peng 
Chan Kay Cheung 
Wong Chung Hin 
Lo Yau Lai Winston 
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Wong Chi Yun Allan 
Kwok Ping Kwong Thomas 
Li Fook Sean Simon 
Tan Man Kou 
Lee Shau Kee 
Li Fook Wo 
Li Kwok Po David 
Henderson Investment Kwong Che Keung Gordon 
Suen Kwok Lam 
Lee Ka Kit 
Woo Ka Bill Jackson 
Sit Pak Wing 
Lam Ko Yin Colin 
Lee King Yue 
Lau Chi Keung 
Lee Shau Kee 
Lau Yum Chuen Eddie 
Li Ning 
Lee Ka Shing 
Leung Hay Man 
Cheung Ping Keung Donald 
Kwok Ping Ho Patrick 
Wong Ho Ming Augustine 
Yuen Pak Yiu Philip 
Lee Tat Man 
Woo Po Shing 
WuShu Chih Alex 
Ho Wing Fun 
Hang Lung Properties Liu Pak Wai 
Ng Sze Yuen Terry 
Yuen Wai Leung Nelson 
Chan Chi Chung Ronnie 
Arculli Ronald Joseph 
Ho Sai Leung Wilfred 
Yin Shang Shing 
Cheng Hon Kwan 
Chen Lok Yee Laura 
China Merchants Tsang Kam Lan 
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Zhao Huxiang 
Lee Yip Wah Peter 
Meng Xi 
Fu Yuning 
Kut Ying Hay 
Li Yinquan 
To Wing Sing 
Li Yi 
Hu Zheng 
Li Kwok Heem John 
Yu Liming 
Johnson Electric Wang Shui Chung Patrick 
Wang Koo Yik Chun 
Wang Kin Chung Peter 
Enright Michael John 
Kuhlmann Arkadi 
Wang Wing Yee Winnie 
Edwards Peter S A 
Paul Patrick Blackwell 
Neto Oscar D P B 
Wang Li Chung Richard 
Wrangham Peter John 






Cheung Doi Shu 
Ding Baoshan 
Zhang Fangyou 
CITIC Pacific Yuen Kee Tong Norman 
Lee Chung Hing 
Li Shilin 
Yao Jinrong 
Hamilton Alexander Reid 
Moore V F 
Yung Chi Kin Larry 
Yung Ming Jie Carl 
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Ho Hau Cong Norman 
Fan Hung Ling Henry 
Chang Zhenming 
Loh Chung Hon Hansen 





China Resources Enterprise Keung Chi Wang Ralph 
Lau Pak Shing 









Kwong Man Him 
Zhong Yi 
Li Ka Cheung Eric 
Cathay Pacific Airways Zhang Xianlin 
Tumbull David Muir 
Swire Adrian 
Yuen Lik Hang Raymond 
Cridland Derek George 
So Chak Kwong Jack 
Chen Nan Lok Philip 
Lee Ting Chang Peter 
Cubbon Martin 
Or Ching Fai Raymond 
Yung Ming Jie Carl 
Fan Hung Ling Henry 
Atkinson Robert M J 
Hughes-Hallett J W J 
Moore V F 
Tyler Antony Nigel 
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Tung Chee Chen 
Esprit Holdings Griffith Jerome Squire 
Ying Lee Yuen Michael 
Hamilton Alexander Reid 
Poon Cho Ming John 
Lai Sau Cheong Simon 
Friedrich Jurgen A R 
Krogner-Komalik Heinz Jurgen 
Grote Thomas Johannes 
Or Ching Fai Raymond 
Cheng Ming Fun Paul 
Li and Fung Yasuda Makoto 
Fung Kwok King Victor 
Small Steven Murray 
Lau Sai Wing Danny 
Lau Butt Fam 
Wong Chi Yun Allan 
Haugen Thomas Morton 
Boyd Leslie 
McFarlan Franklin Warren 
Rockowitz Bruce Philip 
Leung Wai Ping Annabella 
Fung Kwok Lun William 
Chan Henry 
Selway-Swift Paul Edward 
Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings Choi Kwok Keung 
Tsai N F David 
Tsai Chi Neng 
Poon Yiu Kin Samuel 
Lu Chin Chu 
Shih Hung 
So Kwan Lok 
Li I Nan Steve 
Sy J D John 
Ku Y Edward 
Kuo Tai Yu 
Tsai Pei Chun Patty 
Chan Lu Min 
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Kung Sung Yen 
China Unicom Judson C James 
Chang Xiaobing 
McCaw Craig D 
Cheung Wing Lam Linus 













Courtis Kenneth S 
Fu Chengyu 
Chiu Sung Hong 
China Mobile Lo Ka Shui 
Cheng Mo Chi Moses 
Wong Kwong Shing Frank 
Xu Long 









Cheung Kong Infrastructure Cook Barrie 
Lee Pui Ling Angelina 
Cheong Ying Chew Henry 
Fok Kin Ning Canning 
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Sixt Frank John 
Chow M F Susan 
SNG Sow Mei 
Kwan Bing Sing Eric 
Kam Hing Lam 
Kwok Eva Lee 
Lan Hong Tsung David 
Li Tzar Kuoi Victor 
Ip Tak Chuen Edmond 
Tso Kai Sum 
Magnus George Colin 
Russel Colin Stevens 
















Wong Tin Yau Kelvin 
Li Kwok Po David 
Hamilton Alexander Reid 
Li Yunpeng 
Liu Kit Man 
Ma Zehua 





Yang Linda Tsao 
Sun Changji 





Lenovo Group Shan Weijian 
Zhu Linan 
Ting Lee Sen 
Wong Wai Ming 
Ma Xuezheng 
Carroll Daniel A 
Chang T Justin 
Coulter James G 
Yang Yuanqing 
Woo Chia Wei 
Feng Vince 
Grabe William O 
Liu Chuanzhi 
Ward Stephen M 
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